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The usual instruments of humanitarian military intervention are the regular armed forces 
of a state, or a group of states, but even when gross crimes such as genocide are 
committed and an intervention becomes morally obligatory, states are reluctant to risk the 
lives of their own soldiers. This moral tension is at the root of the international 
community’s failure to act in most cases. However, for states to fulfill the duty to prevent 
crimes against humanity, and at the same time protect their soldiers in the interests of 
national defense, a third party could be employed. In this thesis, the case will be made 
that the use of private military companies (PMCs) for humanitarian intervention is 
morally preferable to the employment of a state’s armed forces. To serve as a moral 
guideline for the concept, a theory of ethically justifiable private intervention has been 
formulated based on elements of Just War Theory and James Pattison’s Moderate 
Instrumentalist Approach to humanitarian intervention. Three case studies are analyzed to 
conclude that, under certain conditions, humanitarian intervention conducted by PMCs is 
a morally permissible option. 
 vi 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................8 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE .................................................................................9 
C. DEFINITIONS ...............................................................................................10 
D. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................15 
1. Case Study Selection ..........................................................................16 
2. Congruence Procedure ......................................................................17 
3. Counterfactuals ..................................................................................17 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS ..........................................................19 
II. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ....................................................................21 
A. WHEN TO INTERVENE .............................................................................23 
B. THE DUTY TO INTERVENE .....................................................................26 
C. WHO SHOULD INTERVENE .....................................................................28 
III. ROLE OBLIGATIONS: THE STATE AND THE SOLDIER ..............................37 
IV. FROM MERCENARY TO PEACEKEEPER: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
PMC ............................................................................................................................41 
A. MERCENARIES OF THE PAST ................................................................42 
1. Golden Age Mercenaries ...................................................................42 
2. The New Mercenaries ........................................................................47 
B. THE NEW CORPORATE WARRIORS ....................................................49 
1. Accountability ....................................................................................53 
2. Profiteering .........................................................................................55 
3. Providing “Violent Services” ............................................................57 
4. Can Private Warriors Be Ethical, Then? ........................................58 
C. PMCS AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ..................................58 
V. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...........................................................................61 
A. SOME CRITERIA FOR ETHICALLY JUSTIFIED PRIVATE 
INTERVENTION: JUST WAR THEORY AND PATTISON’S 
MODERATE INSTRUMENTALIST APPROACH ..................................63 
1. Jus Ad Bellum ....................................................................................67 
a. Right Authority: Local External Effectiveness ......................68 
b. Just Cause: Proof of Atrocity .................................................70 
c. Right Intention ........................................................................70 
2. Jus In Bello .........................................................................................72 
a. Discrimination .........................................................................72 
b. Proportionality ........................................................................73 
c. Internal Jus In Bello ...............................................................73 
3. Jus Post Bellum: Just Transfer of Authority ..................................74 
B. A THEORY OF ETHICALLY JUSTIFIED PRIVATE 
INTERVENTION ..........................................................................................75 
 viii 
VI. CASE STUDIES .........................................................................................................77 
A. THE NEW CORPORATE WARRIORS: EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES 
IN SIERRA LEONE ......................................................................................79 
1. Background ........................................................................................80 
2. Sierra Leone: A Theory of Ethically Justified Private 
Intervention ........................................................................................85 
a. Right Authority ........................................................................86 
b. Just Cause ...............................................................................87 
c. Right Intention ........................................................................87 
d. Discrimination .........................................................................89 
e. Proportionality ........................................................................91 
f. Internal Jus In Bello ...............................................................92 
g. Just Transfer of Authority ......................................................93 
3. Assessment ..........................................................................................95 
B. THE LAND OF THE UNEXPECTED: PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND 
THE SANDLINE AFFAIR ...........................................................................97 
1. Background ........................................................................................98 
2. Bougainville: A Theory of Ethical Private Intervention ..............104 
a. Right Authority ......................................................................106 
b. Just Cause .............................................................................107 
c. Right Intention ......................................................................108 
d. Discrimination .......................................................................109 
e. Proportionality ......................................................................109 
f. Internal Jus In Bello .............................................................110 
g. Just Transfer of Authority ....................................................111 
3. Assessment ........................................................................................111 
4. Postscript: Harry Baxter, Concerned Citizen of the World ........112 
C. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ON THE EXTERMINATIONS IN 
RWANDA .....................................................................................................113 
1. Background ......................................................................................115 
2. Rwanda: A Theory of Ethically Justified Private Intervention...119 
a. Right Authority ......................................................................120 
b. Just Cause .............................................................................123 
c. Right Intention ......................................................................124 
d. Discrimination .......................................................................124 
e. Proportionality ......................................................................125 
f. Internal Jus In Bello .............................................................125 
g. Just Transfer of Authority ....................................................126 
3. Assessment ........................................................................................126 
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .......................................................................128 
VII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................131 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................133 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................143 
 
 ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Ficarrotta’s amalgamation of Just War Theory criteria ...................................64 
Table 2. Summary of the criteria that make up the theory of ethically justified 
private intervention ..........................................................................................76 
Table 3. Summary of the cases being studied. ...............................................................78 
Table 4. Summary of findings, Sierra Leone case study. ..............................................96 
Table 5. Summary of findings, Bougainville case study .............................................112 
Table 6. Summary of findings, Rwanda genocide thought experiment .......................127 
Table 7. Consolidated summary of findings ................................................................129 
Table 8. The refined theory of ethically justified private intervention ........................132 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ABC  Australian Broadcasting Commission 
APC  All People’s Congress 
AU  African Union 
BBC  British Broadcasting Commission 
BCL  Bougainville Copper Limited  
BIG  Bougainville Interim Government  
BRA  Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
DDE  Doctrine of Double Effect 
DoD Department of Defense 
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo 
EO Executive Outcomes 
EU European Union 
FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises  
FNLA  Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola  
GSG  Ghurka Security Guards  
ICISS  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDP  Internally Displaced Persons 
IHL  International Humanitarian Law 
INGO  International Non-governmental Organization  
ISOA  International Stability Operations Association 
ITAR  International Traffic in Arms Regulation 
JWT Just War Theory 
MPLA  Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola   
MPRI Military Professional Resources, Incorporated 
MRND  Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
NPRC  National Provisional Ruling Council 
OAU  Organization of African Unity  
OBE  Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire  
 xii 
PARMEHUTU  Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation des Bahutu  
PLA  Panguna Landowners Association 
PMC  Private Military Company 
PMSC  Private Military and Security Company 
PNG  Papua New Guinea  
PNGDF  Papua New Guinea Defense Force 
PSC  Private Security Company 
PSYOP  Psychological Operations  
R2P Responsibility to Protect 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
RPF  Rwandan Patriotic Front  
RPNGC  Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary  
RTLM  Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines  
RUF  Revolutionary United Front  
SADF  South African Defense Forces  
SAS  Special Air Service  
SFU  Special Forces Unit 
SHIRBRIG  Multinational Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United 
Nations Operations 
SLA  Sierra Leone Army 
SLCU  Sierra Leone Commando Unit  
TNC Trans-national Corporations 
UN United Nations 
UNAMID  United Nations Assistance Mission for Darfur 
UNAMIR  United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
UNAMSIL  United Nations Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone 
UNAR  Union Nationale Rwandaise  
UNEPS  United Nations Emergency Peace Service  
UNHRC  United Nations Human Rights Commission 
UNITAF Unified Task Force 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force  
UNSAS  United Nations Standby Arrangements System 
 xiii 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
  
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Many thanks to Dr. Bradley J. Strawser for his guidance and support while this 
thesis unfolded. His encouragement and confidence was a huge help in making this thing 
happen. I would also like to thank Marcus Hedahl and Sean Dansberger for their input 
very early on in the project, Dr. Gordon McCormick for taking the time out of his hectic 
schedule to review my work, and James Pattison for his commentary on my ideas. Harry 
Baxter deserves recognition as well for being one of those people that I was sure existed 
somewhere. He personifies that “concerned citizen of the world” that I envisioned at the 
beginning of this thesis. Of course, my most humble thanks are reserved for my cherished 
family; my wife, Jade-Lin, and baby daughter Stella for their encouragement and 
understanding while I wrote this. 
 xvi 




In 1994, hundreds of thousands of people were brutally murdered in Rwanda; 
men and women, young and old—Tutsis and moderate Hutus viciously bludgeoned or 
hacked to death by extremist Hutus with cheap clubs, farm tools, or machetes. The 
international community watched the genocide with full knowledge of the events as they 
took place and did virtually nothing about it. In fact, representatives of numerous 
countries ignored the killing even though they “were stumbling on corpses” while 
evacuating their expatriates.1 Not only was the killing allowed to continue unabated, it 
has also been speculated that the world’s collective inaction served to embolden the 
murderers, enabling the genocide’s spread throughout the country until the number of 
deaths reached nearly one million.
2
  
General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission 
for Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops during the genocide, is to this day convinced that he could 
have stopped the slaughter had he been given the means.
3
 With no standing army, 
however, the United Nations (UN) is dependent on member states’ willingness to send 
their own troops into harm’s way, and as a result, inadequate international support 
enabled the killing to continue. Dallaire did everything he could within his power, 
including requesting electronic warfare assets to jam Hutu radio transmissions that were 
promoting the genocide, but most of his appeals for troops, additional assets, or a revised 
mandate were ignored, denied, or passively resisted. Finally, as the death toll neared a 
half million, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized Resolution 918 to 
create UNAMIR 2, which authorized a change in the UN mandate to that of a 
humanitarian force, and a rapid deployment of new troops. Dallaire’s initial UNAMIR 2 
                                                 
1 Romeo Dallaire quoted in United Nations’ “Memorial Conference on Rwanda Genocide Considers 
Ways to Ensure More Effective International Response in Future: Secretary-General Says Silence In Face 
of Past Genocide Must Be Replaced with ‘Global Clamour,’ “ press release AFR/868, HQ/630, 26 March 
2004, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/afr868.doc.htm.  
2 Alison Des Forges, “Alas, We Knew,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (May 2000): 141. 
3 Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (New York: 
Carrol and Graf Publishers, 2003), 374. 
 2 
plan for 5,500 troops was never realized, however, because member states continued to 
refuse support.4 Even a request to the 19 states taking part in the United Nations Standby 
Arrangements System (UNSAS) resulted in no contribution of forces.5 The world’s most 
powerful nations simply did not deliver during one of mankind’s greatest moments of 
need. Years later, Kofi Annan, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations at the time, said that 
The international community had failed Rwanda, which must always leave 
it with a sense of bitter regret and abiding sorrow. If the international 
community had acted promptly, it could have stopped most of the killing. 
But neither the political will nor the troops had been there. If the United 
Nations, government officials and the international media had paid more 
attention to the gathering signs of disaster, it might have been 
averted…the international community was guilty of sins of omission.6 
There were other sins, however. To avoid taking action in Rwanda, officials from 
all over the world, including the Clinton administration, quibbled over the use of the term 
“genocide” in reference to the atrocities taking place, ostensibly to avoid the moral 
obligation to intervene.7 The U.S. government’s bureaucracy could be blamed for many 
deaths as the crisis in Rwanda was relegated to low-level officials who were unable to 
promote a meaningful response to the killings without the support of more senior 
officials. Once all American citizens had been satisfactorily evacuated though, officials in 
the White House, Pentagon, and the State Department lost interest in Rwanda.8 When 
General Dallaire requested one hundred armored personnel carriers (APCs) to facilitate 
the employment of the UNAMIR 2 force he anticipated, the U.S. government offered 
fifty. After much haggling and multiple payments of millions of dollars, “tons of rusting 
                                                 
4 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 374–375. 
5 Malcolm Hugh Patterson, Privatising Peace: A Corporate Adjunct to United Nations Peacekeeping 
and Humanitarian Operations (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 17. 
6 “Memorial Conference on Rwanda Genocide.,” paragraphs 15-16. 
7 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 374; Jared Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence: America and 
the Rwanda Genocide (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 132; Alison Des Forges, Leave None 
to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 595; Dore Gold, Tower of 
Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos (New York: Crown Forum, 2004), 146–147. 
8 Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence, 95–96; Dallaire acknowledges that some U.S .senators did 
lobby in favor of an expanded humanitarian mission in Rwanda (Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 372 
n1). 
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metal,” in the form of fifty stripped-down APCs were delivered to Uganda, with no 
trained drivers or method of transport to Rwanda, making them effectively useless. 
Likewise, the British provided antiquated trucks that almost immediately broke down.9 
The UN had a hand in delaying action as well, by denying Dallaire’s requests for assets 
to counter the malicious Hutu information campaign or to secure arms caches and 
confiscate illegally acquired weapons from the civilian population, anything to slow or 
stop the killing.10  
There were proponents of action, however. At some point it was suggested that a 
Private Military Company (PMC) be hired to create safe havens in Rwanda to protect 
refugees from the genocide.11 In fact, the chief of a prominent PMC at the time, 
Executive Outcomes (EO), claims to have been contacted by a UN representative early in 
the crisis for a quote and to see whether EO could handle the job. Within 24 hours, the 
company responded with a four-phase plan to stabilize the situation and set conditions for 
a handover to the UN. The plan called for a six-month operation with a force of 1500 
men, with air and fire support.12 Kofi Annan considered the option but it was rejected 
when the subject of who would pay the $100 million bill came up.13 Later, Annan said 
that “the world may not be ready to privatize peace.”14  
Despite the shock and horror that followed Rwanda, and repeated pledges of 
“never again,” the scene repeated itself on a smaller scale the very next year, in 1995, at 
Srebrenica in the former Yugoslavia, where more than 7,500 Bosnian Muslims were 
massacred in a UN safe area.15 Similar stories have occurred, or are occurring, in Sudan, 
Darfur, and Eastern Congo—yet the international community has continually failed to 
                                                 
9 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 375–376. 
10 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 167; the denial was signed by Kofi Annan. 
11 P. W. Singer, “Peacekeepers, Inc.,” Policy Review 119 (June 2003): 65. 
12 Eeben Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds (Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 2007), 441. 
13 Barlow puts the figure at U.S.$100 million for a six month operation (Barlow, Executive Outcomes, 
441), compared to the U.S.$3 million the UN mission cost per day (Singer, “Peacekeepers, Inc.,” 65). 
14 Jan Grofe, “Human Rights and Private Military Companies: A Double-Edged Sword too Dangerous 
to Use?” in Private Military And Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, ed. 
Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel (Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 258. 
15 “Netherlands and UN Blamed over Srebrenica Massacre,” Guardian, April 10, 2002, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/10/warcrimes1. 
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stop it. The moral crime of this inaction is not in dispute, only what to do about it remains 
in question. A decade after the Rwandan genocide, Jan Grofe suggests that if coalition 
experience in Iraq (and Afghanistan) is an indicator, then the time for privatization may 
be at hand.
16
 By 2008 the numbers of private contractors outnumbered those of active-
duty troops,
17
 and the huge numbers of contractors employed during both conflicts 
demonstrates not only the sheer numbers of willing participants from the private sector, 
but also the willingness of states to hire them. In fact, the activities of PMCs have grown 
to such an extent that it has been observed that modern armies would find is difficult to 
prosecute a war without them, and that the privatization of conflict may have “reached 
the point of no return.”18 Given these legions of contractors, only a small percentage of 
them would be required to transition the organization to combat. A major obstacle, 
however, is the enduring concern over the ethics of outsourcing the business of warfare. 
Ethical issues with PMCs have escalated with the rise of PMCs themselves. From 
the 1990s to the present, the world has experienced an escalation in activity within the 
private military industry. Heavy demand for massive military formations in the global 
public sector vanished with the end of the Cold War, and the downsizing of militaries 
throughout the world that resulted created a substantial labor pool of well-trained and 
experienced professional soldiers.19 The market was also flooded with small arms from 
raided Cold War-era supplies, and the low cost of arming rebel troops enabled relatively 
small groups to destabilize nations all over the world in violent, yet strategically 
insignificant, conflicts.20  
Power struggles in poor countries are usually of little political importance to the 
major powers; nonetheless, these conflicts create significant humanitarian crises 
                                                 
16 Grofe, “Human Rights and Private Military Companies,” 258. 
17 Ian Wing, Private Military Companies and Military Operations (Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare 
Studies Centre, 2010), 15–16. 
18 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private 
Military and Security Companies,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
Occasional Paper No. 6 (March 2005): 1. 
19 Singer, “Peacekeepers, Inc.,” 61. 
20 The “small arms” referred to are largely AK-47s and variants, which could be obtained in the early 
2000s in bulk for about $150 per weapon (C. J. Chivers, The Gun (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 
386–387); Singer, “Peacekeepers, Inc.,” 61. 
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wherever they occur, and the effects of mass killings or widespread starvation morally 
transcend political importance. Even in the case of intra-state conflicts where valid 
concerns over state sovereignty may be an issue, when a crisis warrants a permissible 
intervention, the international community may still have a moral obligation to intervene. 
On this reading of moral obligation, were such an obligation to occur, it is understood as 
an imperfect duty in the Kantian sense, because it is an unassigned duty. When a duty is 
assigned, based on a special relationship to the victimized population or a special 
capability, it becomes perfect.21 This being the case, perfect or imperfect, the obligation 
is at times at odds with the purpose of a state’s armed forces, which is to defend its 
national interests. This disjunct leaves a state with an abiding moral tension in its duty to 
stop crimes against humanity versus its duty to protect its own citizens, and as a result 
states are oftentimes justifiably reluctant to deploy their own forces and risk any cost in 
lives to help non-citizens. Unwillingness to deploy state forces would not circumvent the 
obligation, however; it would still at least require some facilitation of intervention. When 
appropriate state forces are not available, and the international community is unable to 
provide an ad hoc force for intervention, the employment of a PMC could be a morally 
and operationally viable option, under certain circumstances. 
The permissibility of forcibly occupying a foreign country with a private army 
with the aim of protecting its population from human rights abuses is not a foregone 
conclusion, however. To explore the possibility of ethical privatized humanitarian 
intervention, the ethics of humanitarian intervention itself must first be explored. To 
accomplish this, the framework provided by Just War Theory (JWT) will be used to 
consider the ethical concerns of humanitarian intervention.22 Because humanitarian 
intervention does not fall into the usual category of a war between two or more states, 
                                                 
21 Kok-Chor Tan, “The Duty to Protect,” in Humanitarian Intervention, NOMOS XLVIII, ed. Terry 
Nardin and Melissa S. Williams (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 86–87; Tan characterizes 
the difference between perfect and imperfect duties as analogous to assigned and unassigned duties, 
respectively. That is, one is morally obligated to carry out a duty that is assigned to him; whereas, it is 
merely permissible, yet admirable, to carry out unassigned duties when they are carried out at a cost that is 
not too great. 
22 Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War,” Mershon International 
Studies Review 42 (1998): 283. 
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some special considerations must be made with regard to the jus ad bellum23 criteria of 
JWT, especially proper authority, just cause, and right intention. These criteria are 
especially important in traditional JWT, and will prove useful as a component of a theory 
of ethically justified private intervention.24 
Once a version of JWT that is specific to humanitarian intervention is established, 
it is necessary to tailor the theory to fit PMCs. As the agent of intervention, PMCs are 
primarily concerned with jus in bello25 considerations of JWT, although the principles of 
jus ad bellum cannot be ignored by the PMC. For example, an ethical private company 
does not accept just any principal client, and therefore, the principal’s intentions must be 
scrutinized by the PMC as closely as his ability to pay. Concerning jus in bello, the 
conduct of a PMC while carrying out its mission is of paramount importance; the criteria 
must be examined to tailor traditional principles of proportionality and discrimination to 
modern humanitarian intervention. Indeed, James Pattison concludes that that a private 
intervention force should follow stricter versions of those traditional principles.26 
Furthermore, the principle of internal jus in bello has been added that concerns the 
treatment of the intervening force’s own troops.27 This criterion requires that a private 
intervening force respect the rights of its employees; that no child soldiers or conscripts 
are used, and that adequate protection and care are provided commensurate with the 
amount of risk they are expected to accept. 
Therefore, the theory of ethically justified private intervention presented here will 
be in three parts: first, adherence to jus ad bellum principles of right authority, just cause, 
and right intention; second, jus in bello criteria of proportionality, discrimination, and 
                                                 
23 Jus ad bellum are the criteria for justly going to war. 
24 Joseph Boyle, “Traditional Just War Theory and Humanitarian Intervention,” in Humanitarian 
Intervention, NOMOS XLVIII, ed. Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams (New York: New York 
University Press, 2006), 35. 
25 Jus in bello are the criteria supporting ethical conduct in war. 
26 James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should 
Intervene? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 109. 
27 Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, 109–110; see also Brian 
Orend, The Morality of War (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006), 127–136. 
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internal jus in bello; in the analysis of these six criteria, the need for a seventh criterion 
has been identified to ensure a responsible handover to a recognized authority. Therefore, 
the third part of the theory will consist of the jus post bellum criterion of just transfer of 
authority. Most studies are concerned only with the agent of intervention, while this 
study will hypothesize that the principal, or the employer of the PMC, is equally 
morally responsible, and thus potentially culpable. However, the hypothesis being 
tested in this thesis is that ethical private intervention can be justified under the 
guidelines of this theory. 
To further aid the formulation of a theory of ethically justified private 
intervention, three case studies will be examined within the framework. The cases were 
selected based on criteria that establish their suitability, and for their extreme variation in 
the study variable (SV), which is that of a morally permissible private intervention. Given 
the limited number of true-life instances of privatized intervention, some license must be 
assumed to aid the theory’s formulation, and hence, many aspects of the case studies 
could correctly be thought of as “thought experiments.” The first case is the least so; the 
case of the PMC Executive Outcomes (EO) in the Sierra Leonean civil war in 1994 is 
arguably the most-often cited case of a successful military intervention by a PMC. The 
legendary speed and effectiveness with which EO defeated the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) is compelling, and provides the most appropriate case in which to consider 
the theory presented here. The second case is that of the PMC Sandline, hired by the 
prime minister of Papua New Guinea (PNG) to quell an uprising on the resource-rich 
island of Bougainville. This intervention was not humanitarian in nature and was not 
successful; however, it provides an interesting and useful commentary on the jus ad 
bellum criteria presented here. Counterfactual analysis will be used in both of these cases 
to speculate on what could have happened if conditions had been different. The final case 
is purely counterfactual, and essentially uses the plan conceived by EO staff to conduct 
an intervention in Rwanda. It has been well established that an intervention should have 
taken place; the thought experiment here will consider what could have happened if it had 
taken place using a PMC.  
Finally, a further conceptual point will be examined. If the PMC option is still not 
accepted by any state or international organization, and the threat of crimes against 
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humanity proceeds unabated, then conceptually, the funding of intervention by a PMC 
could be underwritten by an International Non-governmental Organization (INGO) or 
even a private individual. This possibility presents myriad ethical issues, beginning with 
the requirement of proper authority. In situations where crimes of humanity exist, 
however, a scaled approach to the theory is required. Deborah Avant concludes that, 
under certain extreme circumstances, the private funding of private intervention could be 
permissible, but is not an option to be relied upon.28 In the final case study of this thesis, 
the idea of private funding of a humanitarian intervention will be explored further. 
The conclusion is that ethically justified private intervention is possible using not 
only the framework proposed here, but also with the guidance provided by international 
conventions and codes of ethics established in the industry. JWT is useful in an analysis 
of historical or counterfactual cases, and to provide general guidelines of conduct, but 
further codified industry specific and contractual ethical guidelines would be necessary 
for true success. These regulations exist now, and it may not be necessary to create more 
beyond situation-specific contractual guidelines. Given the international community’s 
moral dilemma presented by the duty to stop crimes against humanity and the duty states 
have to protect its own citizens, PMCs present a morally plausible third option, and this 
third option could make a difference when genocide happens again. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The theoretical literature on humanitarian intervention, private military 
companies, and Just War Theory is reviewed in detail in the chapters that follow, so it 
will not be repeated here. All three categories are critical in the formulation of the theory 
of ethically justified private intervention to be presented in Chapter V, so they are 
presented separately in the sections that follow this introduction. A number of other 
works have suggested the principles of Just War Theory as an ethical guideline for 
                                                 
28 Deborah Avant touches on this possibility with reference to transnational corporations, pointing out 
one of the many valid ethical dilemmas that comes with financing violent services; that to organize and 
carry out violent activities is to place oneself inside the governance process, and that to attempt to seize a 
role in the government of a foreign country by force is immoral (Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: 
The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 192); Another 
view of this may be that in the case of a failed state, this point becomes invalid as long as there is a clear 
plan to reinstitute local governance. 
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humanitarian intervention,29 but no critical analysis of any formulated ethical guideline 
using actual or counterfactual cases is known to exist. This is the gap that this thesis 
seeks to fill.  
The facts surrounding the case studies are derived from accounts written by 
people who were there: Eeben Barlow and Roelf Van Heerden in Sierra Leone; Tim 
Spicer and Sean Dorney in Papua New Guinea; and Roméo Dallaire and Alison Des 
Forges and in Rwanda. Most elements of the cases are based on these personal accounts; 
others come from analysis of news articles contemporary to the event or scholarly work 
conducted years later.   
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to formulate a theory of ethical military intervention 
by a private entity using forces provided privately, referred to as a theory of ethically 
justified private intervention. Ethical issues associated with the employment of PMCs for 
the purpose of humanitarian intervention will be explored with the aim to provide an 
ethical guideline for decision makers faced with the duty to prevent crimes against 
humanity, but without the support of state-sponsored military forces. This thesis 
hypothesizes that there is a moral obligation to intervene in response to crimes against 
humanity, and in the absence of state-sponsored forces, it can be permissible to outsource 
military intervention to a PMC under certain conditions.  
Some assumptions are necessary for this thesis to proceed. First, it must be 
assumed that there could reasonably be a functional PMC to act as the agent, with the 
available resources to accept the mission, and the ability to carry it out in accordance with 
the terms of its contract. The manpower potential is a safe assumption, considering that 
the PMC Blackwater deployed thousands of security personnel to Iraq from 2003–2007. 
                                                 
29 Including the ICISS Report, The Responsibility to Protect (December 2001), 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
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The exact number of contractors deployed is not known, but it has been estimated that by 
2008 they outnumbered U.S. troops, or were at least at a ratio of one-to-one.30 
Second, it must be assumed that for the purposes of this discussion, the PMCs 
available for employment understand that their success or failure in the private military 
industry depends on a general perception of their legitimacy, and that it is in their best 
interests to behave accordingly. David Shearer notes that this is generally the case,31 and 
since PMCs are a business dependent on follow-on employment, they are likely to be 
attentive to their reputation in the industry. 
A final assumption is that there are organizations or individuals that exist with the 
means and motivation to fund a private military intervention. Considering that in 2013, 
there are 1,426 billionaires in the world,32 and that there are NGOs that command 
resources up to $9 billion,33 it is not unreasonable to believe that one among them might 
be willing to fund a mission of humanitarian intervention, if it were morally permissible. 
Very rich individuals have frequently made significant contributions to charitable causes 
that lie outside the realm of their responsibility to society, and notwithstanding the 
potentially violent nature of the proposed contribution, it follows that there are other 
individuals in existence that would be willing to make similar contributions. 
C. DEFINITIONS 
Some of the terminology used in this thesis requires clarification before 
proceeding. 
                                                 
30 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: 
Nation Books, 2007), 460; Dunigan lists slightly higher figures, at roughly 173,000 contractors to 146,000 
U.S. troops in December 2008 (Molly Dunigan, Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies’ Impact on 
Military Effectiveness (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 171 n1); Mark Cancian calls 
265,000 “a fairly reliable count,” as of 2008 (Mark Cancian, “Contractors: The New Element of Military 
Force Structure,” Parameters (Autumn 2008): 62.  
31 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 76. 
32 Luisa Kroll, “Inside the 2013 Billionaires List: Facts and Figures,” Forbes, 4 March 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/luisakroll/2013/03/04/inside-the-2013-billionaires-list-facts-and-figures/. 
33 “Special Feature: The Top 100 NGOs 2013 Edition,” The Global Journal, 23 January 2013, 
http://theglobaljournal.net/article/view/986/. 
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A satisfactory definition of “humanitarian intervention” follows Terry Nardin, 
who defines “intervention” as “the exercise of authority by one state within the 
jurisdiction of another state, but without its permission.” He goes on to define armed 
humanitarian intervention as “when its aim is to protect innocent people who are not 
nationals of the intervening state from violence perpetrated or permitted by the 
government of the target state.”34 Since the use of force is implied, it is not necessary to 
include “armed,” and so the words “humanitarian intervention” will be used alone. 
The use of the term “permissible” is intended to have ethical connotation (not 
legal) and is used to denote an action that has moral justification. Moreover, a morally 
permissible action is not an assigned duty; that is, it is not obligatory, and is therefore an 
imperfect duty and not morally required. To undertake a permissible duty is admirable, 
but to self-assign a permissible duty makes it a perfect duty, and the agent accepts a 
responsibility and an obligation to successfully carry out that duty. The term “obligatory” 
is used interchangeably with “duty,” and is a perfect, assigned duty that the agent has a 
moral obligation to carry out. Furthermore, a duty determined to be “supererogatory,” is 
the act of going above and beyond in the performance of a duty that is not morally 
required.  
The terms “private military and security company” (PMSC) and “private security 
company” (PSC) are used elsewhere in the literature. Both refer to companies that 
provide security services, while the former retains the ability to provide military services 
as well. Since this thesis is concerned with companies that provide military intervention 
services, including combat, the term “private military company” (PMC) will be used 
exclusively.35 
A careful treatment of the terms “mercenary” and “private military company” are 
in order here. The mercenary label has been problematic from the beginning. The notion 
                                                 
34 Terry Nardin, “Introduction,” in Humanitarian Intervention, NOMOS XLVIII, ed. Terry Nardin and 
Melissa S. Williams (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 1. 
35 PMCs are referred to by Singer as “military provider firms.” See Singer, Corporate Warriors, 92–
95; also James R. Davis, Fortune’s Warriors: Private Armies and the New World Order (Vancouver, 
British Columbia: Douglas and MacIntyre, 2002), 31. 
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that PMCs and mercenaries are one in the same is a very real dilemma; it has given rise to 
the application of ethical issues associated with mercenaries, and resultant rejection of the 
potential utility of PMCs.36 
A discussion of force-provider PMCs or contracted combatants in the context of 
military intervention is difficult without tackling the stigma of the term “mercenary.” 
Numerous authors have sought to define the term, with each coming to slightly different 
conclusions. Carlos Ortiz conceptualizes two methods from which to derive a definition: 
the strictly legal approach, or the generally accepted approach.37 Most definitions are 
based on popular perceptions of mercenaries, not necessarily the legal definition. Still, 
the legal definition is important and will be covered here. 
The legal definition of a mercenary is derived from the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Article 47 of which relates to 
mercenaries. The article, in its entirety, is as follows: 
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of 
war. 
2. A mercenary is any person who: 
   (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight 
in an armed conflict; 
   (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by 
the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a 
Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that 
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the 
armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a 
resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
                                                 
36 David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), Adelphi Paper 316, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 76. 
37 Carlos Ortiz, Private Armed Forces and Global Security (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 55. 
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(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the 
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.38 
Notwithstanding the POW status exclusion, to be classified a mercenary the 
individual would have to meet all of the other six criteria. This alone makes the legal 
definition too complex to be conceptually useful, and coupled with the legal difficulty in 
proving that an individual is motivated by private gain, makes the definition effectively 
useless.39 Two other conventions, the AU’s 1977 Convention for the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa, and the UN’s 1989 International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries both draw from Article 47 in 
their own definitions of mercenaries, and as a result, the definitions are no less 
problematic.40 A famous quote about this definition sums up the problem, “any 
mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition should be shot—and his 
lawyer with him!”41 
Other authors have sought to define mercenaries in more acceptable terms. Uwe 
Steinhoff defines a mercenary as “a person who is contracted to provide military services 
to groups other than his own (in terms of nation, ethnic group, class, etc.) and is ready to 
deliver this service even if this involves taking part in hostilities. Which groups are 
relevant depends on the nature of the conflict.”42 This definition takes the financial 
                                                 
38 ICRC, “International Humanitarian Law – Treaties and Documents,” ICRC.org, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/470–750057. 
39 Ortiz, Private Armed Forces and Global Security, 56; see also ICRC, “Customary IHL, Rule 108. 
Mercenaries,” ICRC.org, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule108. 
40 Ortiz, Private Armed Forces and Global Security, 56; see also “OAU Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenarism In Africa,” Organisation of African Unity, CM/817 (XXIX) Annex II Rev.1, 3 
July 1977, http://www.africa-union.org/official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/ 
Convention_on_Mercenaries.pdf; and “International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries,” UN General Assembly, A/RES/44/34, 72nd Plenary Meeting, 4 December 
1989, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm. 
41 Geoffrey Best quoted in Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 18. 
42 Uwe Steinhoff, “What are Mercenaries?,” in Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, 
Policies, and Civil-Military Relations, ed. Andrew Alexander, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 19–29. 
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motive out of the equation, and as Deane-Peter Baker points out, also fails to describe 
what exactly is immoral about being a mercenary.43 It is also vague (“military services” 
can be anything, and does not exclude support services such as transportation) and 
conditional, though not as much as the Article 47 definition. David Isenberg provides a 
more useful definition that allows the clarity necessary to confront the issues surrounding 
mercenaries. His definition is similar to Steinhoff’s, yet more concise. It describes 
mercenaries as “non-nationals hired to take direct part in armed conflicts.”44 As Malcolm 
Patterson points out, however, a definition such as this could apply to “green card” 
holders who enlist in the U.S. military as a quick path to citizenship and serve in places 
like Iraq and Afghanistan.45 These people are certainly not mercenaries. 
In asking the question, “What the heck is a mercenary, anyway?,” Baker 
concludes that the term is “derisive” but searches for what is so ethically wrong with 
being a mercenary by comparing them to prostitutes, and the corresponding changes in 
societal norms associated with their existence. Due to the unavoidable moral ambiguity 
associated with the term, Baker chooses to discard the mercenary label and proceed with 
the term “contracted combatants.”46 Likewise, to avoid ambiguity, the term “mercenary” 
will be discarded here.47 Since the subject of this thesis is concerned with larger scale 
humanitarian intervention operations, the collective term PMC will be used instead. 
Schreier and Caparini make no initial distinction between mercenaries and 
PMCs.48 Other authors call this approach simplistic, and that the practice of applying the 
mercenary designation to any individual who works for a PMC obscures the legitimate 
utility these companies have.49 In fact, it is difficult to classify people who work for 
                                                 
43 Baker, Just Warriors, Inc., 35. 
44 David Isenberg, quoted in Wing, Private Military Companies and Military Operations, 3. 
45 Patterson, Privatising Peace, 45–46. 
46 Baker, Just Warriors, Inc., 31–47. 
47 An exception is in Chapter IV. 
48 Schreier and Caparini, “Privatising Security,” 2. 
49 David Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Policy 112 (Fall 1998): 69. 
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PMCs as mercenaries.50 Schreier and Caparini eventually acknowledge that mercenaries 
operate on an ad hoc basis while PMCs maintain corporate structures with permanent 
staff and have the ability to carry out complex operations.51 Singer classifies PMC 
operations into three generally accepted categories: military provider firms, military 
consultant firms, and military support firms.52 The PMCs in this thesis will be of the 
military provider type, or those at the “tip of the spear,” involved in the command and 
control of fighting units.53 This type of PMC is the only type with a stand-alone 
capability that would be effective in the situations proposed here. 
Finally, in the discussion of agency theory with respect to the contract between a 
PMC and its employer, the employer will always be referred to as the “principal,” or 
“principal agent,” and the PMC as the “agent,” or “agent of the principal.” 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To test the hypothesis put forth in this thesis, three cases were selected based on 
predetermined criteria. These cases were studied in factual and counterfactual form to 
determine what conditions are required for the ethical employment of a PMC to conduct 
humanitarian intervention. First, each case has been outlined based on analysis of facts 
and events as depicted in the literature. Then, congruence procedures were conducted on 
each case to determine the values of each independent variable (IV) relative to “normal” 
values, which for the purposes of this thesis will be adherence to the criteria presented in 
Chapter V.54 These values will then be used to determine the value of the dependent 
variable (DV), which is the outcome in terms of moral permissibility or 
impermissibility.55 Finally, where the DV is determined to be false, counterfactual details 
                                                 
50 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 18–19. 
51 Schreier and Caparini, “Privatising Security,” 17. 
52 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 91. 
53 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 93. 
54 This follows the congruence procedure type 1 outlined in Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for 
Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 58–61. 
55 A congruent variable will be determined to be true, while an incongruent variable will be referred to 
as false. If the value of any IV is determined to be false, then the DV will be false. 
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have been devised in each case so that the values of each IV become true, based on 
qualifying conditions artificially introduced for the purposes of hypothesis testing. Since 
these counterfactuals are created based on the hypothesis being tested, it is not necessary 
to repeat congruence procedures because all of the variables must be congruent by definition; 
the hypothetical conditions themselves are shown to represent conditions under which the 
employment of PMCs to conduct humanitarian intervention would be ethical. 
1. Case Study Selection 
Case studies were selected based on a modified list of criteria presented by Van 
Evera, who writes, “[c]ongruence procedure type 1 works best if we select cases with 
extreme (very high or very low) values on the [study variable (SV)].”56 Because the IVs 
in this thesis are the SVs, cases were selected without regard to the outcome of the DV, 
ethical or otherwise. One case selected will be purely counterfactual, because a PMC was 
only considered and not employed in that case. Other criteria were established to ensure 
relevance to the research objective and to avoid selection bias.57 Van Evera presents 
eleven criteria for case-selection, eight of which were used:  
1. Data richness: there are many cases of interest that simply are not 
represented well in the literature.58 Therefore, cases that have a 
significant amount of information available in the public record, 
including first-hand accounts and critical analyses, were 
selected.59 
                                                 
56 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 59. 
57 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 22–25, 83. 
58 Cases such as the Serbian mercenary unit in Zaire (James C. McKinley, Jr., “Serb Who Went to 
Defend Zaire Spread Death and Horror Instead,” New York Times, 19 March 1997, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/19/world/serb-who-went-to-defend-zaire-spread-death-and-horror-
instead.html), Stabilco and Omega Support Ltd., in Angola (mentioned in Singer, Corporate Warriors, 
224), and Russian mercenaries in Sudan (James Dunnigan, “Russian Mercenaries Over Africa,” Strategy 
Page, 21 June 2008, http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200862112816.asp) are all relevant cases 
with undoubtedly extreme values on the SVs, but so little information is available on them, an attempt to 
include them as case studies would be impractical. 
59 George and Bennett argue that cases should not be selected according to availability of data, but for 
the purposes of this thesis, such a level of detail is required to assess adherence to moral norms, data 
richness must remain a criterion (George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, 83). 
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2. Extreme values on the values of the IVs: although counterfactuals 
will serve to match the values of the IVs, it is desirable to have a 
starting point that is very different in each case. 
3. Large within-case variance on the values of the IVs. 
4. Predictions made by competing theories disagree with the 
hypothesized outcome: although this applies to any case of PMC 
employment, the criterion is still used here.  
5. Similarity to current policy issues. 
6. Similarity of case background conditions: all are concerned with a 
rebellious population. 
7. Suitability for comparison with other cases. 
8. Fundamental importance.60 
2. Congruence Procedure  
“Type 1” congruence procedures are used in each case to observe the values of 
the IVs and compare them to the values of typical IVs that would be found in the world.61 
In this study, it is not necessary to predict the result, because it is already known based on 
the historical outcome. A comparison to typical values, or conditions that would be 
expected in accordance with the theory presented, is still necessary to determine whether 
or not those conditions are possible. To aid in the formulation of the theory presented 
here, it is then necessary to use counterfactuals. 
3. Counterfactuals 
Unfortunately, analysis of each case study reveals very different values on the 
IVs; two cases present situations where intervention is certainly permissible, one case 
does not. The reasons the cases are permissible or impermissible are varied; each is 
associated with a different case of adherence or non-adherence to the theory of ethically 
justified private intervention presented in Chapter V. To test the hypothesis that private 
intervention can be permissible under these conditions, counterfactuals based on the cases 
                                                 
60 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 77–88. 
61 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 58. 
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selected for this thesis must be developed where variables are changed by changing 
conditions from what actually happened to what could have feasibly happened.62 If the 
value of an IV revealed in the case complies with the theory’s criteria, then 
counterfactual details will not be used. It is acknowledged that this technique is far from 
ideal, but it is necessary since there are few examples in the modern historical record that 
would apply here; the technique has also been shown to be useful in previous work.63 
Acknowledging the difficulty of creating convincing counterfactuals, five of six criteria 
outlined by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett will be followed to ensure the 
effectiveness of the technique.64 
First, the counterfactuals will be built upon the cases that were selected using the 
criteria discussed above. Each case study will already have identified critical variables 
which caused the case’s historical outcome and its resultant adherence or non-adherence 
to the theory; those variables will be changed to reflect a different outcome, implying 
causation to that variable to infer conditions under which the case would have been 
permissible, if necessary. Second, the conditions to be changed will be feasible resulting 
in a feasible alternative outcome. Since the outcome to be sought after is one of 
permissibility within an ethical framework, the variable change will not mean the 
difference between victory or defeat in any case, and will largely deal with changes that 
represent a significantly different moral status, but with only a corresponding subtle 
change at the tactical level. Third, the independent variables to be altered are all 
autonomous. When any one variable proves false it can render the dependent variable 
false as well. For example, in the event of non-adherence to the principles of internal jus 
in bello, the case is rendered morally impermissible within the operating framework. 
Interconnected causation is possible however, so when multiple independent variables are 
determined to affect the dependent variable, they will all be changed within a reasonable 
                                                 
62 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 25–26. 
63 James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics 43, 
no. 2 (January 1991): 170. 
64 Two of the criteria presented by George and Bennett do not apply; the first criteria implies that all 
causal variables should be changed, which is not necessary in this analysis; the second refers to causal 
substitution, which suggests that a variable different from an identified causal variable may also cause the 
same outcome. All causal variables identified as false will be changed. The possibility of interconnected 
variables is addressed in the third criteria. 
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level of complexity. Finally, for simplicity, the decisive points in each case will be 
restricted to seven criteria. These decisive points correspond to the criteria of permissible 
private intervention presented in Chapter V, and are causal by definition, in that each may 
independently determine the outcome of the case.65 
It should be noted that the counterfactual analyses in this thesis are not meant to 
test the theory. Their purpose is to test the hypothesis that permissible private 
intervention is possible. As Van Evera writes, “…counterfactual statements are not data 
and cannot replace empirical data in theory-testing.”66  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis proceeds in seven chapters, beginning with this introduction. In 
Chapter II, the ethics of humanitarian intervention will be introduced to establish the 
origins of the duty to protect innocent civilians and to discuss the question “who should 
intervene?” Chapter III is an overview of the soldier’s duty to his country and the state’s 
duty to its citizens, and how those duties conflict with the more general duty of 
humanitarian intervention. Chapter IV introduces the ethics of PMC operations and 
tackles the stigma surrounding them; it also serves to address the objections to their 
employment up front. PMCs are uniquely suited to humanitarian intervention, in spite of 
objections otherwise, and that argument is presented there. Chapter V outlines the 
theoretical framework to be used in this thesis, beginning with an overview of Just War 
Theory. The traditional criteria, and some modern ones, will be considered and the 
resulting rationale behind the criteria chosen for the theory presented in this thesis. To 
further aid the formulation of the theory, the chosen case studies will be presented 
Chapter VI. They are unique cases and present a valuable opportunity to consider the 
ethics of humanitarian intervention. In one case, a thought experiment on the implications 
of private funding of humanitarian intervention by a wealthy individual will be 
considered. This highly unlikely scenario nonetheless presents a valuable lesson beyond 
the continuation of crimes against humanity; it is an experiment in rebellion against the 
established order itself by an unlikely rebel: the extremely wealthy and influential 
                                                 
65 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 168–169, 230–
232. 
66 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 48. 
 20 
individual. The final chapter concludes with a revised version of the theory of ethically 
justified private intervention, and commentary on the future of PMCs in the world order. 
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II. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Humanity has visited horror upon itself since the dawn of time. Crimes against 
humanity are probably no more frequent now than they were a thousand years ago, 
except that today, news of mass killings reaches our televisions or computer screens 
within hours. This painful awareness brings questions of responsibility and a relatively 
new debate on whether or not there is a duty to take action to prevent the further suffering 
of other people.67 A nonintervention principle is firmly rooted in international law, 
however, and specifies that no state may force its authority over another state within the 
borders of that state’s territory without its consent.68 An intervention without the 
permission of the target state is an act of aggression.69 Yet, under certain conditions, such 
as crimes against humanity, most scholars agree that armed humanitarian intervention is 
morally permissible, as an exception to the nonintervention principle. An alternate view 
is that in the event of crimes against humanity, the nonintervention principle has already 
been violated and that humanitarian intervention actually upholds the nonintervention 
norm.70 Some realists believe that if an intervention is not in the state’s national interests, 
then it should not be done at the risk of blood or treasure; other realists believe that 
people in dire circumstances should be helped if the costs are not too great.71 An 
increasing few subscribe to the legalist paradigm and its adherence to the notion of 
inviolable state sovereignty. In the post-Cold War world, the rights of individuals have 
come to the forefront and humanitarian intervention is generally viewed as permissible in  
 
 
                                                 
67 Michael Walzer, “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention,” Dissent 49, no. 1 (Winter 
2002), 29. 
68 Nardin, “Introduction,” 1. 
69 Nardin, “Introduction,” 11. 
70 Mervyn Frost, “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention: Protecting Civilians to Make Democratic 
Citizenship Possible,” in Ethics and Foreign Policy ed. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (West Nyack, 
NY, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 51. 
71 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention after September 11, 2001,” in Just Intervention, 
ed. Anthony F. Lang, Jr. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 194. 
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cases of aggression by a state against its own citizens, in the form of genocide and other 
crimes against humanity.72 What is not readily apparent, however, is the moral obligation 
to intervene.  
Pattison supplies a satisfying answer to what humanitarian intervention is, 
beginning with four criteria. His first criterion specifies that the intervention is military in 
nature, and as a rule, armed. The second criterion requires that grievous suffering or loss 
of life is actively in progress or impending. The third requires that intervention be carried 
out by an external agent, and the fourth requires at least some humanitarian intention. In 
summary, Pattison’s definition to be adopted here is “forcible military action by an 
external agent in the relevant political community with the predominant purpose of 
preventing, reducing, or halting an ongoing or impending grievous suffering or loss of 
life.”73 The definition cannot provide, however, when it is appropriate to intervene, 
whether or not it is supererogatory or obligatory, and who exactly, besides an external 
agent, is supposed to carry it out. 
In this chapter, conditions that warrant humanitarian intervention will be 
considered through an examination of the moral and legal philosophy of intervention. 
Then, the traditional view of a right to intervene is demonstrated to be a duty, and this 
duty to intervene will be discussed within the framework of the Kantian categorical 
imperative, using an interpretation that frames intervention as an imperfect or perfect 
duty, depending on whether the duty is assigned or not. An argument will be presented 
that, in the event of crimes against humanity, that intervention continues to be an 
imperfect duty, but it need not remain so. Finally, the important question of who should 
intervene will be considered, in terms of both the principal’s special relationship to the 
victims, and the principal’s unique capability to carry out the intervention, in this case 
with the available services of a PMC acting as agent. 
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A. WHEN TO INTERVENE 
Numerous authors have sought to define the conditions under which military 
intervention ought to be carried out. Michael Walzer considers intervention in cases of 
secession, civil war, and humanitarian crises, and concludes simply that intervention is 
permissible when events occur “that shock the moral conscience of mankind.”74 Such 
interventions are humanitarian in nature, but may also have limited political objectives. 
The same author describes two historical examples of justified military intervention and 
concedes that although mixed motives were likely present, the horrific nature of the 
atrocities and crimes against humanity that occurred in these cases is undeniable, and so 
the interventions were justified. He rejects the notion that a mission that is only partially 
humanitarian is not permissible. Nicholas Wheeler agrees, and notes that an intervention 
motivated by purely ethical values would require such a high moral standard, that it 
would be impossible.75 Walzer objects further to the moral defense of waiting for a 
higher authority, such as the UN, to take action.76  
Humanitarian intervention is undertaken not in conquest but with a just cause, and 
with the aim to aid the beneficiaries of the intervention with the ability to exercise their 
right to self-determination. Granted, this statement is problematic. Walzer acknowledges 
the problems with enabling self-determination on behalf of a people by discussing John 
Stuart Mill’s argument on the subject. He relates the Millian view as one of self-help, and 
that liberty must originate from within a society. Liberty from without, or facilitated 
through foreign intervention, is a failed effort by definition because it violates the essence 
of self-determination.77 This view does not account for the moral dilemma of crimes 
against humanity allowed or perpetrated by a state, however, and while it is important to 
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note the Millian view, this thesis supposes that to facilitate the right to self-determination 
on behalf of other people is permissible and that the defense of human rights always 
supersedes sovereignty.78 Therefore, an operating assumption of this thesis is that the 
notion that sovereignty is inviolable is outdated, and no state can do as it pleases with its 
citizens without the threat of intervention.79 
Nardin takes Walzer’s shock of moral conscience further and lists three 
conditions under which humanitarian intervention ought to be conducted: 1) when a 
sufficiently grave threat exists that warrants the violation of a state’s sovereign rights, 2) 
when authorized by a recognized international authority (if available, therefore optional), 
and 3) with the highest degree of effectiveness.80 These conditions are consistent with the 
jus ad bellum principles of ethically justified private intervention to be considered here: 
just cause, right authority, and right intention.81  
Brian Orend follows Walzer and considers a critical legal requirement of an 
intervener, which is United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization. He points 
out that in general, UNSC authorization is “absolutely necessary.”82 While this may be 
true in the anarchic world of international law, it not only lies in the realm of the 
unenforceable, it also poses a moral dilemma in the event of a humanitarian crisis absent 
UNSC authorization to intervene.83 Pattison considers the dilemma and concludes by 
rejecting UNSC authorization as an indicator of moral standing. He reasons that UNSC 
authorization may be slightly preferable in the interests of international order, but that 
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illegal humanitarian intervention is preferable to no intervention at all.84 Nardin agrees by 
noting that, “to insist on such authorization is to presume a degree of justice and 
effectiveness at the supranational level that the world has not yet achieved.”85 Beyond 
this point, that the legal status of an intervener is not necessarily morally relevant, the 
debate concerning the legal implications of humanitarian intervention exceeds the scope 
of this thesis. 
It also must be made clear that military intervention is always the last resort, and 
that no other version of that is assumed or implied in this thesis. Intervention violates the 
political and territorial integrity of a sovereign nation, and must be justified. Walzer 
describes the burden of proof as one that rests on the shoulders of the intervener, 
especially in the case of an intervention that is likely to result in violence.86 Orend argues 
that there must be consideration to the severity of the crisis, that “‘run-of-the-mill’ 
government insensitivity” would not justify intervention, and that those kinds of cases 
that can be solved through political or social activism related to the Millian self-help 
method of self-determination.87 Humanitarian intervention does not violate humanity’s 
right to self-determination; it seeks to uphold it. As Mervyn Frost argues, like the right to 
self-determination, the nonintervention principle is to be upheld by the intervening 
power. When crimes against humanity are at issue, those rights and principles have 
already been violated and intervention is permissible.88 
The hallmark document in humanitarian intervention is the report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) entitled The 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This report is important because it begins a shift in 
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thinking away from intervention as a right, to intervention as a duty.89 It invokes 
Walzer’s succinct phrase by describing when to conduct humanitarian intervention as 
“exceptional circumstances…cases of violence which so genuinely ‘shock the conscience 
of mankind.’”90 The report also provides an ethical guideline for making the decision to 
intervene that mirrors six commonly accepted criteria of jus ad bellum. Each criterion 
will be considered in detail in Chapter V, but three will be repeated here: just cause, right 
authority, and right intention.91 
B. THE DUTY TO INTERVENE 
R2P focuses on state sovereignty and the nonintervention principle, however, and 
assumes that if intervention is permissible, then it must also be obligatory, which 
generates the “responsibility to protect.”92 Tan argues that this assumption is not without 
merit, except that there is no specific entity identified as the owner of the task.93 Nearly 
all of the previously mentioned scholars consider humanitarian intervention an 
“imperfect” duty, as distinguished in one interpretation of Kant as a moral obligation that 
is simply praiseworthy if fulfilled, yet holds no requirement for fulfillment by all. In other 
words, the imperfect duty to contribute to the happiness of other people is non-binding in 
the framework of Kant’s end-in-itself conception of humanity, because it fails the test of 
self-contradiction. Walzer laments this by writing, “the massacres go on, and every 
country that is able to stop them decides that it has more urgent tasks.”94 
Wheeler, like Walzer, characterizes humanitarian intervention as “an act of great 
kindness,” where a state places the lives of its citizens at risk for the sake of 
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noncitizens.95 In fact, most theorists consider humanitarian intervention to be an 
imperfect duty.96 Carla Bagnoli takes a different position. She points out that many 
arguments to justify humanitarian intervention wrongly seek to establish whether or not 
such an action is permissible, when in fact the intervention may be morally obligatory. 
When violations of human rights occur, these arguments characterize the duty to protect 
as charity, which implies that neutrality is also permissible and not morally 
objectionable.97 Bagnoli’s argument follows Kant’s second formulation of the categorical 
imperative, whereby humanity should be treated “always at the same time as an end and 
never simply as a means.”98 Bagnoli identifies two duties whereby respect for humanity 
is achieved; to protect the victims and to punish the offenders. She argues that these 
duties are not of charity but of justice, and therefore both are perfect duties. Neutrality is 
not an option; in fact, in the event of human rights violations, neutrality is a moral offense 
and cause for blame.99 Nearly one million dead following the Rwanda genocide attest to 
the consequences of neutrality, as do the regret and feelings of responsibility expressed 
by Kofi Annan many years later.100 
John Lango takes a similar position. His argument is that an intervention must 
first be determined to be permissible; once it has been determined to be permissible, a 
presumption that it is also obligatory can be made as well. The presumed obligation can 
be overridden, however. The burden of proof that the obligation should be overridden 
then falls on the intervener; if the intervener fails to prove that the obligation should be 
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overridden by proving that the moral costs of the intervention are excessive, then there 
actually is an obligation.101  
Unfortunately, the position that humanitarian intervention is a perfect duty does 
not hold up because it is largely an unassigned duty; that is, exactly who bears this duty is 
unclear, since it is general and standing. Furthermore, the position taken by Lango, that if 
an intervention is permissible then it is also obligatory unless proven otherwise, is 
difficult to justify for the same reason. If there is no principal identified, then there is no 
obligation to override. Therefore, the duty to intervene is best described as an unassigned 
duty that becomes perfect when assigned to a principal agent. Tan asserts that the duty 
need not remain imperfect; that it can be assigned, if the duty to protect is 
institutionalized.102 Therefore, the fact that a duty exists is not usually the problem; how 
the duty is assigned becomes the real issue. 
C. WHO SHOULD INTERVENE 
Several scholars have addressed the question of who should intervene. Pattison 
describes the duty to intervene in a humanitarian crisis as a generally unassigned duty 
that should be accepted by a principal with the most legitimacy. If a number of principals 
with a degree of legitimacy can claim the right to intervene, then the principal with the 
highest degree of legitimacy has the duty to intervene.103 Patterson is more specific, and 
singles out the UN as the world’s primary humanitarian force, but also points out ten 
other regional organizations that could take on the role.104 Tan describes the problem of 
assigning the duty as the “agency condition,” and specifies two circumstances in which 
this condition is met: when the principal maintains a “special relationship” with the 
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victims, or when the principal possesses such extraordinary capability, he becomes the 
obvious choice.105 In this section, the issues of legitimacy, the expectations of 
international and regional organizations, and the agency condition will be explored to 
illustrate the complexity an ambiguity of who should intervene. 
Pattison sketches the notion of legitimacy through the Moderate Instrumentalist 
Approach, in which the intervener’s effectiveness is of prime importance. This approach 
asserts that a legitimate intervener is one that can achieve a good outcome, such as 
stopping crimes against humanity. Therefore, the principal agent that can most effectively 
achieve its goal is also the most legitimate. This concept is important in an analysis of 
privatized intervention, so it will be described here. The approach is largely 
consequentialist, but has some non-consequentialist criteria as well. Pattison describes 
three forms of effectiveness that make up the first three of seven qualities contained in his 
approach. The first is “local external effectiveness,” which is the intervener’s ability to 
end the crisis and successfully promote human rights in the area of the intervention. The 
second is “global external effectiveness,” which is the effect of the intervener’s actions in 
the promotion of global human rights, outside of the area of intervention. Pattison’s final 
form of effectiveness is the “internal effectiveness” of the intervener, which is 
determined by the intervention’s effect on the intervener’s own citizens.106 
Pattison suggests that these qualities are necessary, but perhaps not sufficient for 
an intervener to be legitimate. Some non-consequentialist qualities are required, 
beginning with adherence to the traditional criteria of jus in bello: proportionality and 
discrimination, which Pattison refers to as “external jus in bello.” Next is “internal jus in 
bello,” or a form of the “no means mala in se” principle directed at the intervener’s own 
troops, including a prohibition on the use of child soldiers or methods that put the 
intervener’s own troops at unnecessary risk. Two other factors specified by Pattison are 
worth noting: “internal representativeness,” and “local external representativeness.” The 
former is concerned with the requirement of a positive consensus of opinion within the 
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organization conducting the intervention, and the latter stipulates agreement with the 
political machine within the state subject to the intervention.107 These last two factors are 
an important part of determining the legitimacy of an intervener, but in the event that a 
humanitarian intervention is being considered, they will be an assumed positive. 
Pattison’s Moderate Instrumentalist Approach is a compelling framework for 
ethical intervention, and when used in a scaled approach, provides a measure of 
legitimacy that is perhaps sufficient for a principal agent to move forward with an 
intervention. There are other factors mentioned by Pattison: legal authorization; the 
degree of humanitarian intention of the intervener, including whether the intervener’s 
motives are exclusively humanitarian, mixed, or self-interested; or “global external 
representativeness,” whether or not the intervener’s goals reflect world opinion. While 
these factors play a role in the likelihood of an intervener’s legitimacy, they are not 
necessary.108 In summary, an intervener determined to be adequately effective should 
intervene, as determined using the factors of Pattison’s Moderate Instrumentalist 
Approach. The factors to be considered here are: 
 local external effectiveness 
 global external effectiveness 
 internal effectiveness 
 external jus in bello 
 internal jus in bello 
Pattison also identifies some legitimate potential principal agents to conduct 
humanitarian intervention; the most obvious of which is international and regional 
organizations, but includes PMCs.  
International organizations are generally created in the interests of collective 
security under four conditions: two objective criteria, concerning the existence of 
politically divided autonomous states and the existence of communication or trade 
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between those states to create interdependence; and two subjective criteria, whereby 
states recognize the problems created by interdependence and as a result, identify a need 
to create a third-party organization to deal with those problems.109 The collective security 
principle under which they are founded is the characteristic of the organizations to be 
considered here. The UN, for example, whose founding principles included the idea that 
elective war is never permissible, made provisions in its charter for its members to 
provide military forces in the event of crisis or unauthorized military action.110 However, 
the efforts of the UN, and those of most international organizations, to conduct 
humanitarian interventions have often been criticized as failures. The commonly accepted 
reason for failure is the ad hoc nature of UN operations, dependent on the willingness of 
member states to provide forces when the UN needs them. Kofi Annan calls it “the built-
in delay” in which the UN operates.111 Dore Gold, a former Israeli ambassador to the 
UN, has delivered strong criticism of the UN efficacy.112 Pattison points out three 
specific failures of UN peacekeeping: United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
Bosnia, during which 230,000 people died; UNAMIR in Rwanda, which was actually 
drawn down while approximately 800,000 people were slaughtered; and United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which had to be bailed out by the 
British as the RUF committed atrocity after atrocity under their noses. The same author 
goes on to discuss the lengthy process of ad hoc troop deployment used by the UN, 
attributing the laboriousness and unreliability of the process to the resultant UN mission 
failures, notwithstanding the low quality of the troops provided by member states. 
Pattison uses the recent example of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Darfur 
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(UNAMID) to illustrate the enduring nature of the problem.113 He acknowledges that 
there have been some improvements in UN peacekeeping, however. In fact, it should be 
noted that although the previously mentioned UN missions were a failure overall, they 
did save some lives and so were at least partially effective.114 The difficulties 
experienced by UNAMID in 2009 may have been due to overreaching; as of 31 May 
2012, there are 17 UN peacekeeping missions being carried out by over 121,000 
personnel.115  
Patterson also outlines the inherent difficulties of the UN’s method of using ad 
hoc military forces but presents several alternatives, including a permanent rotating force 
of member states’ forces, standby forces, or a “UN Legion,” a permanent standing force 
loyal to the UN alone. The rotating force is limited in that its nation’s interests would still 
retain primacy. The “UN Legion,” will not likely be suddenly accepted by member states, 
not after over 70 years of the idea’s proposal. Standby forces have not been successful in 
the past, as evidenced by the failure of UNSAS to react in response to the Rwanda 
crisis.116 The standby force idea is still alive, however. In 1996, the Multinational Stand-
By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) was formed by 
seven countries, and seeks to reinforce UNSAS “through effective and continuous pre-
deployment planning.”117 SHIRBRIG maintained a permanent headquarters in Denmark 
and took part in six peacekeeping operations, but was disbanded in 2009.118 Several 
NGOs have called for the creation of a United Nations Emergency Peace Service 
(UNEPS), a “standing, international peacekeeping service,” to “fill the gap between the 
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Security Council’s authorization of a peace operation and the actual deployment of a 
conventional peacekeeping mission.”119 Several NGOs have versions of the proposal on 
their websites,120 but nearly ten years after the initial proposal written by Robert 
Johansen, there is still no evidence of implementation. 
Moving on with the assumption that a UN standing force is not a viable option, 
Pattison identifies five organizations with the potential to accept the duty to intervene, 
which he presents in their proposed order of legitimacy: the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), states or coalitions of the willing, the UN, regional organizations 
such as the African Union (AU) or European Union (EU), and PMCs. The order could 
change depending on the circumstances, and considering local effectiveness based on the 
cultural makeup of the force and the nature of the threat.121 The first four would 
intuitively have the greatest legitimacy; however, each has carried out humanitarian 
interventions with variable effectiveness.122 PMCs should not be on the list without 
further qualification, as PMCs do not do anything they are not paid to do. The correct 
way to identify an intervener in this context would be perhaps “Principal Agent of a 
PMC.” This clarifies the intervener more correctly as the sponsor of the intervention and 
the PMC as the tool. The PMC derives its mandate from the principal agent, and the two 
together derive the legitimacy required for the intervention. If effectiveness is a true 
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measure of legitimacy, then the right principal agent with the right PMC has the potential 
to be at least as legitimate as any other entity on this list. 
Another measure of legitimacy is the principal agent that maintains a “special 
relationship” with the victims, for example, ethnic ties, an economic partnership, or a 
former imperial power; or when the principal possesses such extraordinary capability that 
he becomes the obvious choice. The unique obligation of these principal agents is a factor 
of their legitimacy. Tan advocates these antecedents as methods that could be used to 
solve the “agency condition,” by institutionalizing shared responsibilities in the 
international community, and in effect create obligations on behalf of states which would 
have previously held only supererogatory duties.123 The creation of new institutions is far 
from an ideal solution, however. The creation of the UN in 1945 was meant to solve this 
problem, and history has shown that new, different institutions have been no better. The 
creation of a new institution to assign the duty of humanitarian intervention is not likely 
to be more effective than the status quo. 
The question of who should intervene remains unanswered. Three determinants 
have been presented here: from the most effective principal agent, to existing 
organizations, to the designation of a new institution to assign the duty of intervention; 
out of these, the most convincing is that the duty should go to the most effective principal 
agent. Who that would be is the obvious next question, and the answer is open-ended. 
The UN is an obvious choice, but its processes have proven to be unreliable. Kofi Annan 
himself has suggested, “[w]hen the UN is too slow, go past us.”124 The world’s 
superpower may be an answer, but its armed forces may be stretched thin; a neighboring 
country with ethnic ties could also take the job, but maybe their armed forces are too 
weak. There are other influential powers in the world as well. Transnational Corporations 
(TNCs) may have an interest in the stability of a region and may find it in their best 
interest to outsource an intervention in a failed state. There are extremely wealthy 
individuals who may find peace in the brotherhood of humanity, or simply find it in the 
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interests of their self-image to finance an intervention. In the chapters that follow, the 
possibility that PMCs act as the agent of intervention will be considered, in the 
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III. ROLE OBLIGATIONS: THE STATE AND THE SOLDIER 
The usual instruments of humanitarian intervention are the regular armed forces 
of a state. As a result, discussions regarding “who should intervene” are usually directed 
at states, because in the modern day, states generally maintain a monopoly on the use of 
violence.125 However, the question should actually be phrased, “whose soldiers should be 
sent to intervene and potentially be killed in the process?” Since humanitarian 
intervention is conducted by force, by definition, it should be expected that at least some 
soldiers will likely die. This expectation necessitates some follow-on questions. If 
collective security for citizens is part of a state’s reason for being, does that extend to 
non-citizens? When a person enlists in the armed forces, he probably accepts the 
possibility of being deployed to dangerous places, but does he expect to be deployed to 
protect foreigners? The answer to both of these questions is “probably not.” To explore 
this issue further, the role obligations that states have in the world must be examined 
versus the obligations soldiers have to the state. Even when gross crimes such as 
genocide happen and an intervention becomes morally necessary, states are reluctant to 
risk the lives of their own soldiers. It constitutes a constant moral tension that is at the 
root of the international community’s failure to act in most cases. However, for states to 
fulfill the duty to prevent crimes against humanity, and at the same time protect its 
soldiers in the interests of national defense, a third party could be employed. Considering 
this, the case will be made that the use of PMCs is morally preferable to the employment 
of a state’s armed forces. 
As previously discussed in Chapter II, the existence of a duty, of some kind, to 
protect helpless human beings has been well established.126 If states incur obligations to 
protect non-citizens and to prevent crimes against humanity, it follows that to fail to do 
this a moral offense. In early 1992, the international community made an effort to fulfill 
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its duty after becoming outraged by the horrific famine being playing out in Somalia. 
Over 500,000 Somalis were estimated to have died of starvation, while a number of 
warlords and their associated armed groups profited from the theft of relief supplies.127 
After a weak effort by the UN, the U.S. administration offered to lead an armed effort to 
ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, if it was authorized by the UN Security Council. 
When UN Resolution 794 passed, authorizing the U.S. to use “all necessary means”128 to 
alleviate the human suffering in Somalia, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was 
launched on December 4, 1992.129 Less than one year later, the Battle of Mogadishu 
occurred in which 18 Americans were killed and an additional 75 wounded.130 Regarding 
this, Samuel Huntington wrote “[i]t is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible 
that members of the [U.S.] armed forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing 
one another.”131 Considering the possibility that opposing views probably exist, it will be 
accepted nonetheless that Huntington is correct. 
The backlash following the deaths of American soldiers in Somalia is believed to 
have directly resulted in the international community’s failure to organize a meaningful 
intervention in Rwanda the following year.132 Interventions have occurred elsewhere 
since then, but under a new strategy of “immaculate” intervention, where the intervening 
troops are exposed to an absolute minimum of risk. This strategy is believed to originate 
from the ethical tensions that result from states’ obligations to both humanity at large and 
its own citizens, including its obligations to its own soldiers who have (presumably) 
                                                 
127 Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, 2005, CCRP Publications Series, 
Washington, DC : National Defense University Press, 11, http://dodccrp.org/files/Allard_Somalia.pdf. 
128 Andrzej Sitkowski, UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), 101. 
129 The U.S. operation was called Operation RESTORE HOPE; UNITAF was the U.S.-led 
multinational force. 
130 Allard, Somalia Operations, 17. 
131 Quoted in Tan, “The Duty to Protect,” 108. 
132 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 619–620,623–624; Cohen, One Hundred Days of 
Silence, 49–54. 
 39 
agreed to serve in the military on the condition that they be used for national defense.133 
Ironically, this strategy leads to more civilian deaths. The NATO-led interventions in 
both Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011 serve as examples of the doctrine of “priority of 
combatants,” where combatants are encouraged to give a higher priority to their own 
lives, as opposed to the lives of civilians.134 The high-altitude bombings that took place 
in both campaigns claimed the lives of many civilians,135 and although precision-guided 
munitions were used, the accuracy of those munitions would have been improved at 
lower altitudes, but at greater risk to the pilots. The decision to adopt airpower-only 
campaigns, in contrast to traditional boots-on-the-ground, demonstrates the priority of 
force-protection in these operations.136 While the statesman’s desire to protect his 
nation’s fighting man is admirable, the decision to accept a higher rate of civilian 
casualties is not morally defensible. This is a clear-cut violation of the jus in bello 
principle of discrimination.137 
The extreme risk-averse nature of these operations is probably a result of the 
moral predicament a state may find itself in when called upon to conduct a humanitarian 
intervention. Soldiers sign up to defend their nation, among other things, and when the 
soldier—not the state—is called upon to conduct a humanitarian intervention, he could 
say, with some moral gravity, “[t]his isn’t what I signed up for.”138 However, one could 
argue that although it may not be specified in a soldier’s contract that he may be required 
to participate in humanitarian interventions, it may be implied. Given the fact that 
hundreds of thousands of troops from dozens of nations have participated in 
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peacekeeping operations, the possibility may be a little more than implied.139 Another 
approach would be to suggest that if humanitarian intervention is not included in the 
soldier’s agreement with his state, then it should be; that an expanded definition of the 
soldier’s duties is in order. These solutions of implication or stipulation, however, do not 
hold up under consideration of true democratic principles.140 To require a state, and its 
soldiers, to carry out humanitarian interventions would force it to place the interests of 
foreigners over those of its own citizens, which would effectively break the contract 
between the state and its citizens.141 While this is more of a realist view that places the 
material interests of a state over all other interests, including human rights, the argument 
has some validity here. 
If a state accepts the duty to guard against human rights violations but also 
maintains its obligation to protect the interest of its own citizens, including its soldiers, 
then a third option is to employ a PMC. Under the moral tension that states, and other 
organizations, face as crimes against humanity occur the option is certainly a morally 
preferable one. A quick speculative look at the possible stakeholder views provides some 
insight: bearing only the financial cost, the citizens of states could be satisfied with a 
privatized solution, given the knowledge that they contributed in some way. Statesmen 
that work to secure funding could rightfully claim a moral victory as the crisis was 
stabilized. Employees of the PMC would be grateful for the opportunity, and eventually 
proud of their efforts. Indeed, the victims of genocide would probably not complain if 
their lives were saved by contractors instead of regular troops. However, PMCs still elicit 
a cacophony of moral objections that must be confronted. These will be addressed in 
Chapter 4, along with the origins of the modern PMC. 
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IV. FROM MERCENARY TO PEACEKEEPER: THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE PMC 
There is an international norm against the use of mercenaries that dates back to 
the formation of modern nation-states and the formation of citizen armies. It originates 
with the birth of patriotism in the late 18th century, which gave rise to the notion that one 
could not honorably fight for a cause in which one did not have a personal stake, such as 
nationalism.142 Prior to that, the employment of mercenaries was a standard practice, but 
not without objections. As early as 400 B.C., huge formations of mercenaries are known 
to have been recruited to assist ancient rulers in their wars of conquest. During the 
Middle Ages, feudal powers preferred foreign-born professional soldiers for their skill in 
battle, especially against hastily-trained peasants. Some of these mercenaries were held in 
high regard.143 Some still are; the oldest known, and longest-running, mercenary contract 
in history is held by the Vatican, whose Swiss Guard has provided security for the Pope 
since 1506.144 Even through the 18th
 
century, powerful armies were predominantly 
composed of mercenaries.145 In fact, it is believed that the traditional military rank of 
“private” originates from the idea that a soldier’s enlistment was a “private financial 
contract” between a soldier and his commander.146 These contracts still exist in some 
national armies, including the Légion Etrangère of the French army and the Royal 
Gurkha Rifles of the British army. Aside from these well-respected and legendary 
mercenary formations, somewhere along the way the idea of employing mercenaries 
became repugnant in most societies. In spite of the objections, and due to an enduring 
need for private military or security forces, the formation of the modern PMC became 
necessary. In this chapter, the evolution of the modern PMC will be traced from its 
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mercenary origins to better understand the norms against PMC employment that exist 
today. Objections to their use will be addressed along the way in order to confront the 
issues associated with their employment. Finally, the suitability of modern PMCs for 
humanitarian intervention will be discussed by asking the question, can private warriors 
be ethical? 
A. MERCENARIES OF THE PAST 
The history of the mercenary is often said to go as far back as that of war itself. A 
complete treatment of this history is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, to better 
understand the origins of the norm against mercenary use, it is useful to briefly cover two 
periods before moving on to the modern PMC. First is the early period, which covers the 
broadest part of history from antiquity to World War II. This period could be called the 
“golden age” of the mercenary. Entire conflicts were fought by mercenary bands; it was a 
time when mercenary commanders were held in high regard and the citizen-soldier 
became known only towards the end when the motivations of the individual soldier 
became important. Second, the age of the “new mercenary” will be discussed. This most 
recent period of mercenary activity probably explains best why modern prohibitions 
against mercenary activity exist. It lasts through the post-colonial period from 1960 to 
1981, beginning in the Congo after independence from Belgium and culminating with a 
failed coup in the Seychelles, attempted by a mercenary group. The events of those years 
gave rise to some of the most notorious figures in mercenary lore, and also the most 
robust objections to their use. Both periods are important to note because of the enduring 
effects they have on modern society’s view of mercenaries and the resulting effect on 
attitudes towards modern PMCs.  
1. Golden Age Mercenaries 
The “golden age” of mercenary activity reflects a time when it was more accepted 
that the ordinary citizen should stay home while the professional soldier should fight in 
wars.147 The writings of Xenophon provide an early account of the Ten Thousand 
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Greeks, a legendary mercenary force of heavily-armored hoplites hired in 401 B.C. to 
fight a war in Persia. The story includes prophetic details of the intricate relationships 
between the mercenaries, their leaders, and the rulers that employ them; like all ancient 
adventure stories, there are victories, defeats and betrayals.148 Mercenaries in Europe 
during the Middle Ages are much more well known, however. The groups available for 
hire in medieval Europe were known as “free companies,” a term that was adopted by 
modern militaries to refer to a unit of a size below battalion.149 In Italy they were known 
as condottieri, in reference to the condotta, or contracts, that the Italian city-states signed 
with the mercenary captains they employed.150 Some of these captains became heroes to 
the people of the cities they served; one example is Sir John Hawkwood, an English 
condottiero who served the city of Florence in the 14th century. He was so successful, 
and so well respected, that when he died he was buried in Florence’s main cathedral, the 
Duomo, where a fresco in his honor exists to this day.151  
When not needed, these free companies, or condottieri, were not under the control 
of anyone, but continued to wield considerable coercive power wherever they were. 
When these groups found themselves unemployed, they often resorted to extortion. Even 
the revered Sir John Hawkwood was known to demand protection money. The city of 
Siena almost rivaled Florence in the 14
th
 century until Hawkwood suggested that unless 
they were offered a substantial payment, he and his mercenary band may be inclined to 
raze the city. The amount extorted from the city at that time was so great that it is 
believed to have directly resulted in the city’s decline from a powerful city-state to a 
relatively unknown provincial village.152 The norm against their use however, did not 
likely come as a result of crimes perpetrated by a few groups. It originated from the view 
that mercenaries like Hawkwood did not fight for a suitable cause, as defined as a cause 
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that contributes to the common good of a state. Not being formally aligned with a state 
other than under temporary contract, a mercenary could not be as effective as a citizen-
soldier, who fights for his homeland. Also, by occupying a position that should be held 
by a citizen-soldier, the mercenary weakens the state; if the nation’s strength lies with its 
armed forces, every member of those forces should also be a citizen of that nation.153 
Nonetheless, the idea that mercenaries were not appropriate actors on the battlefield was 
likely a result of the lack of effective control over them.154 
Niccolò Machiavelli was an early opponent of mercenaries, and his views have 
been influential.155 In his book The Prince, he describes mercenaries as “useless and 
dangerous,” because their motives are only a “meagre wage” and that while they are 
“brave among friends; among enemies they are cowards.”156 His first objection to their 
employment is that they are not willing to die for the cause for which they fight; he cites 
the showmanship with which mercenaries would fight other mercenaries in the endless 
wars between city-states, but as soon as a foreign invader stepped ashore in Italy, 
resistance from these hired condottieri was nonexistent. Machiavelli describes how 
opposing mercenary armies fail to fortify their camps, and fail to kill each other in 
combat; they would also take each other prisoner instead without demanding ransom. Not 
surprisingly, when Charles VIII of France invaded Italy in 1494, the same mercenaries 
failed to put up a meaningful resistance.157 His second objection was that if a mercenary 
captain was incompetent, his employer was lost from the beginning; if the mercenary 
captain was capable, then it was only a matter of time before he would “aspire to [his] 
own greatness” and attempt to seize political control. Machiavelli mentions Florence’s 
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hero, Hawkwood, here. Machiavelli assumes that Hawkwood aspired to eventually seize 
control of Florence, but since he died before he could, his true loyalty “will never be 
known.”158 He rejects the notion of placing citizen commanders in charge of mercenary 
troops as well. Here he cites the Carthaginians, who were nearly overthrown by the 
mercenary soldiers they employed during their first war with Rome, in spite of having 
Carthaginian citizens as officers.159 Machiavelli’s third objection is to the general 
substitution of citizen soldiers with mercenaries and the resulting degradation in the 
loyalty and ferocity of a state’s armed forces. Using the example of Venice, he notes how 
well Venetian noblemen and citizens fought until they became overextended and began to 
rely on mercenaries like almost every other city-state. After this “mistake,” Machiavelli 
describes how Venice became more concerned with minding its losses instead of 
enjoying its acquisitions, citing the Venetian defeat by France at Vailà in 1509, a single 
day in which Venice lost “what had cost them eight hundred years…to acquire.”160 He 
alleges that only armed republics or princes in command of citizen-soldiers make true 
progress; mercenary troops and their captains diminish the prestige of citizen-soldiers, 
weaken the state, and by the 16
th
 century, had “led Italy into slavery and humiliation.”161  
Machiavelli’s bitter treatment of mercenaries comes during a time of heavy 
foreign invasion in a fractured political environment. Competing city-states were 
constantly at war and thus unable to unite against any invader. Since the use of 
mercenaries had become so widespread by necessity, it would follow that most defenders 
against an invasion would also have to be mercenaries. Political leaders could not unite 
against an invasion, so neither would any mercenary force. Machiavelli’s objections of 
dubious motivations, malicious intent, and the resulting degradation of state prestige 
leveled at mercenaries would probably have been remedied by a coalition of willing city-
states or a large standing force of professional Italian soldiers; however, given the 
political climate of the time, this was not a viable solution. Furthermore, none of his 
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objections reflect a moral failing: to do a job in exchange for money is not unique to 
mercenaries; seeking to improve one’s station in life is actually a supererogatory duty in 
modern ethics; and the diminishing effect of privatizing force on the status of domestic 
forces should be attributed to the state alone, if applicable.162 Machiavelli acknowledges 
that Italy brought devastation upon itself, but that does not prevent him from directing 
some blame to the mercenaries, diminishing their moral standing nonetheless.  
The irony of Machiavelli’s indignation toward the performance of the mercenaries 
in Italy during the invasion of Charles VIII of France in 1494 is that Charles’ force was 
composed of mostly mercenaries: German axemen, Swiss halberdmen, and Gascon 
crossbowmen.163 They performed so well that France maintains the practice of 
employing mercenaries, through the formation of the Légion Etrangère in 1831 to the 
present.164 In spite of the known drawbacks, the employment of mercenaries was so 
widespread that even after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, from which the modern nation-
state was born, the practice continued. By the time of the American Revolution, however, 
the employment of mercenaries had become despicable in popular opinion.165 The 
employment of Hessian troops by the British was strongly condemned by the Americans 
and could have contributed to the failure of the British to keep its colony, especially after 
their defeats at Trenton and Saratoga Springs, and after more than 5,000 of them 
deserted. It also left a permanent hatred for mercenaries, one that arguably exists to this 
day, in the minds of most Americans.166 
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2. The New Mercenaries 
The colonial era and the wars of national existence of the early 20
th
 century 
finally gave way to the era of the “new mercenary,” the modern-day Soldier of Fortune 
upon which most opinions of mercenaries are now based. Existentialist wars like World 
War II do not generate a need for mercenaries; the total war concept where the whole of a 
nation’s resources are levied against an enemy simply leaves no market for them. The 
post-colonial era that followed, however, and the multitude of civil wars that erupted 
after many colonies were granted independence is a different story.  
One such conflict, the Congolese civil war following independence from Belgium 
in 1960, is the veritable womb of the new mercenary. The troubles there began 
immediately after independence when the Force Publique began to massacre any Belgian 
nationals who had not left the Congo before independence. One Congolese province, 
Katanga, attempted to secede but was helpless in the face of the Simba Rebellion, a 
ruthless group that had defeated the Congolese Army and was raping, looting, and 
murdering its way across the Congo and into Katanga. With no other option, the 
Katangese President hired a mercenary group led by Mike Hoare called “5 Commando” 
to fight the Simbas.167 The unit, and others, including “6 Commando” under Bob Denard 
and “10 Commando” under “Black Jack” Schramme, participated in missions throughout 
the Congo but were vilified in the international community for their participation in what 
was viewed as a war of secession between the legitimate Congolese government and a 
renegade province, Katanga. The mercenaries’ status as villains was clinched when they 
fought Ethiopian UN troops in a confused and possibly accidental firefight. Several of the 
UN troops were killed and approximately thirty mercenaries were captured.168 In spite of 
some successes, including the “5 Commando” rescue of some Belgian nuns held by 
Simbas in Albertville,169 the mercenaries in the Congo were viewed by the UN as being 
on the wrong side of the conflict. 
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Other groups were more bloodthirsty, most notably the one led by “Colonel 
Callan,” a Greek Cypriot whose real name was Costas Georgiou. As the leader of a 
mercenary crew recruited in 1975 to fight the Movimento Popular de Libertação de 
Angola (MPLA) and their Cuban allies in Angola, Callan quickly became known for his 
ruthlessness. He fought on the side of the guerrilla movement Frente Nacional de 
Libertação de Angola (FNLA), along with hundreds of other mercenaries from all over 
the world. Callan was remarkable, however, for his penchant for murder. Aside from 
routine killings of MPLA prisoners, Callan was known to casually execute FNLA troops 
who simply exhibited signs that they may desert. In one alleged incident Callan “tested” a 
double-barreled shotgun by putting its barrel in the mouth of one of his own FNLA 
soldiers and pulling the trigger. After operating for nearly a year with a complete 
disregard for human rights, this obvious sociopath was eventually captured and executed 
by the MPLA for ordering the execution of fourteen of his own men.170 
Mercenary participation in these conflicts directly led to the AU’s 1977 
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, and the UN’s 1989 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries.171 In addition to these conventions, other conflicts and similar stories in 
Nigeria, Angola, the Seychelles, and other places from 1960–1981 provide the genesis of 
the current popular view of mercenaries as immoral, thrill-seeking thugs willing to sell 
their services to anyone.172 As the examples presented here suggest, the idea is not 
without merit; but with a closer understanding of the objections to mercenary use it is 
possible to separate the immoral behavior of a few individuals and determine what is 
intrinsically immoral about being a mercenary. 
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As previously mentioned, the idea that mercenaries were not appropriate actors on 
the battlefield was likely a result of the lack of effective control over them. From the 
condottieri to Callan, instances of abuse seem to have validated that argument. But the 
argument fails; simply because a right can be abused does not invalidate that right or 
imply that it cannot be used justly. Hence, the bad behavior of some mercenaries is not a 
valid reason to deem all mercenaries immoral, a priori.  
A more convincing argument is that two normative shifts in modern societies have 
brought about a norm against mercenary use: first, the moral change in the relationship 
between citizen and state; second, the moral change in the decision to employ citizens in 
national armies.173 States recognized the need to employ citizen armies, and citizens 
recognized that they had a patriotic duty to serve in the army. This suggests that these 
normative shifts were not a result of mercenary activity; rather, they are a product of a 
normal evolution in society. This explanation is referred to elsewhere as the “state-building 
argument,”174 and explains how neither the condottieri nor Callan would be acceptable 
today. This duty of state to citizen and citizen to army necessitates the moral prohibition of 
mercenaries; however, it opens a different market for modern PMCs.  
B. THE NEW CORPORATE WARRIORS 
Modern-day PMCs are not mercenary organizations.175 Their corporate structure 
distinguishes them from their distant mercenary cousins, as does the era in which they 
operate. The rise of the modern PMC has been chronicled by several authors, most 
notably by P. W. Singer in his widely-cited book Corporate Warriors. Singer 
characterizes PMCs as a business, “first and foremost,” and often part of larger multi-
national corporations with diverse interests.176 PMCs represent the newest incarnation of 
military service providers, but are very different from the condottieri or Hessians 
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previously described.177 Their re-emergence in the post-Cold War arena was the result of 
a rising demand for military forces due to the effects of civil war and failed states, a 
burgeoning supply of unemployed soldiers in the post-Cold War era, and a growing 
political theory that supported privatizing public functions.178 PMC employees have 
served by the thousands in the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet there still 
exists strong moral opposition to their use. A complete history of the rise of PMCs is 
outside of the scope of this thesis;179 instead, the ethical objections to their use will be 
discussed in this section. Other than some contingent objections based on hypothetical 
expectations of abuse, there are effectively no valid objections to the employment of 
PMCs in principle and under the right conditions. 
Avant describes PMCs as firms that provide “violent services,”180 and Singer puts 
them at the business end of his “tip of the spear” typology.181 Before proceeding it is 
useful to present a more comprehensive definition of a PMC, written by Tim Spicer, 
OBE,182 the founder of the PMC Sandline International: 
A PMC…offers a packaged service covering a wide variety of military 
and quasi-military skills…PMCs are permanent structures, corporate 
entities, which are run like a business. They have a clear hierarchy, are run 
on military lines and operate to high disciplinary standards and within the 
law of armed conflict, with a particular concern for human rights.183 
The last part of this definition is of concern here. For PMCs to be effective in this 
century, they must operate with a high regard for human rights issues. This is understood 
by the PMC professional organization, the International Stability Operations Association 
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(ISOA), whose “Code of Conduct” requires that its members adhere to no less than ten 
international conventions, including the Geneva Convention, the Convention Against 
Torture, and the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, 
among others.184 In spite of these internal efforts at regulation, the stigma of past events 
endures, and moral objections to the use of PMCs remain.  
The debate about PMCs can be divided into two camps: those that view PMCs as 
legitimate business ventures with a valid place in the international arena, and those that 
view them as re-treaded classical mercenaries that only see dollar signs through the 
smoke of conflict.185 The latter group has valid concerns that should be addressed, 
because they relate directly to the suitability of PMCs to conduct humanitarian 
intervention missions. Decision makers who view PMCs as a new form of mercenary 
organization apply the same objections to PMCs as they would to mercenaries of the past. 
Sarah Percy asserts in a radio interview that moral objections against the use of 
mercenaries are “entirely illogical but they’re very deeply held.”186 To shake the 
mercenary stigma and provide a more lucid illustration of the modern PMC, some 
objections will be addressed here. 
While not every objection can be covered here, the three major ones will be 
discussed. First, the most commonly heard objection is that PMCs are not accountable to 
anyone. This is a valid concern, due to some high profile transgressions, including gross 
human rights violations perpetrated by some PMC employees that resulted in no 
meaningful prosecutions.187 Many scholars seek to remedy the accountability issue by 
proposing stricter regulation and systems of accountability on the operations conducted 
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by these companies.188 However, it will be shown that there are existing regulatory 
mechanisms in place that can be effective, including the codes of ethics maintained by 
industry-wide organizations, international conventions, and most importantly, the 
principal agent’s responsibility for his agent’s behavior. A second objection is to the 
motive of profiteering. This is also a valid concern, since contractors in Iraq have been 
known to overcharge the government to the tune of millions of dollars for services that 
were either performed to a substandard degree or not at all.189 This objection is followed 
by the assertion that money is not a just motivation for putting oneself into harm’s way; 
but in spite of the blatant and organized theft by a number of U.S. contractors in the first 
decade of the 21st century, it will be shown that it is not immoral to do a job in return for 
payment, even if it involves killing in just defense. The third objection that follows is 
concerned with PMC use as a violation of the social contract, which asserts that states 
alone should hold a monopoly on the use of violence. This objection would be valid in a 
perfect world, but PMCs have already challenged states’ monopoly on the use of force. 
The increasingly large role that private contractors have played in the conflicts of the last 
two decades, especially in Iraq, is strong evidence that privatized force is no longer a 
“nice to have,” it is now a necessary component of war fighting, and will likely continue 
to be so.190  
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1. Accountability 
Human rights abuses by employees of PMCs have happened and the employees 
are usually not punished. An often-cited case is the human trafficking and child 
prostitution cases committed by DynCorp employees in the Balkans.191 Another well-
known case is the involvement of CACI International192 and Titan employees in the Abu 
Ghuraib torture case.193 There is also the murder of seventeen civilians in Baghdad’s 
Nisour Square by Blackwater security guards.194 In yet another case of egregious 
behavior by a PMC employee, Jacob Washbourne, an employee of Triple Canopy, 
allegedly declared “I want to kill somebody today,” before going out on a convoy. That 
day, Washbourne was later found to be involved in three unjustified shooting incidents. 
After a short internal investigation by Triple Canopy, Washbourne was fired.195 In fact, 
little more than being fired is all that happened to any of the offenders in these cases.196 
Not surprisingly, opponents of PMCs charge that companies can do whatever they 
want, wherever they want, and that legal and ethical oversight is nonexistent.197 These 
cases seem to support this, but as Chia Lehnardt argues, PMCs do not, in fact, operate in 
a legal vacuum. Responsibility for these incidents arguably lies with the state or other 
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entity that employed the PMC.198 Unfortunately, that responsibility is infinitely easy to 
circumvent by allowing the full blame to be placed on not only the PMC, but also the 
entire PMC industry. While most authors call for more regulation,199 the regulatory 
mechanisms already in place remain largely ignored, except for by a few academics. 
Ortiz outlines a number of laws, licensing mechanisms, and codes of conduct already in 
place that govern the conduct of PMCs.200 Furthermore, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) already has the duty to prosecute crimes committed internationally, whether it is 
perpetrated by a private individual or a PMC employee.201 While the study of the 
regulation of PMCs constitutes a separate subject and beyond the scope of this thesis, for 
the sake of clarity and to effectively deal with this objection, some of the regulatory 
mechanisms that govern the conduct of PMCs are: International Traffic in Arms 
Regulation (ITAR), a licensing method; International Humanitarian Law (Anti-
Mercenary Convention);202 and the Montreaux Document, a guide to “good practices” in 
the industry.203 
These methods of regulation seem to be sufficient, yet they are certainly not all 
that exist. They simply serve as examples of a wide range of mechanisms available for 
external regulation of PMC activity. Their efficacy is questionable in most cases, 
however. International law is notoriously difficult to enforce, as are codes of conduct, 
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even with a self-regulating, governing body such as the ISOA that is accepted in the 
industry. Considering this, the PMCs contract would be the most effective method of 
holding PMCs accountable, as agents of a principal employer.204 Thus, far, objections 
have focused on the PMC themselves, or the agent to be employed to carry out the 
intervention. However, the principal that hires the PMC should be ultimately responsible 
for the activities of the PMC.205 This is not to say that PMCs should not be held 
accountable; on the contrary, it is to suggest that the current systems are sufficient for 
PMC regulation, but also that the onus must be placed on the employer to hold the 
employee accountable.  
2. Profiteering 
The objection that it is wrong to profit from war has been raised many times, but 
the logic of an individual expecting payment for a service is not controversial.206 In fact, 
the motives of individuals willing to provide violent services would be most questionable if 
they did not require reasonable amounts of money as payment. These individuals would fit 
nicely into yet another mercenary definition, Mockler’s “real mark of the mercenary – a 
devotion to war for its own sake.”207 An issue that does raise valid concerns is the 
controversy surrounding contractors’ overcharging for services delivered in wartime. U.S. 
Congressmen have discovered massive payments to Halliburton in the past, while fearing 
that they may only be “the tip of the iceberg.”208 The suspicions raised by incidents 
uncovered during the Iraq War should not color attitudes towards all contractors, however. 
Other PMCs have provided effective services for relatively small sums.209 
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Another concern with profit-seeking PMCs is that they make it easier for states to 
go to war. Interestingly, this is one of the same criticisms of Just War Theory. Walzer 
discusses this same objection in defense of JWT by pointing out that there are acts of 
aggression and crimes against humanity that should be resisted by force, using the 
example of the Nazis in World War II. He further points out that, in his opinion, a 
military intervention to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 would have been a just war, 
and that an easier road to war in that case would have been beneficial, not detrimental.210 
It follows that the same would be true if a force-provider PMC had been hired to 
intervene in that same situation; in certain cases, the availability of contracted combatants 
could have made a significant difference in the lives of thousands of people. A follow-up 
concern to that is that PMCs make it easier for states to prosecute a war without obtaining 
the approvals usually required in a democratic society. The approvals are in place to 
minimize the use of violence, and PMCs allow principals to circumvent that.211 This 
assumes that PMCs will accept any job and that politicians are willing to get their hands 
dirty. Yet another concern is that profit-seeking PMCs could disrupt peace processes 
because it is in their best interests for conflict to continue. Shearer disputes this, and notes 
that “coercion is often essential to breaking deadlocks and bringing opposing parties to 
the negotiating table.”212 In a scenario such as this, PMCs would be part of the solution, 
not the problem. This objection is analogous to the idea that a firefighter would be likely 
to go out and commit arson in the interests of his job security. This is certainly possible; 
but highly unlikely and not a good basis for an objection against the moral permissibility 
of firefighters. It has also been suggested that PMCs used in an intervention could 
subsequently be illicitly used to dominate the population, expand territory, or take control 
of an invaded territory’s resources. This is another criticism of JWT, and like the 
objection that PMCs undermine the democratic control of violence, amounts to a 
distortion of the actual reasons for embarking on a military intervention by substituting a 
more nefarious intention that may not exist. Walzer writes in his response to this 
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criticism, “…if critics can distinguish between concocted excuses for war and actual 
reasons, why can’t the rest of us do the same thing?”213 Wars of aggression, conquest, or 
economic advancement are unjust wars and are not permissible, and should not be fought 
by anyone, including PMCs. 
Finally, there is some empirical evidence that contractors are not motivated by 
money alone. In a survey of more than 200 contractors, Franke and Von Boemcken found 
that the motivations of contractors serving in Iraq and Afghanistan were similar to those 
of their counterparts in uniform. Like other military professionals, they believe in a high 
standard of professionalism, codes of ethical conduct, and most importantly, motivated 
by a self-imposed duty to serve in the interests of the greater good.214 
3. Providing “Violent Services” 
Another major issue with the employment of PMCs is the belief that they 
represent a violation of the state’s monopoly on the use of violence per the terms of the 
Social Contract. The legions of contractors that have already deployed throughout the 
world, however, would suggest that the notion that states still maintain that traditional 
monopoly on the use of violence is already outdated. Therefore, a more relevant 
objection would be that PMCs may challenge states’ ability to control the use of 
violence.215 The regulatory mechanisms discussed in the previous sections are a good 
reference for questions of control, but so is the question of the professionalism of the 
PMC employee. 
What follows is the objection that PMC employees are immoral because they kill 
for money. Alleging that PMC contracts are hunter-killer in nature, or are assassination-
based activities is a distortion of the true nature of a typical force-provider PMC 
operation. As will be shown in Chapter 6, PMCs are usually hired to carry out a mission 
with a terrain-based objective; nowhere should it be stated that killing is the objective. 
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However, just defensive killings are an integral part of armed conflict, and should be 
expected. If the war is just, then killings carried out in the prosecution of that war and in 
defense of other people’s lives are justified.216 In fact, an enemy fighting in support of 
genocide has ostensibly forfeited his right to life, and killing him would be morally 
permissible, whether by a PMC employee or soldier.217 
4. Can Private Warriors Be Ethical, Then? 
In spite of examples of sociopaths like Washbourne, there is really no evidence 
that PMC employees are more likely to engage in human rights violations than their 
counterparts in uniform.218 Can private warriors be ethical, then? Deane-Peter Baker asks 
this question and concludes that they can. He asserts that their moral status is no different 
from regular soldiers of a state.219 With consideration of the objections previously 
discussed, the same conclusion is reached here. Of course, not every possible objection 
can be addressed, but the most important ones have. In this section it has been shown that 
the accountability issue is exaggerated, and requires no new regulatory mechanisms; the 
ones already in place are sufficient. The immorality of the profiteering motive has been 
determined to be false, and issues with privatized provision of violent services have been 
addressed. Following this, one can conclude that PMCs could potentially be morally 
suitable for employment in armed conflict, including humanitarian intervention, but 
further discussion is necessary. In the next section, concepts and issues associated with 
the employment of PMCs for humanitarian intervention will be discussed. 
C. PMCS AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Why not, when nations have already lost the monopoly of violence, 
consider creating volunteer mercenary forces organized by private 
corporations to fight wars on a contract-fee basis for the United 
Nations…Governments unwilling to send their own young men and 
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women to die in combat…might have fewer reservations about allowing 
the UN to contract with a non-political, professional fighting force made 
up of volunteers from many nations—a rapid-deployment unit for hire.220 
As the preceding quote suggests, the idea that PMCs could be employed to 
conduct humanitarian intervention has been proposed by a number of theorists.221 There 
are PMCs that have proposed the idea themselves,222 which demonstrates willingness and 
the presumed capability to carry out the mission on the part of the PMC. Pattison argues 
that the employment of a PMC to conduct a humanitarian intervention can be morally 
permissible.223 Furthermore, as argued in Chapter III, the employment of a PMC in this 
case may be morally preferable, on the grounds that humanitarian interventions are not 
typically part of the agreement between the state and the individual who volunteers to 
join that state’s armed forces.224 Given what has been presented, a simple framework to 
guide ethical private intervention is required, so in Chapter V, a theory of ethically 
justified private intervention based on Just War Theory will be presented. 
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V. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We shall know nothing until we know whether we have the right to kill 
our fellow men, or the right to let them be killed. In that every action 
today leads to murder, direct or indirect, we cannot act until we know 
whether or why we have the right to kill.225 
Once the decision is made to intervene, and a responsible principal finds it 
necessary to hire a PMC, then an ethical guideline under which to carry out the 
intervention becomes necessary. Existing guidelines, such as the Montreaux Document 
and the ISOA Code of Conduct,226 are useful for lists of “good practices” directed at 
industry professionals; but these good practices should be observed alongside a theory of 
ethically justified private intervention, which aims to provide a more flexible guideline 
for ethical conduct in a broad range of circumstances. Before the theory can be 
formulated, however, the validity of a few arguments must be accepted. First, one must 
accept the arguments that humanitarian intervention is morally obligatory under certain 
circumstances, there exists conditions under which it can be permissible to outsource 
intervention, and that soldiers employed by a PMC are not different than any other 
soldier in any morally relevant way. Next, if it is not controversial to say that a war is just 
when it is prosecuted under the principles of Just War Theory, then it follows that an 
armed humanitarian intervention conducted by a PMC would also be just, if it is carried 
out under an appropriately modified version of the same theory. The former three 
arguments have been presented in the previous chapters of this thesis; the latter argument 
will be presented for the remainder. 
The unique problems that PMCs pose to ethical intervention must be addressed by 
any such theory. Beginning with traditional Just War Theory as a baseline, appropriate 
criteria will be identified and defined as they apply. To accomplish this, a brief overview 
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of Just War Theory as it exists in the current literature will be presented, and traditional 
criteria will be described as they relate to PMCs and intervention. Considering the 
hypothetically consequentialist nature of the mutual contractual obligations between the 
principal and agent, the criteria from Just War Theory given the most weight are non-
consequentialist in nature. Of particular interest and relevance are the jus ad bellum 
principles of right authority, just cause, and right intention; and the jus in bello criteria of 
proportionality and discrimination. Within these criteria lies a major challenge for PMCs: 
legitimacy. Traditional legitimacy, or right authority, came from a state official or 
equivalent; the principal agent of a PMC may not have that status. Therefore, it is 
necessary to recall Pattison’s Moderate Instrumentalist Approach from Chapter II, where 
it is proposed that legitimacy is derived from effectiveness, and that only a legitimate 
intervention force can achieve a desirable outcome. If accepted, this approach could 
exclude some state forces and international organizations, such as the UN. While 
Pattison’s framework is designed to determine who is most suitable to conduct an 
intervention, its criteria will be used here as consequentialist determinants of ethical 
performance in an intervention. Of special interest within this framework as it relates to 
PMCs is internal jus in bello. Pattison identifies this criterion as especially problematic 
for PMCs,227 but the opposite will be argued here. Either way, the criterion is important 
to include in this theory of ethically justified private intervention exactly because of the 
potential problems it poses. Finally, so as to present a complete theory that does not 
exclude conflict termination, a final jus post bellum criteria will be presented that takes 
into account the special nature of PMCs in conflict as peacemakers, not necessarily 
peacebuilders. Since there is no satisfactory jus post bellum criterion available, a new one 
will be presented–just transfer of authority. 
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A. SOME CRITERIA FOR ETHICALLY JUSTIFIED PRIVATE 
INTERVENTION: JUST WAR THEORY AND PATTISON’S MODERATE 
INSTRUMENTALIST APPROACH 
Armed humanitarian intervention is governed by the same ethical guidelines as 
any incarnation of warfare, and as a stand-alone theory, the framework offered by Just 
War Theory offers the most comprehensive method of scrutinizing the morality of war. It 
originated in ancient times as a secular alternative to “holy war,” but still came to be 
associated with religion, especially Christianity. Aristotle (384–322 BC) coined the term 
“just war” and Augustine (354–430 AD) adapted the early concept to make war possible 
from a religious and moral point of view; he struggled with the purely pacifist dogma of 
Jesus Christ versus the constant threat of armed attack from outside forces, and concluded 
that war must be permissible under certain conditions to protect innocent civilians.228 The 
conditions have evolved over time, but the criteria are usually classified in three 
divisions: jus ad bellum, the criteria required to justly go to war; jus in bello, the 
conditions under which war should be justly fought; and jus post bellum, the conditions 
under which war should be justly concluded. A table provided by J. Carl Ficarrotta is a 
useful distillation of the Just War Theory criteria found in the literature: 
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The Just War Theory 
Jus ad Bellum Jus in Bello Jus post Bellum 
Right Authority Discrimination Right Authority 
Just Cause Right Intention Just Cause for Termination 
Right Intention Minimize Suffering Right Intention 
Last Resort Proportionality Declaration 
Declaration No Means Mala in Se Discrimination 
Proportionality  Proportionality 
Probability of Success   
Aim of Peace   
Table 1.   Ficarrotta’s amalgamation of Just War Theory criteria229 
The theory is largely, though not completely, non-consequentialist. Its hallmark 
criterion is the principle of just cause; a war is unjust if the cause is unjust, regardless of 
the consequences. Notable exceptions from Ficarotta’s table are the aim of peace and 
probability of success criteria; they are consequentialist because they allude directly to 
the outcome of the intervention, but in a business arrangement between a principal and 
agent these can be safely assumed to be met. If a principal is engaging a PMC to carry 
out a humanitarian intervention, his only just aim is peace; for the PMC, assuming that 
his business model would include success, as will be discussed below. 
There is substantial disagreement not only on which criterion fits where, but also 
what each criterion really means. Ficarrotta considers some examples to demonstrate the 
ambiguity inherent in the Just War Theory criteria.230 First, the criterion of just cause could 
mean many things; it is generally agreed to be self-defense, but of what? A just cause could 
be the protection of a nation’s borders, its population, or its natural resources; another just 
cause could be carrying out the will of God, same as the justification used by Al-Qaeda. 
Another example is the criterion of last resort. Emotion and pride often cloud perceptions 
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of alternatives to war, as the American experience in the 2003 Iraq War showed.231 It is 
difficult for national leaders to honestly say when all options have been exhausted. A third 
example is the ambiguity of right authority. As with many things, the concept is relative. A 
country’s leaders will likely reject the authority of an invader, and a rebel leader will 
certainly reject the authority of the leaders in the government he opposes. In the 
international community, the UN is often referred to as a legitimate legal body, but their 
legitimacy is hypothetical; their resolutions are often disregarded and they have no organic 
enforcement mechanism.232 These are hardly characteristics of a true authority.  
There are also some problems with the theory of just war itself. In fact, Ficarrotta 
objects to Just War Theory’s classification as an actual theory, because that would 
“[confer] on it a theoretical coherence [he thinks] it simply fails to deliver.”233 He prefers 
to call it a framework, and believes that the purpose of the theory (or framework) is to 
provide a moral justification for war after the fact, and that it effectively serves no other 
purpose, and in fact makes war more common and morally acceptable.234 In contrast, 
Walzer celebrates the “triumph” of Just War Theory, and considers Ficarrotta’s objection 
to the theory’s justification of war to be its strength. If it had been easier to “moralize” 
war in Rwanda in 1994 to stop the massacres, Walzer reasons, then humanity would have 
won a victory, instead of suffering an overwhelming defeat.235 This perspective is more 
convincing, and considering the horrors that humanity continues to visit upon itself, the 
criminalization of war may be something best reserved for visions of a more peaceful 
planet in the future. 
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Examinations of Just War Theory in a context including PMCs invariably call for 
a revision of the just war principles.236 Joseph Runzo hangs on to the principles of 
discrimination and proportionality, but proposes an added jus in bello principle of 
military professionalism that excludes private forces on the sweeping assumption that 
PMC employees are not honorable military professionals. He concludes that PMC 
employees are untrained in just war, among other things, and are therefore unsuitable for 
neither peacemaking nor peacebuilding, and should be excluded from combat roles.237 
While there is some empirical evidence of weak training standards and hasty hiring 
practices on the part of PMCs, Runzo’s allegation does not reflect reality. Considering 
the source of the labor pool from which PMCs draw their employees, which is almost 
exclusively ex-military, it is more likely than not that PMC employees have received 
training in just war, especially higher echelon officers such as those employed by 
Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI) and other PMCs.238 In Iraq, in 
spite of scandals, contractors in have been portrayed as “highly professional.”239 
Furthermore, the study conducted by Franke and Von Boemcken, which uses actual data, 
concludes that most PMC employees possess characteristics that are similar to their 
counterparts in uniform.240 Therefore, the contribution of a criterion of military 
professionalism is trivial. In the following sections, each of the three categories of Just 
War Theory will be considered to determine which criteria from each category, if any, are 
non-trivial in the context of PMCs and humanitarian intervention. 
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1. Jus Ad Bellum 
Although PMCs are being proposed as a tool of a principal agent, and thus rightly 
not involved in the initial decision making process regarding whether to intervene or not 
intervene, the PMC retains a responsibility to ensure the relevant principles of jus ad 
bellum are met. The notion has been challenged that the entity to authorize the use of 
force should only be concerned with jus ad bellum while the element that fights is only 
concerned with jus in bello;241 it follows that it should be with PMCs. Therefore, jus ad 
bellum elements of a theory of ethically justified private intervention will be considered 
here. These criteria represent the PMCs basic requirement of due diligence before 
accepting a contract; a “no questions asked” arrangement must not be an option. The 
criteria presented here are a mix of consequentialist and non-consequentialist principles; 
as distinct ethical traditions, they will be considered separately. 
The fact that any contract for intervention is a business arrangement must be 
considered, first and foremost. Therefore, the assumption is safe to make that both 
principal and agent believe that the arrangement is in their best interests. It would likely 
follow, then, that the two consequentialist criteria of jus ad bellum, probability of success 
and aim of peace, would be met with the drafting of the contract. No profit-driven 
organization would enter into an arrangement that they did not expect to be successful. If 
they did, due to some ulterior motive, then the affair would be unjust. It must be assumed 
that there is an expectation of success based on a reasonably estimated probability 
generated by both principal and agent. Furthermore, no sensible principal would hire a 
company that was not expected to be successful. The aim of peace should be similarly 
assumed in a humanitarian intervention. 
Three of the non-consequentialist criteria must also be assumed to be met. 
Humanitarian intervention is necessarily overt, so a formal declaration of intent may not 
be necessary, especially in the case of failed states; there may be no entity to which 
intentions may be declared. The nature of the unique business arrangement proposed here 
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dictates proportionality. It would not be cost-efficient for a principal to commit more 
resources than necessary, though the scales will likely tip the other way in the 
proportionality calculus given the nature of the cause. In other words, given that the 
moral stakes involved for a humanitarian intervention will be high in the extreme to begin 
with (if it is a just cause), the potentially high cost of an intervention conducted by a 
PMC would be easily proportionate. Finally, the principle of last resort is dubious, since 
there are always alternatives to war, in theory.242 If a principal is negotiating with a 
PMC, then it should be safely assumed that all other possible avenues of approach have 
been exhausted. These criteria are not unimportant, however; they are considered 
preconditions of the business arrangement being considered. If any fail to be met, then 
the effort would be unjust from the start. This leaves a final three criteria out of the eight 
presented by Ficarrotta: right authority, just cause, and right intention.243 These criteria 
are the most important for the present purpose because they pose the most problems for 
PMCs; even though the decision to intervene must happen before contact is made with 
the PMC.  
a. Right Authority: Local External Effectiveness 
PMCs that are hired as agents of humanitarian intervention derive their 
authority from the principal that hires them, since they act on behalf of that principal. The 
PMC has an obligation, however, to ensure that the principal possesses right authority, 
but not necessarily from a legal institution such as the UNSC.244 In this section, the 
terms “right authority” and “legitimacy” will be used interchangeably. 
As previously discussed, there is a view is that an intervention is not 
permissible when carried out without authorization from a public authority. This “public 
authority” is defined as an individual or group, with no higher authority, responsible for 
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the well-being of a state or other political element.245 However, if that public authority is 
unable or unwilling to protect the human rights of its citizens, then it ceases to be a 
legitimate authority and the responsibility to protect the citizens of that state passes to an 
intervener with the highest degree of effectiveness.  
In this view, the non-consequentialist criterion of right authority, which 
dictates that that the intervener have legal authorization, is transformed into a 
consequentialist notion of a right authority that depends on effectiveness, from which 
legitimacy follows. As has been shown, the principle of legitimacy is especially 
problematic for PMCs; the legal status of PMCs in international law is unclear and has 
long been a subject of debate.246 However, by setting aside the relevance of the 
intervener’s legal status, the moral authority an intervener possesses can be readily 
assessed by the PMC using the three forms of effectiveness from Pattison’s Moderate 
Instrumentalist Approach: local external effectiveness, global external effectiveness, and 
internal effectiveness. While these elements of Pattison’s approach are useful as a 
framework to establish legitimacy, they should be considered in a scaled method of 
establishing legitimacy, where only the first criterion, local external effectiveness, need 
be satisfied to achieve a sufficient degree of legitimacy. 
Local external effectiveness has been previously characterized as the 
intervener’s ability to end the crisis and successfully promote human rights in the area of 
the intervention. Furthermore, it dictates that the opinions of the affected population be 
on the side of the intervention.247 If the opinions of the victimized population do not 
support an intervention using a PMC, then it would be unethical and should not be 
undertaken, and vice versa. There are many ways to establish the truth of that opinion, 
such as independent polling or a bona fide request from a representative of an affected 
group; in short, if the people want it, the legitimacy is likely achieved.  
                                                 
245 Boyle, “Traditional Just War Theory and Humanitarian Intervention,” 36–37. 
246 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, 10. 
247 Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, 140. 
 70 
The two remaining forms of effectiveness, global external effectiveness 
and internal effectiveness are not unimportant, but they are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to establish legitimacy, and so they will considered for future study.248 Two of 
the remaining elements of Pattison’s approach, external and internal jus in bello, will be 
considered in the section on jus in bello that follows. 
b. Just Cause: Proof of Atrocity  
This criterion is simplest to define for PMCs. Moving beyond Walzer’s 
qualification of an intervention, which requires that events “shock the moral conscience 
of mankind,” a principal’s just cause must be well established and undisputable, since the 
burden of proof is on him.249 Furthermore, the intervention must be a righteous response 
to unjust aggression, in defense of the lives of others. Simply put, it is necessarily a 
response to physical violence.250 Genocide and other crimes against humanity are 
atrocities that, when proven, provide a reasonable just cause for intervention.251  
c. Right Intention 
This criterion is often cited as a reason that PMCs are inappropriate for 
humanitarian intervention: they are motivated by financial gain.252 As argued in 
Chapter IV, this is not a compelling argument. It also ignores the distinction between 
motivation and intention; the agent’s motive is his reason for carrying out the operation, 
while his intention is the goal he wishes to achieve.253 It is not intrinsically immoral to 
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be a mercenary, or to be employed by a PMC.254 Even if a PMC employee is motivated 
primarily by the money he earns, he is not very different than his counterparts in 
uniform, except that he has not rallied to a flag and he is not likely to be ready and 
willing to die to achieve his objectives.255 Nonetheless, PMCs will strive to achieve 
what they are paid to achieve, and if their intent is to establish a safe haven for a 
victimized population or halt the advance of a murderous force carrying out the 
genocidal orders of a corrupt regime, then the fact that they are being paid to achieve 
that goal does not make their actions immoral. 
So, if the intent of the principal is just, then it follows that the intent of the 
PMC, as the agent of the principal, is also just. There is a caveat in this relationship, 
however. The principal must ensure that it is in the best interests of the PMC to achieve 
his intent. A method to achieve this can be found in the two principles of positivist 
agency theory: outcome-based contracts and supervision.256 An outcome-based contract 
with specific objectives and conditions for their achievement is required, as is some type 
of effective reporting system, such as direct supervision by observers, so that the 
principal knows what the agent is doing at all times. Furthermore, a system of rewards 
and penalties should be put into place that ensures that undesirable behavior is punished 
and the achievement of objectives is rewarded.257 If one considered the circumstances 
surrounding some of the criminal activities involving PMCs in Iraq, one could probably 
conclude that the lack of effective controls over those contractors contributed to that 
activity. Nevertheless, a just intent on the part of the principal is necessary, imposed on 
the PMC through outcome-based contracts and supervision. 
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2. Jus In Bello 
While it is right to resist physical violence visited upon fellow human beings, 
resistance should also be subject to restraint.258 Concerning PMCs, jus in bello concerns 
begin when they finally engage in the use of force, and potentially just defensive killing. 
They also become legitimate targets themselves, placing them in an especially grave 
moral position as they defend themselves and the people they are paid to defend. 
The jus in bello principles of right intention, to minimize suffering, and to use no 
means mala in se symbolize the responsible application of violence to which any armed 
force should adhere, including PMCs. On the other hand, the just war principles of 
discrimination and proportionality are of special interest to the application of privatized 
violence; PMCs, as agents of humanitarian intervention, must adhere to stricter versions 
of those principles.259 These principles make up the external jus in bello of Pattison’s 
Moderate Instrumentalist Approach, but will be considered separately here. A final 
factor, internal jus in bello, will be considered as a distinct criterion. 
a. Discrimination 
The principle of discrimination is probably most important for PMCs. The 
principle dictates that the PMC must gain and maintain the ability to discriminate 
between permissible and impermissible targets. Permissible targets should be defined as 
those “engaged in harming,” while impermissible targets are not.260 While this is fairly 
straightforward, the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) enables foresight of civilian 
casualties which poses a significant problem for PMCs. The DDE specifies at least two 
potential effects for every action in combat: one good and one bad. For every action 
against a legitimate target, civilian casualties and collateral damage is inevitable, 
commensurate with the complexity of the situation. Usually, as long as the action itself is 
permissible, the bad effects are not intended, the bad effects are not the means by which 
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the good effects are achieved, and the bad effects do not outweigh the good effect, the 
action remains permissible.261 However, for a PMC, this is not good enough. Indeed, an 
idealist position may be that when carrying out a humanitarian intervention, there can be 
no civilian casualties whatsoever. Due to the already morally tenuous position PMCs are 
in, it could be argued in such a way, but the burden to achieve such a standard would be 
excessive. Civilian casualties inevitably occur, and the PMC command structure must be 
prepared to mitigate the negative effects of those casualties, much like modern militaries 
do, through active engagement of the population through public relations, civil affairs, 
and the like. Failure to mitigate the effects of collateral damage risks the perception of a 
violation of the discrimination principle; it also risks losing any local external 
effectiveness from which the intervention’s legitimacy derives.  
b. Proportionality 
The proportionality criterion prescribes the level of force that is 
appropriate to the target, at the tactical level.262 While the jus ad bellum criterion of 
proportionality can be accounted for through cost-effectiveness, whereby it is assumed 
that as a business arrangement, a PMC will not deploy forces beyond what is necessary to 
counter the threat, this is not necessarily so at the tactical level. PMC employees must 
understand that it is not permissible to inflict excessive harm on an enemy that poses a 
less proportionate threat. Employees must be trained in the use of aimed, proportionate 
fire, and appropriate weapons systems for threat response. To accomplish this, informal 
training on proportionality is not sufficient; formal policies must be in place that dictate 
reasonable rules of engagement and prohibit unnecessary suffering. 
c. Internal Jus In Bello 
This element of Pattison’s Moderate Instrumentalist Approach is 
compelling because it seems to have been formulated with PMCs in mind. It is in two 
parts, the first is concerned with the sort of soldiers employed to undertake the 
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intervention; the second provides for appropriate protection for the PMCs own 
employees.263 In some historical cases, PMC employees have been trained soldiers from 
elite units. In more recent cases, out of necessity, PMCs have employed personnel from 
less prestigious backgrounds.264 This major concern, however, is the use of conscript and 
child soldiers. While the use of conscripts may not be of concern in a privatized force, the 
use of child soldiers, especially in places where the practice is generally accepted, is a 
potential problem. As the demand increases, and the supply of trained, ex-soldiers 
decreases, there may be a temptation to hire local troops of an unacceptable age. 
Furthermore, a failure to provide adequate protection for those troops may become a 
problem as well. As evidenced by the deaths of four Blackwater employees in Fallujah in 
2004, a heavy operational tempo and failure to plan could result in PMC employees being 
sent to places without adequate protection. In this case, the four men were killed and 
mutilated before friendly forces knew of their presence in the area.265 This was a clear 
violation of internal jus in bello by Blackwater, who failed to provide adequate protection 
for these employees. 
To aid implementation of internal jus in bello, oversight by the principal is 
suggested. While necessity may dictate more austere measures in a conflict, PMC 
employees should be of appropriate age and background for the job, and they must be 
provided adequate protection in the form of personal equipment, fire support, and 
casualty evacuation capabilities. If the treatment of a PMC’s own employees is unjust, 
then the contract to conduct any operation should be considered to be unjust. 
3. Jus Post Bellum: Just Transfer of Authority 
Regarding the ultimate goal of ending a conflict once and for all, PMCs pose a 
legitimate problem. The private intervention force proposed here is aimed at setting the 
conditions for peace; it is unlikely that a PMC, as described, would be equipped for a 
                                                 
263 Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, 110–111. 
264 Fainaru describes a PMC that “hired former cage fighters, tow-truck operators, qualified AARP 
members, then handed them weapons and sent them out into Iraq” (Fainaru, Big Boy Rules, 62). 
265 Dunigan, Victory for Hire, 69–71. 
 75 
long-term peacekeeping operation, and thus could only gain a temporary peace.266 The 
traditional jus post bellum criteria for conflict termination–right authority, just cause for 
termination, right intention, declaration, discrimination, and proportionality–apply more 
closely to the principal agent; that is, it is the principal’s responsibility is to ensure that 
these conditions are ultimately met. 
However, in the spirit of Colin Powell’s warning to George Bush prior to the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003: “You break it, you own it,”267 the PMC who breaks a stalemate 
in a conflict maintains a responsibility to ensure that there is a just transfer of authority to 
either another agent of the principal or to a public authority, such as the UN. As an 
intervention force, the PMC would necessarily be in control of the affected region, and 
understandably untenable situation in a scenario where long-term stability and a return to 
public order is the goal. Therefore, the PMCs plan must include a single jus post bellum 
criterion for conflict termination: just transfer of authority. 
B. A THEORY OF ETHICALLY JUSTIFIED PRIVATE INTERVENTION 
“When everything is said and done, troops will only be prepared to risk 
their lives if they feel, not merely in their brains but in the marrow of their 
bones, that their cause is just.”268 
The seven criteria are presented here in three categories: jus ad bellum, jus in 
bello, and jus post bellum. These divisions are designed so that ethical issues associated 
with distinct phases of warfare can be focused on separately.269 However, as a theory of 
ethically justified private intervention, all seven criteria will be considered together as 
elements of a contract between a principal and agent. The criteria that make up the theory 
are summarized in Table 2, including test questions to help determine whether or not the 
criteria are satisfied: 
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Does the intervener possess local external 
effectiveness: an ability to end the crisis? 
Just Cause 
Is there proof of crimes against humanity? Is the 
intervention a response to physical violence? 
Right Intention Is there a humanitarian-based end state? 
Discrimination 
Does the agent discriminate between permissible 
and impermissible targets? Are there attempts to 
mitigate the effects of collateral damage? 
Proportionality 
Are there formal Rules of Engagement (ROE)? Are 
employees trained in the use of aimed, proportionate 
fire, and appropriate weapons systems for threat 
response? 
Internal jus in 
bello 
Is there appropriate protection for the PMCs own 
employees? 
Just Transfer of 
Authority 
After hostilities cease, is there a planned transfer of 
authority to either another agent of the principal or 
to a public authority, such as the UN? 
Table 2.   Summary of the criteria that make up the theory of ethically justified private 
intervention 
Most scholars recommend that prior to the privatization of any military operation 
a solid system of regulation must be in place.270 Apart from the existing licensing 
mechanisms, conventions, and codes of conduct already in place, this is unlikely to be 
feasible. Using this theory as a guideline, ethically justified private intervention is 
possible. In the case studies that follow, three cases will be analyzed, bearing in mind 
actual events and using counterfactuals, to test the theory and help refine it further. 
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VI. CASE STUDIES 
Cases of humanitarian intervention missions carried out solely by private forces 
are almost nonexistent. In fact, significant cases of tip-of-the-spear intervention of any 
type by PMCs are rare. Percy suggests that there are only three: Executive Outcomes 
(EO) in Sierra Leone, Sandline in Papua New Guinea (PNG), and EO in Angola.271 The 
first two of these are used here; the last case, EO in Angola, is not included because the 
main actors are almost all the same as in the EO in Sierra Leone case and would not 
provide sufficient variance for a meaningful comparison. Furthermore, the case of EO in 
Sierra Leone more closely resembles a humanitarian mission, due to the unparalleled 
savagery demonstrated by the enemy in that conflict. In contrast, the case of Sandline in 
PNG could not be characterized as a humanitarian mission at all. This case is presented as 
it occurred, but in the analysis counterfactuals are presented that help refine the 
conditions under which an ethical intervention could have happened. The final case is 
concerned with the Rwanda genocide; it is purely humanitarian, and the intervention is 
purely counterfactual. It is unique in that a PMC was not hired by any entity to intervene, 
and since it provides the impetus for this thesis in many ways, it is uniquely suited as a 
case study. The Rwanda case represents the archetypical scenario under which a PMC 
seems to be most appropriate, and therefore, it will also be used as a thought experiment 
to help refine the conditions under which an ethical intervention could have happened. To 
help with the feasibility of the counterfactual, a previously studied PMC will be used as 
the notional intervention force: EO. As opposed to using the Angola case, the use of EO 
in a theoretical intervention in Rwanda is meaningful; this PMC had a plan for an 
intervention and the available assets at the time of the genocide. Furthermore, this case 
presents an opportunity to consider a unique principal not previously encountered—the 
altruistic individual with the resources to employ a private army. 
The three cases presented here were selected based on: data richness, extreme 
values on the values of the IVs, large within-case variance on the values of the IVs, the 
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idea that predictions made by competing theories disagree with the hypothesized 
outcome, their similarity to current policy issues, the relative similarity of case 
background conditions, their suitability for comparison with other cases, and their 
fundamental importance.272 The central hypothesis of the theory of ethically justified 
private intervention is that under certain conditions, humanitarian intervention carried out 
by a private force, such as a PMC, is permissible. The IVs in this study are the seven 
criteria that make up the theory of ethically justified private intervention presented in 
Chapter V; the SV is the permissibility of the case as an ethical intervention using a 
PMC. It is not necessary to predict the value of the SV in these cases because it is already 
known based on the historical outcome. However, as discussed in Chapter I, if the value 
of an IV is determined to be false, counterfactual conditions will be used to help 
formulate conditions under which the variable would change to true. A summary of the 
cases, some selected variables, and the known outcome is presented in Table 3. 
Case Humanitarian? PMC Principal 
Outcome – 
Permissible? 


















Table 3.   Summary of the cases being studied. 
Other prominent cases, such as MPRI in Croatia, Keenie Meanie in Sri Lanka, or 
any of the companies that were present in Iraq, are important but not suitable for this 
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study.275 These companies did not provide direct intervention services; in fact, they could 
not rightly be classified as PMCs. They would be more appropriately described as PSCs, 
since their products are dominantly training and security. Blackwater’s tasking in Iraq 
was mainly personal security details (PSDs), to include the individuals involved in the 
Nisour Square incident in which seventeen people were unjustly killed.276 They were not 
paid to conduct independent operations against a determined enemy, unlike EO in Sierra 
Leone and Sandline in PNG, as the following sections will illustrate. 
A. THE NEW CORPORATE WARRIORS: EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES IN 
SIERRA LEONE 
The case of the PMC Executive Outcomes (EO) in Sierra Leone is often studied 
because it is a prototypical case of a re-invigorated form of warfare that had not existed 
since the 19
th
 century.277 It takes place amid a vicious civil war between a weak, 
constantly changing Sierra Leonean government and the murderous Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), a non-ideological movement with no serious political base and no 
coherent plan beyond what benefits a criminal with a gun can enjoy.278 Between 1991 
and 1996 over 15,000 people were killed and nearly three million displaced as a result of 
the RUF’s activities. By March 1996 only 16 percent of Sierra Leone’s health facilities 
were operational; the humanitarian crisis was exacerbated by the RUF’s penchant for 
randomly killing civilians and chopping off the arms of people or mutilating them in 
other ways.279 This caused thousands of people to flee to safer areas, except that usually 
the areas did not stay safe for long. During all this, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was 
ineffective and provided no viable solution. Help from the UK was requested to no avail, 
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and pleas for help from the UN were similarly refused.280 Finally, with no other options, 
the Sierra Leonean President decided to hire EO to help defeat the RUF and restore 
stability in the country. In the section that follows, the time period between March 1991 
and March 1997 will be discussed; these time periods correspond with the RUF’s first 
operation in Sierra Leone and EO’s departure following peace accords.281 
1. Background 
In March 1991, Foday Sankoh, the commander of the RUF, made an 
announcement on the radio that Joseph Momoh, the President of Sierra Leone, should 
resign within ninety days or face an armed rebellion. By March 23, however, the RUF 
conducted a raid on two villages and killed thirteen people, including a major in the 
SLA.282 The civil war had begun and attacks commenced throughout the country after 
that, with the RUF targeting mainly small villages to acquire plunder and captives. The 
SLA was so ineffective that there were reports of “informal collaboration” between the 
two forces.283 The SLA was not being cared for, however. With every facet of the Sierra 
Leone bureaucracy rotten to the core with corruption, money meant for the SLA was not 
making it down to the rank and file, and by April 1992, troops on the front line had not 
been paid in three months. Fed up, and intending to find out why they had not been paid, 
a group of junior SLA officers and men went to the capitol to speak to the president. As 
they entered the State House in Freetown, Momoh believed that a coup was in progress 
and fled to Guinea. Suddenly this group of young soldiers found themselves in charge of 
the country, and their 25 year old senior officer, Captain Valentine Strasser, became 
president and the world’s youngest head of state.284 
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Strasser immediately replaced Momoh’s All People’s Congress (APC) with his 
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) as ruling party. Strasser pledged an end to 
the corruption of the APC, a swift end to the war with the RUF, and civilian elections by 
the end of the year. However, the corruption continued under the NPRC, and Strasser’s 
calls for the RUF to surrender went unheeded. The RUF believed that the coup was a 
result of their revolution and demanded a place in the government, which Strasser 
refused.285 The war, and the slaughter, continued for nearly three more years. Strasser 
asked for outside help, and Nigeria sent troops but they were confined to Freetown. A 
massive recruitment campaign was ordered, and the ranks of the army swelled from 
5,000 to around 12,000.286 The SLA remained as ineffective as it was under Momoh, 
however; a fact that was attributed to the low quality of recruits and the lack effective 
leadership. By December 1994, Strasser sent a request to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the 
Secretary-General of the UN at the time, and asked him to use his “good offices to assist 
in bringing about a peaceful settlement to the rebel war.”287 The UN did nothing, and by 
early 1995, the RUF was threatening the nation’s capital. Finally, to break the stalemate 
between his government and the RUF, Strasser decided to hire some foreign military 
professionals. 
The contract was first awarded to the Ghurka Security Guards (GSG); a PMC 
based in the UK but composed of mainly Nepalese ex-soldiers. GSG was contracted to 
train the Sierra Leone Commando Unit (SLCU); to accomplish this, GSG hired a well-
respected American commander, Bob MacKenzie, who was a Vietnam veteran and 
former member of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS). By late January 1995, 
within weeks of making the agreement with Strasser, GSG deployed around 60 personnel 
and went to work immediately training the “elite” SLCU. MacKenzie and his Ghurkas 
soon found themselves in combat, however, due to the sorry state of the SLCU and the 
immediate need to regain territory. The contract soon ended in tragedy. After some initial 
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successes, GSG suffered from a devastating chance encounter with the RUF that resulted 
in the deaths of MacKenzie and 19 others.
288
 Some witnesses later reported that 
MacKenzie had been mutilated; his body was hung up, impaled with wooden stakes and 
spun around by children. His heart was cut out and eaten raw by some rebels; some other 
parts of his body were cooked and eaten, including the flesh on the palms of his hands.289 
Within a month, GSG canceled its contract and pulled out of Sierra Leone. 
By April 1995, the RUF was massing its forces near Freetown. That same month, 
EO representatives met with Strasser and agreed on the terms of a contract. EO’s 
chairman, Eeben Barlow, accepted the contract with full knowledge of what had happed 
to MacKenzie less than two months prior, and that aggressive offensive operations would 
be required to accomplish the mission in Sierra Leone. By May 5, a 50-man EO advance 
party deployed to Freetown to begin preparations. Because EO did not possess its own 
weapons, armor, or artillery, the government of Sierra Leone was required to issue all 
these items to the EO men. Since many of these things were in a state of disrepair, a 
significant amount of maintenance and modification of weapons and vehicles was 
required before operations could commence.290 
The EO force that deployed to Sierra Leone in May 1995 was composed of ex-
South African Defense Forces (SADF) personnel (mostly serving with the SADF Special 
Forces), former members of the SADF Reconnaissance Commandoes or Parachute 
Brigade, former members of the elite 32 Battalion, or former members of the South 
African Koevoet.
291
 To face the RUF, EO deployed around 180 men. They formulated a 
simple, five-phase plan: Phase 1 was to occupy Freetown, drive back RUF forces that 
threaten the capital, and establish staging bases in Waterloo (approximately 20 km 
southeast of Freetown); in Phase 2 key natural resource areas would be seized (Kono 
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District diamond and rutile mines) to deprive the rebels of financial resources and recover 
them for the government; Phase 3 consisted of clearing the eastbound roads towards 
Liberia; Phase 4’s objective was to locate and destroy the RUF headquarters; and finally, 




As preparations were being made in Freetown, the RUF continued to inflict pain 
on the population throughout the countryside. The types of things that were happening 
were noted later by Barlow:  
A woman reported how she had fallen victim to rebel activities in early 
May 1995. They had first fired into her house, wounding her in the arm, 
and had then broken down the door. Why her house had been chosen, she 
didn’t know. With her were her husband and two sons, as well as a 
pregnant woman, her two small children and several young men. The 
rebels murdered the whole lot within the house except for her and some 
other women who were taken outside and repeatedly raped. After this 
some of the women were killed. Her daughter was repeatedly stabbed in 
the back, shoulder and chest and she died a few hours later. Her story was 
not an isolated one. Some people have been herded into their homes and 
burnt alive.293 
In the face of this horror, the people of Sierra Leone recognized that EO was there to help 
them. Local inhabitants were reported to be “cheering, waving” as the EO force rolled 
by.294 Combat operations began on June 6, as an EO Mobile Force carried out Phase 1 of 
their plan: to fix and destroy an RUF position in Waterloo that was threatening Freetown, 
so that the area could be used as a staging area for EO. This first operation was 
successful, at the cost of several wounded EO men, including light wounds to the EO 
Ground Force Commander, Roelf Van Heerden, and more serious wounds to another man 
who lost his eye, but Freetown was no longer threatened by the RUF.295 
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After Phase 1 was complete and Freetown secured, the EO Mobile Force was 
reorganized to seize the town of Koido in the Kono District, the heart of Sierra Leone’s 
most valuable resources. The Mobile Force was composed of eight vehicles and 49 men 
with helicopter gunship support; they used Shell Roadmaps from a gas station to 
navigate, and fought their way to Koido in three days.
296
 After encountering sporadic 
resistance from the RUF along the road to Koidu, Van Heerden found that the RUF had 
fled the town as the EO force advanced. He immediately established himself as the 
town’s ombudsman, and began recruiting and training a local security force. With Phase 
2 achieved, the EO force in Koidu began aggressive patrols in the area to disrupt RUF 
activities, while Phases 3, 4 and 5 were swiftly carried out in the south and east.
297
 The 
RUF was effectively defeated within three months, and soon afterwards, Sierra Leone 
held its first elections in 28 years. Shortly before the elections, Strasser was ousted in 
another coup conducted by his deputy,298 and EO stayed out of it. The elections remained 
on track and EO remained, continuing to conduct training and operations, until their 
contract was not renewed 1997 because of international pressure on the newly elected 
president, Ahmad Kabbah.299  
Overall, EO’s mission lasted 21 months, and cost the Sierra Leonean government 
$35 million, or one-third of its defense budget.
300
 EO’s involvement was widely 
criticized, which is why Sam Norma, the Sierra Leonean deputy defense minister, said in 
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April 1996, “Our people have died, lost their limbs, lost their eyes and their properties for 
these elections. If we employ a service to protect our hard-won democracy, why should it 
be viewed negatively?”301 
2. Sierra Leone: A Theory of Ethically Justified Private Intervention 
Framing this case as a humanitarian intervention is not difficult; the atrocities 
committed by the RUF are innumerable and the previously discussed numbers of people 
displaced by the conflict speaks for itself. Of course, there is much more to the story than 
can be related here. To address the criteria of the theory presented in Chapter V, more 
details of the case have been retrieved from the literature, and congruence procedures 
conducted on each criterion to determine the values of each IV. Recalling that the theory 
requires compliance from both the principal and agent to be successful, all of the criteria 
in this case have been determined to be true except for two: discrimination and just 
transfer of authority. At least one extrajudicial killing of a prisoner took place, and 
although an EO employee did not carry out the killing, it happened in the presence of an 
EO commander and thus EO was at least partially responsible. There were probably 
more, but the single known killing is enough evidence to indicate a problem. However, 
one war crime does not make an entire campaign unjust. It requires justice be done on 
behalf of the murdered individual. Additionally, the security vacuum that was created by 
EO’s departure in January 1997 directly resulted in another coup against the 
democratically elected president, Kabbah. What followed was several more years of 
bloodshed that could have been prevented. In the sections that follow, evidence will be 
presented to show that the other criteria have been met, and in the cases of the two 
criteria that were not satisfied, counterfactual scenarios will be presented, as solutions to 
false results, that demonstrate under what conditions the principles could have been met. 
In spite of these existing issues, using a scaled approach to the theory, EO’s involvement 
in Sierra Leone could have met the requirements for an ethical intervention. 
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a. Right Authority 
Does the intervener possess local external effectiveness: an ability to 
halt the crisis? 
Recall that in the theory presented in Chapter V, whether a force is 
effective or not is the sole determinant of right authority. Compared to the SLA, EO 
demonstrated a much better ability to organize an effective offensive against the RUF. It 
was actually difficult to distinguish SLA soldiers from RUF rebels, so much so that the 
word “sobel” was introduced into the lexicon of Sierra Leone as a combination of the 
words “soldier” and “rebel.” Sobels also carried out random attacks and plundered 
villages, and as a result the local population was afraid of SLA troops almost as much as 
the RUF, for fear that they may be sobels. EO was forced to deal with the sobel problem 
as well, but the stability EO brought to the areas around Koido and elsewhere resulted in 
a high degree of support from the local population.302 
EO crushed the RUF in a very short time, brought Foday Sankoh to the 
negotiating table, and facilitated national elections and a peace agreement. EO 
accomplished in three months what the SLA could not do in four years. From the 
beginning, locals would line the streets and cheer for EO as they passed by.303 It is 
doubtful that they ever did that for the SLA; it is also doubtful that the SLA could have 
brought the stability that EO achieved during that time. Therefore, with the legitimate 
government of Sierra Leone as principal,304 the effectiveness that EO demonstrated 
meets the criteria of right authority, more so than any other actor present. 
Result: true.  
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b. Just Cause 
Is there proof of crimes against humanity? Is the intervention a 
response to physical violence? 
The RUF had no discernible agenda beyond theft, so there was no 
organized genocide of any particular group, except for the defenseless. The RUF “robbed 
and torched villages, and their trademark was hacking people to death or chopping off 
their hands, feet or genitals. Sometimes they ate them too.”305 These acts unequivocally 
qualify as crimes against humanity. 
In one incident, dubbed “Operation Pay Yourself” by Sankoh, the RUF 
attacked the outskirts of Koidu just to kill everyone and loot everything they could 
find.306 There were many other similar operations. Therefore, this ample proof of the 
RUF’s crimes constituted a just cause for attacking them. 
Result: true. 
c. Right Intention 
Is there a humanitarian-based end state? 
EO’s goal in Sierra Leone, as stated by Barlow, was to “give support to a 
country moving towards democracy.”307 To accomplish this, the stated goal of the 
operational commander was to destroy the RUF’s ability to continue operations. The 
RUF’s effect on the country resulted in a humanitarian crisis; stopping them would 
satisfy the criteria of right intention. EO had other intentions as well that supported a 
move towards democracy, including setting the example for the people of Sierra Leone 
by avoiding corrupt practices.308 EO openly opposed the plundering raids they found the 
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SLA to be frequently conducting; this was resisted by some military leaders but EO made 
their point.309 
EO’s motives in the conflict are often at issue, and although 
distinguishable from its intentions, should be addressed here.310 While there was a cash 
arrangement between Strasser and EO, reports of mining concessions being awarded 
indirectly to EO as future payment are controversial.311 EO could have been taking 
advantage of a weak state ruled by a military junta; the legitimacy of weak states has 
been called into question because of their dubious representation of the people, and the 
questionable ability of a people to exercise self-determination when their economy is 
dominated by foreign interests. If the population has only minimal access to revenue 
generated by the country’s natural resources, the presence of that foreign entity may not 
be in the best interests of the country.312 However, the status quo was that ordinary 
citizens had very little access to revenues generated by the country’s natural resources; 
EO would do no damage to that situation. Instead, it provided the opportunity for a 
departure from that status quo.  
Even if EO was financially motivated to get involved in the conflict, its 
intentions could still be plausibly taken to be humanitarian-based: to bring peace to Sierra 
Leone. 
Result: true. 
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d. Discrimination 
Does the agent discriminate between permissible and impermissible 
targets? Are there attempts to mitigate the effects of collateral damage? 
An account that describes the method used to target RUF camps provides 
some insight into how EO discriminated permissible and impermissible targets. To locate 
the camps at night, EO flew Sierra Leone’s Mi-24 helicopters at 5,000 feet so they would 
be difficult to hear. As they flew over the targeted area, EO personnel used Night Vision 
Goggles (NVGs) to spot the RUF’s cooking fires, which were usually organized in such a 
way that would distinguish them from hunters, farmers, or villagers. Once the positions 
were marked, EO took advantage of the open-frequency radios the RUF used to intercept 
their signals and verify their locations. Once verified, EO would call in mortar fire on the 
locations, and continue to listen to RUF radio traffic to confirm the hits.313 A potential 
problem with this method is that the RUF frequently traveled with captives as porters or 
sex slaves. There would be no way for EO to discriminate between captives and rebels 
using this method. However, excessive restraint due to the presence of captives would 
defeat EO before it began. Considering the DDE, if these types of attacks still satisfy the 
criteria that the action itself is permissible, the deaths of captives are not intended, and 
any collateral killings are not the means by which the RUF operations are disrupted, then 
the action could still be permissible, even if such deaths were foreseeable. In the theory 
presented here though, this is not good enough. In an admittedly idealistic position where 
no killing of civilians is permissible, or else it would defeat the purposes of a 
humanitarian intervention, EO should have taken precautions that would prevent the 
deaths of captives, if it were a possibility that could be achieved by any alternative 
means. This would include restraint from the use of an area fire weapon, such as mortars, 
in favor of a more risky method, such as a ground assault with a strict ROE and perhaps a 
kill-criterion that would result in the deaths of only RUF rebels that display deadly intent; 
assuming captives were not armed. 
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EO had a policy of helping the local population when possible. The 
rationale behind the policy was that if EO could gain the support of the populace, the 
RUF would lose any support it had.314 This involved things such as providing protection 
for villagers from rebels so that they could hold a soccer match without disturbance.315 
Simple actions on behalf of the population such as this would probably not help mitigate 
the effects of the DDE, however. The problem of an army on the offensive atoning for 
civilian deaths on the battlefield is sensitive and sometimes dealt with in particularly 
heartless ways; during the Iraq War, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
authorized a maximum payment of U.S.$2500, which Iraqis invariably considered an 
outrage.316 For EO, more precise targeting would be the best method of mitigating 
collateral damage. 
Van Heerden, an EO commander who held the rank of Colonel, casually 
describes a war crime in his memoir that must be addressed. After an engagement in 
which four rebels were killed and one captured, the surviving rebel is detained and 
interrogated. When the prisoner is determined to have no more useful information, he is 
handed over to Lieutenant Colonel Sena of the SLA, who makes it immediately clear that 
no prisoners would be kept alive. Van Heerden explains to Sena that EO men could not 
carry out such an unjustified killing because it would amount to murder; except that 
incredibly, Van Heerden sends for one of Sena’s men to do the job, and the man is 
summarily executed.317 Clearly, Van Heerden’s view here is that if he does not pull the 
trigger, then he is not responsible, but the fact of the matter is that Van Heerden, Sena 
and everyone else present could rightly be found guilty of a war crime for the 
extrajudicial killing of a prisoner who posed no further threat.318 Other cases of 
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mutilation and extrajudicial killing, while not committed by EO troops, were tolerated 
with only weak, symbolic protest when committed by SLA troops.319 
The alleged crime is a war story in a memoir told nearly 20 years later, 
however. If it did happen, then EO had a major problem if its goal was humanitarian in 
nature. Van Heerden described the prisoner as “badly malnourished,” and as he posed no 
more threat, should have been treated with the proper respect and dignity that should be 
afforded to all human beings. If the criterion of discrimination were to be met in this case, 
then systems would have to be in place to protect and care for prisoners, regardless of the 
policies of local “authorities.” Heinous acts by the RUF are no justification for the killing 
of prisoners. Local partner forces would have to agree to and use the systems of 
protection and care for their own prisoners; otherwise the goals of the entire campaign 
would be rendered essentially unjust.  
Result: false. 
e. Proportionality 
Are there formal Rules of Engagement (ROE)? Are employees trained 
in the use of aimed, proportionate fire, and appropriate weapons systems for threat 
response? 
EO was said to have an established ROE.320 However, measured 
responses to threats, as we know them in modern rules of engagement, did not exist; for 
example, EO troops were told to answer one bullet with 100.321 That may be hyperbole, 
or something that is perhaps implicitly accepted elsewhere, but it is not usually codified 
in company policy, formal or not. Regardless of its content, the ROE maintained by EO 
were informal. 
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The weaponry used by EO was supplied by the government of Sierra Leone. 
Small arms were equivalent to the RUF, including AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7 grenade 
launchers. What EO possessed that provided a firepower advantage were several mortar 
systems, two BMP-2 armored personnel carriers (APCs) armed with 14.5mm KPV 
machine guns, and two Land Rovers with a 7.62mm PKM machine gun on one and a 
12.7mm DShK machine gun on the other. EO also made use of Sierra Leone’s Mi-24 
helicopter gunship, which provided a key advantage in reconnaissance, close air support, 
and attack capability. Additionally, three small fixed wing aircraft were available, and EO 
brought in two Mi-17 helicopters for casualty evacuation and mobility.322  
This material advantage was necessary to counter the RUF’s advantage in 
numbers. For example, during EO’s push to Kono, the lead elements of the Mobile Force 
detected an RUF ambush, which turned out to be approximately 100 men. With the Mi-
24 gunship available, the rebel’s positions were strafed with machine gun fire and 
bombed with 30mm AGS-17 grenades; a certainly justifiable proportion of force when 
men numbering in the dozens finds themselves against potentially over 100.323 Although 
EO possessed superior firepower, and used it against the RUF, there is no evidence that 
the proportions used were unjust when friendly troops were threatened. 
Result: true. 
f. Internal Jus In Bello 
Is there appropriate protection for the PMCs own employees? 
EO soldiers were treated well. The weaponry and air support they were 
provided with was more than adequate, and when men were wounded, the treatment they 
got rivaled that of any modern army. For example, the EO man who lost his eye in the 
initial offensive to Waterloo was evacuated by air to Freetown, treated by the EO doctor 
there, and then flown to London via commercial air, with escort, for further treatment.324 
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EO men were recruited largely from disbanded apartheid-era South 
African combat units, but there is little evidence of racial discrimination. There were 
many black soldiers in these units, and EO also employed former members of Nelson 
Mandela’s Umkhonto we Sizwe guerrilla force, pre-apartheid enemies of the South 
African government, who were all out of work by 1995.325 Even outside of combat, the 
lives of all EO soldiers were carefully protected; when a black EO soldier contracted 
malaria, a commercial aircraft was chartered from South Africa to Freetown and back at 
the cost of over U.S.$100,000. The evacuation saved the soldier’s life.326 
No child soldiers or conscripts were used by EO, but the use of child 
soldiers by both the SLA and RUF was met with disdain, but tacit approval.327 The 
cultural acceptance of the practice must have been problematic for EO, but only a long-
term solution to the issue would have been viable. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
among EO’s allies, things such as weapons were considered more important and valuable 
than human beings. The loss of a weapon was considered worse than the loss of a man, 
because a man could be more easily replaced.328 While these two examples are a function 
of the cultural views present in Sierra Leone at the time, they would be inexcusable to an 
observer attempting to assess an intervener’s adherence to the principle of internal jus in 
bello. However, EO’s treatment of its own troops is evidence of a satisfactory degree of 
compliance with the principle. 
Result: true. 
g. Just Transfer of Authority 
After hostilities cease, is there a planned transfer of authority to either 
another agent of the principal or to a public authority, such as the UN? 
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EO was predictably criticized for its role in Sierra Leone from the 
beginning; Enrique Ballesteros, the UN Special Rapporteur on mercenarism, said that 
“[EO] was supposed to have provided Sierra Leone with effective protection and 
security. Obviously, these claims were nothing but propaganda. The deep-lying problems 
remained untouched.”329 There are two problems with this statement. First, the stability 
that EO provided, however fleeting, was quite real; it was not propaganda. A UN 
negotiator, Canadian General Ian Douglas said, “EO gave Sierra Leone a sense of 
stability during this critical time.”330 Even the leader of the RUF acknowledged that if it 
had not been for EO, his forces would have taken Freetown.331 Second, it was never a 
part of EO’s contract to address the deep-lying problems of Sierra Leone; that 
responsibility remained with the principal. However, therein lays the problem of 
satisfying the criterion of just transfer of authority. 
As will be recalled from the background section of this case study, Phase 5 
of EO’s plan was to conduct search and destroy operations on RUF remnants throughout 
Sierra Leone.
332
 There is no evidence of a plan to transfer authority to any other entity. It 
seems that EO’s plan was to stay in Sierra Leone until the money ran out, which it did, by 
January 1997. By May 1997, Pademba Road prison in Freetown was broken open by the 
SLA and a coup against Kabbah’s elected government was conducted by a band of sobels, 
led by Major Johnny Koroma, who installed himself as the new head of state. Without EO 
to oppose him, Koroma invited the RUF to the capital, but the civil war did not end.333 
What followed over the next five years can only be described as pure barbarism. 
The stability purchased by EO was squandered. As previously discussed, 
pressure from the international community, including the IMF, is believed to have forced 
Kabbah to not renew EO’s contract. This non-renewal is considered to be a critical 
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blunder,334 but it should not be regarded as the agent’s blunder. If the principal and agent 
had a plan to carry out a just transfer of authority, EO would have needed to stay in Sierra 
Leone for at least three more years, until the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) could deploy. However, EO is not a welfare organization and cannot do 
what it is not paid to do. The UNSC authorized the establishment of UNAMSIL on 22 
October 1999; troops would not have been deployed until several months after that. 
UNAMSIL was effective in that it claims to have demobilized over 75,000 fighters,335 
but the timing of its deployment is unfortunate. If it had deployed three years earlier, the 
deaths that occurred at the hands of the RUF from the time of the coup in May 1997 to 
UNAMSIL’s deployment in early 2000 could have been prevented. That is admittedly 
speculative, though. What is certain is that EO’s untimely departure, without regard for 
what might happen, directly resulted in the precipitous drop in stability after they left. In 
this case, a plan for transferring authority to an entity capable of securing the country 
should have been presented from the outset. 
Result: false. 
3. Assessment 
I spoke to some Sierra Leonean officials at the time and I remember one of 
them looked at me and he had tears in his eyes and he said, ‘Everyone 
disapproved, but what else were we supposed to do? The international 
community wasn’t helping us, nobody was stepping in to intervene, and 
we just did what we needed to do to survive, we hired these people and 
they pushed the rebels back and it worked.’336  
Public support for EO in Sierra Leone during the study period is remarkable. In 
one tragic yet intriguing example, after the RUF locked 120 villagers into a house and set 
it on fire, the sole surviving villager, a baby that was pulled out alive the next day was 
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named “Colonel Roelf” after the commander of EO forces in the area.337 In Kono, 
villagers prayed for EO in their mosque.338 They had brought security and stability to a 
previously lawless area, and enabled a return to normalcy, however temporary, for 
hundreds of thousands of people.339 But was EO’s intervention ethical? The criteria and 
test results of the theory of ethically justified private intervention are presented in Table 4: 
Criterion Result Counterfactual solution if false 
Right Authority True n/a 
Just Cause True n/a 
Right Intention True n/a 
Discrimination False 
Systems for protection and care of 
prisoners; training and example-setting 
in law of war for partner forces 
Proportionality True n/a 
Internal jus in bello True n/a 
Just Transfer of 
Authority 
False 
Executed plan for just termination of 
hostilities; coordination with UN or 
other entity for transfer of authority 
Table 4.   Summary of findings, Sierra Leone case study. 
The theory of ethically justified private intervention requires compliance from 
both the principal and agent to be successful; as Table 3 shows, all of the criteria in this 
case have been met except for two: discrimination and just transfer of authority. The 
extrajudicial killing of a prisoner rendered a false result for the principle of 
discrimination, and both the principal’s and agent’s failure to exploit the hard-won 
stability achieved by EO resulted in a false result for just transfer of authority. In these 
cases, counterfactual scenarios have been presented as solutions to false results that 
demonstrate under what conditions the principles could have been met. For the other 
criteria, evidence has been presented to show that they have been satisfied. Using a scaled 
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approach to the theory, EO’s involvement in Sierra Leone has been determined to meet 
the requirements for an ethical intervention. 
B. THE LAND OF THE UNEXPECTED: PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND THE 
SANDLINE AFFAIR 
The case study that involves PNG and the PMC Sandline International340 takes 
place in the context of a secessionist rebellion with both economic and cultural origins. It 
was fought by a group of underdogs with seemingly legitimate grievances, including 
demands for political self-determination and the right to the benefits derived from natural 
resources found on their ancestral lands. On one side, the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army (BRA) fights for independence from PNG. On the other side, the Papua New 
Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF) fights to keep Bougainville and its resources part of 
PNG. By the time Sandline gets involved, the conflict has dragged on for nine years at 
the cost of an estimated 10,000 lives,341 with no end in sight. In the sections that follow, 
the origins of the Bougainville Rebellion will be briefly traced from its origins to the 
“Sandline Affair,” during which the frustrated PNG Prime Minister, Julius Chan, 
approved a plan to break the stalemate on Bougainville by employing Sandline. Although 
the plan was never carried out, the humanitarian nature of the conflict will be addressed 
and a counterfactual scenario will be presented in which the plan proposed by Sandline 
could have been implemented to theoretically break the stalemate and bring relief to the 
long-suffering population of Bougainville. Central to the case is how Sandline’s plan for 
neutralizing the BRA could have been carried out. In order to determine whether it could 
have been ethically justified, each criterion of the theory of ethically justified private 
intervention will be discussed using the counterfactual scenario. Since the operation was 
in reality canceled before it was carried out, the values of all IVs are presumed to be 
false; therefore, testing each criterion is not necessary. However, an assessment of the 
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case within the framework of the theory of ethical private intervention is useful and will 
therefore be presented. 
1. Background 
The island of Bougainville is nearly a thousand kilometers east of PNG’s capital, 
Port Moresby, and the people there are culturally and ethnically different from the people 
elsewhere in PNG.342 They also live on top of a huge mass of copper ore that was 
discovered in 1960. By 1967, a mine was constructed by Bougainville Copper Limited 
(BCL) to extract the copper. Of course, the landowners should have profited from the 
mine, but instead of bringing jobs and prosperity to the island the mine brought inevitable 
conflict, culminating in a bid for independence for Bougainville and a decade-long war. 
To show how a PMC became involved, the origins of the conflict are presented, along 
with the performance of the PNGDF, the events that precipitated the employment of 
Sandline, and Sandline’s plan to stop the BRA. 
In 1967, PNG was still administered by Australia. The Australian High Court 
ruled that landowners may own the land, but what lay below the surface of the land 
belonged to the government.343 Traditional landholders in Panguna, where BCL built the 
copper mine, were instantly marginalized. Landowners were paid some royalties from the 
mine, but very little—0.2 percent of the proceeds.344 In 1975, PNG gained its 
independence and by 1980 the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) had formed and 
began to oppose BCL in Bougainville. By 1988, representatives from the PLA stepped 
forward and demanded compensation for the damages done to the land. They not only 
asked for U.S.$10 billion cash, they demanded 50 percent of all future profits, immediate 
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representation in matters of new construction, and within five years, completely localized 
ownership of BCL. As expected, BCL refused.345 
The move was meant to diminish BCL’s standing in the community, but another 
event in 1988 can be attributed to the start of hostilities. The PLA blamed the Panguna 
mine for a number of ecological effects on the community, including the extinction of the 
flying fox, diminishing crop growth, and birth defects in Bougainvillean children. Part of 
the cause of this was attributed to the mine’s pollution of the Jaba River, and the PNG 
government ordered an environmental study of the river to investigate these claims. The 
results indicated no toxicity, only an increase in turbidity. When these results were 
presented, Francis Ona, the General Secretary of the PLA and former truck driver for 
BCL, was infuriated and walked out of the meeting. Several days later, the explosives 
storage facility at the mine was broken into and some pylons and equipment at the mine 
were sabotaged shortly thereafter.346  
After about a year of industrial sabotage, the mine closed down. There were 
attacks on local security forces as well, which provoked a heavy-handed response. In one 
incident, members of the Royal PNG Constabulary (RPNGC) found and beat the provincial 
governor and one of his ministers almost to death after several of their comrades had been 
wounded in a rebel ambush. The minister was blinded in one eye and the governor, Joseph 
Kabui, was forced to lick blood out of the vehicles in which the wounded RPNGC officers 
had been transported.347 When the RPNGC expanded its campaign to include burning 
down villages, Francis Ona formed the BRA and, with the support of Kabui, informed the 
PNG Prime Minister, “[you] have passed the limits allowed in the international laws of 
justice and peace…we are going to try to defend ourselves.”348 
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As the rebellion gained traction, the fighting intensified. The PNG government 
declared a state of emergency but stories of atrocities carried out by the PNGDF spread 
and support for the BRA grew. When the PNG Prime Minister at the time, Sir Rabbie 
Namaliu, received an independent report of the PNGDF’s activities from one of his own 
staff, he realized that the conflict was not going well. Bougainvilleans were being beaten 
to death or shot by the dozens without explanation—it appeared to be pure chaos. 
Namaliu arranged for a cease-fire that was signed by the commanders of both the 
PNGDF and BRA, but hostilities did not cease.349 In 1990 the Bougainville Interim 
Government (BIG), with Kabui as its chairman, declared independence from PNG; the 
PNG government withdrew its troops and followed up with a blockade of the island.350  
The PNGDF gradually returned to the island, but the ensuing stalemate and the 
constant rotations to Bougainville were stressful. There were only two infantry battalions 
in the PNGDF, with a combined strength of just over 1000 men. The entire PNGDF, 
including all units, numbered at around 4000, with no armor or artillery.351 The constant 
deployments, harassment by the BRA, low pay, and substandard equipment all took a 
severe toll. The force was known to be undisciplined and had already rioted in Port 
Moresby as early as 1989; around 400 soldiers marched on Parliament with grievances 
over pay, smashed windows, and overturned a police car.352 On Bougainville, the 
PNGDF routinely brutalized the population to the point that their own commanders could 
not stop them. In an incident where the PNG Joint Forces Commander, a Colonel, 
witnessed a group of soldiers beating a civilian and ordered them to stop, a junior 
PNGDF officer threatened him at gunpoint.353 
Attacks and beatings continued back and forth for several years until 1996, when 
there was a surge in violence. The new PNG Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, had been 
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working towards a peaceful settlement since taking office in 1994, but they fell apart 
after an incident following peace talks in Cairns, Australia. Representatives from BIG 
and BRA, including the BIG Chairman Kabui, attended the talks but as they returned to 
Bougainville by boat, a PNGDF patrol fired on them.354 Interpreting this as a planned 
ambush, BRA went back on the offensive and by the end of the month two PNGDF 
soldiers were dead. PNGDF soldiers retaliated by attacking a village and massacring 
twelve civilians, including an eight-month old baby. The BRA was accused of targeting 
civilians as well, perhaps supporters of a pro-PNG resistance movement. In a last-ditch 
effort to end the conflict once and for all, the PNG Defense Minister, Mathias Ijape, 
began to look for outside help.355 
In the meantime, the BRA killed six members of the PNG security forces near the 
island of Buka, which was supposedly government-controlled. The BRA sank the 
security force boat and shot the officers as they treaded water.356 A week later, Chan 
ordered the lifting of the cease-fire and approved Operation High Speed II, a mission 
aimed at capturing the BRA leadership in the heart of Bougainville. Chan said in an 
announcement to the BRA, “[y]our number has been called and you are now facing the 
full force of the law.”357 As this was happening, Ijape made contact with Tim Spicer of 
Sandline through an acquaintance in London.358 
The PNGDF required helicopters; the Australian government had supplied four 
U.S.-made Iroquois helicopters but had specified that they were not to be used for 
offensive operations.359 Australia refused to supply any more, and a deal to purchase ten 
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more Iroquois helicopters directly from the U.S. government was disapproved by the U.S. 
State Department.360 This was likely due to the atrocities that had already been 
committed on Bougainville by the PNGDF and the probability that the helicopters would 
be used as gunships to indiscriminately fire on civilians. Reports of torture and murder 
committed by the PNGDF, including an incident where a Bougainvillean chief was 
soaked with gasoline and set on fire, were widespread; as were reports that PNGDF 
dropped grenades on villages from the Iroquois helicopters while other troops used 
machine guns supported with rope so that they could fire on the villagers.361 The United 
Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) reported at least sixty-four known 
extrajudicial killings where some of the victims had been cruelly killed by beating or 
being dragged behind a vehicle.362 The Australian and U.S. governments were 
concerned; but as requested, Spicer provided the PNGDF with a proposal to provide two 
Mi-24 helicopter gunships, two Mi-17 transport helicopters, and a fixed-wing aircraft for 
electronic warfare purposes.363 
The PNGDF Commander, Brigadier General Jerry Singirok, was opposed to the 
Sandline plan; it was too expensive at U.S.$30 million anyway, so Operation High Speed 
II went forward. The mission was a dismal failure–most of the PNGDF troops did not 
make it past the beach head. Singirok blamed the failure on the loss of the only two 
remaining Iroquois helicopters, both of which were disabled early in the fighting. The 
operation was widely covered by both the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC) and 
the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC), and Sandline was monitoring the 
situation. The day after the PNGDF troops abandoned the beach head on Bougainville, 
Spicer re-contacted Chan about a possible contract for Sandline.364 This time, Chan was 
more interested. 
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Soon after Operation High Speed II there was a massacre of PNG security forces 
on Kangu Beach; twelve were killed (some had their penises severed and stuffed in their 
mouths), and five were captured. Furthermore, the transitional Premier of Bouganville, 
Theodore Miriung, was assassinated, more PNG soldiers were taken hostage by the BRA, 
and soon after, PNG soldiers mortared a village and killed nine people.365 Finally, in face 
of the continuing violence and systematic failure of the PNGDF, Chan approved a plan to 
engage Sandline. 
Spicer presented a new proposal that included the U.S.$30 million air package 
plus forty commandos to augment the fledgling PNG Special Forces Unit (SFU) at an 
additional cost of U.S.$6 million. Spicer’s plan was to train the SFU, who were all 
already veterans of the conflict, in preparation for ground operations against the BRA. 
When these operations commenced, the SFU would be accompanied by the forty 
Sandline “trainers,” who would also take on a combatant role. The Mi-24 gunships would 
provide an attack capability and close air support, while the Mi-17 helicopters would be 
used for mobility. The electronic warfare assets would be used to intercept BRA radio 
transmissions and to locate their positions. Spicer also planned a non-lethal psychological 
aspect using the surveillance equipment, to plant seeds of doubt in the minds of the BRA 
leadership. He planned to call their satellite phones and notify them of the time and place 
of an Mi-24 firepower demonstration, so that they could witness the effects of such an 
attack. He also planned to use loudspeakers on a small plane to broadcast pro-PNG 
messages to the BRA and the people of Bougainville. In support of all this, the PNGDF 
 
 
would establish bases on Bougainville out of which Sandline and the SFU would 
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operate.366 Their objectives were twofold: neutralize the BRA and take possession of the 
Panguna mine.367 
Soon after the Sandline trainers arrived, the news of their presence broke to the 
world. Relations soured between Chan and his Australian counterpart, John Howard; 
international pressure to call it off mounted immediately. Work to train the SFU began, but 
right away, soldiers of the PNGDF began to resent the amount of money the Sandline 
trainers were being paid. The PNGDF believed it had been overworked, underpaid, and 
generally treated poorly by the government for years, so civil-military relations soon 
became tense. Singirok ordered Spicer and all Sandline employees arrested, then he 
announced that the contract with Sandline was invalid and called on Chan to resign. When 
Chan refused, 2000 civilians rioted in Port Moresby. Ten days later, Chan resigned and all 
of the Sandline employees were deported, except for Spicer, who was kept in PNG to stand 
before a judicial inquiry.368 The Sandline Mi-24 helicopters never arrived in PNG.369 
2. Bougainville: A Theory of Ethical Private Intervention 
Framing this case as a humanitarian crisis from the PNG government’s 
perspective is problematic, because it can be argued that they caused it. The blockade on 
Bougainville, imposed by PNG and supported by the Australian government, included an 
embargo on humanitarian aid. The resulting lack of medical services led directly to the 
majority of the civilian deaths related to the conflict.370 Furthermore, the return of the 
PNGDF in 1991 and the ensuing hostilities necessitated the creation of forty-nine 
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps to house nearly 70,000 people displaced by 
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either the BRA or the PNGDF.371 Combined with the lack of medical care, the 
humanitarian crisis was severe, regardless of the conduct of each belligerent in the 
conflict. Theoretically, the end of the conflict would end the blockade and end the 
humanitarian crisis. In this case, Sandline could have been used with great effect. 
Unfortunately, in consideration of the facts of the case as presented in the 
previous section, not one criteria of the theory of ethical private intervention presented in 
Chapter V would hold true. While the secessionist demands of the BRA could have been 
considered a just cause by itself at the beginning, the proximate cause of the conflict can 
be traced back to the activities of BCL at the Panguna mine. The secessionist demands 
came about later, after the PNGDF’s indiscriminate retaliations for the PLA’s sabotage of 
the mine. Therefore, if the PNG government does not have a just cause, then its agent 
could not possibly either. Since it is known that there are no true values for the IVs, the 
SV is consequently false even when a scaled approach is used; it is not necessary to 
conduct congruence procedures. For the purposes of this thesis, however, in the sections 
that follow, the reason each criterion is false will be stated, followed by a counterfactual 
scenario that would, in theory, render a true value for that IV, and subsequently a true 
value for the SV. 
Hence, with the criteria of the theory of ethical intervention in mind, if Sandline’s 
plan had been carried out in reality, it would not have been ethically justified.372 To 
consider Sandline as a theoretical humanitarian intervention force, however, with the 
PNG government as the principal, one must simplify the scenario and focus on the 
humanitarian objective. In the sections that follow, all responsibility for the humanitarian 
crisis must be counterfactually placed on the BRA. Sandline’s objectives must be 
restricted to the neutralization of the BRA, but their original plan and force package, as 
presented in the previous section, will be considered to be in place. They would require a 
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humanitarian-based end state, and a plan to hand over authority to an internationally 
recognized authority. Only under these conditions, and others to be discussed, would 
Sandline’s involvement as a humanitarian intervention force be ethically justified. 
Therefore, the analysis presented in the following sections will necessarily rely on 
two counterfactual premises: that the BRA is solely responsible for the humanitarian crisis 
on Bougainville, and that the PNG’s government’s plan to employ Sandline went forward 
with popular support. These two premises satisfy all four criteria outlined in Chapter I with 
regard to counterfactuals; first, they build upon the facts of the case as presented. 
Considering the presence of a pro-PNG Resistance force on the island, it can be assumed 
that the BRA did not have the full support of the Bougainville islanders. Also, the events 
that precipitated the arrest of Spicer could have easily been averted with better operational 
security, and if more effort had been made to cooperate with Singirok as PNGDF 
Commander. Second, the premises result in a feasible alternative outcome, in that they 
result in a vigorous offensive operation against the BRA, something that had already 
happened on several occasions, and would have been in the best interests of the PNG 
government. Third, the acceptance of these counterfactual premises results in a change in 
value for all seven IV, each of which remains autonomous. All of the conditions that define 
each variable will have to be changed to facilitate a true result; a true value for the 
dependent variable is the goal of this thesis. Finally, for simplicity, the discussion of the 
effects of the changed conditions that result from the adoption of these premises will be 
restricted to the seven criteria of the theory of ethical private intervention. 
a. Right Authority 
Does the intervener possess local external effectiveness: an ability to 
end the crisis? 
Using effectiveness as the main criterion of right authority, over ten years 
of failure by the PNGDF through four Prime Ministers should be evidence enough that 
PNG is lacking. Operation High Speed II is a good example of the PNGDF’s 
incompetency; their extreme brutality against the people of Bougainville demonstrates 
their lack of control. 
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Counterfactually, it is likely the Sandline plan would have been 
sufficiently effective to break the stalemate, given the techniques and assets brought to 
bear. The BRA used psychological operations (PSYOP) through their Radio Free 
Bougainville program to gain and maintain the support of the people; Sandline had a plan 
to counter that with electronic warfare assets and PSYOP messages of their own. The 
same assets would have precisely located the BRA’s locations and probably its 
leadership, since they were known to use unsecure radios. The PNGDF had been using 
the same tactics of long-range patrolling and cordon-and-search; Spicer’s plan would call 
for an airmobile strike force, composed of its own forty commandos and an equal number 
of PNG SFU troops, supported by gunships.373 Thus, Sandline would have solved 
PNGDF’s critical shortcomings in mobility, firepower, intelligence, and command-and-
control. Its ability to neutralize the BRA and counter its message to the people would 
have allowed Sandline to gain control of the situation, broken the stalemate, and restored 
the authority that its principal required to reach a peaceful settlement. 
b. Just Cause 
Is there proof of crimes against humanity? Is the intervention a 
response to physical violence? 
Hostilities on Bougainville arguably began when members of the PLA 
began sabotaging the Panguna mine. Attacks on mining equipment should not qualify as 
justification for military intervention, much less the use of deadly force. Incredibly, the 
response of PNG security forces was to burn villages and to indiscriminately kill 
people.374 Extrajudicial killings by both the BRA and PNGDF were well known and well 
documented; war crimes took place on both sides. 
The squalid conditions in the IDP camps, however, and the treatment of 
the people there, nearly 40 percent of the island’s population, could be considered a just 
cause for intervention. These so-called “care centers” were known to be sites where 
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people were routinely tortured, sexually assaulted, or murdered.375 These places could be 
reasonably characterized as concentration camps. Hence, if the liberation of these camps 
is added as a secondary objective for Sandline in a counterfactual scenario, and the 
premise that the BRA was responsible for this is accepted, then the requirement for a just 
cause would be met. 
c. Right Intention 
Is there a humanitarian-based end state? 
The end state for the PNG government was to seize the Panguna mine and 
neutralize the BRA. There was no humanitarian aid component anywhere in the plan. 
Chan did not even have a plan for resolving the root problems of the conflict; Spicer 
pointed this out while he planned his own operation.376  
If the destruction of the BRA led directly to the liberation of the “care 
centers,” then the PNG-Sandline arrangement would satisfy the criterion of right 
intention. Note that this is a counterfactual solution; the care centers were run by the PNG 
government in reality. One may argue that the destruction of the BRA would eliminate 
the need for the care centers, and this would serve the counterfactual scenario, but the 
PNG government remains responsible. Nonetheless, if Sandline had the mission of 
bringing humanitarian relief to the IDPs in the care centers, its motives for doing so 
would inevitably come into question. As discussed in the previous case, the PMC’s 
motives should be distinguished from its intentions. The arrangement between Chan and 
Spicer was always for cash. Associates of Spicer suggested some future investments in 
the Panguna mine presumably to sweeten the deal,377 but since the mine was never 
reopened, those investments did not happen. Either way, even if Sandline’s motivations 
centered on money and investments, if its intentions were to liberate the care centers and 
end crimes against humanity, this criterion would be satisfied. 
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d. Discrimination 
Does the agent discriminate between permissible and impermissible 
targets? Are there attempts to mitigate the effects of collateral damage? 
Recall from a previous section that one of the PNGDF commanders told a 
journalist that helicopters had been used to strafe villages and dump the bodies of 
executed BRA suspects in the sea. It is possible he told a journalist this because it did not 
occur to him that the indiscriminate killing of civilians or summary execution of enemy 
combatants was wrong. Shooting unarmed people occurred with depressing regularity on 
both sides.378  
Spicer recognized the need for precision, and if his plan had been carried 
out, there would have likely been an active effort to discriminate between legitimate and 
illegitimate targets. In fact, his original plan read, “[t]his operation is highly sensitive and 
needs to be carried out with…the minimum collateral damage in order to make it 
acceptable…to world opinion.”379 Sandline’s technological advantage surely would have 
facilitated this; BRA positions would have been pinpointed through electronic 
surveillance, and then the SFU would have been inserted to advance for a ground attack. 
This method is the riskiest, but leads to the least amount of collateral damage, because it 
allows the individual operator the opportunity to identify his target visually before firing, 
if necessary.  
e. Proportionality 
Are there formal Rules of Engagement (ROE)? Are employees trained 
in the use of aimed, proportionate fire, and appropriate weapons systems for threat 
response? 
The BRA was not well armed; they largely relied on salvaged Japanese 
weaponry from World War II. Some weapons were home-made, including shotguns 
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made from water pipe and bows and arrows.380 More sophisticated weapons, such as M-
60 machine guns and M-16 rifles, were sometimes captured from the PNGDF.381 Each 
village, however, was restricted to one shotgun for the use of the entire village. Virtually 
unarmed villagers certainly posed only a nominal threat to the PNGDF as supporters of 
the BRA, yet they were oftentimes fired upon with mortars or with machine guns from 
the air. 
There is no evidence of a strict ROE for Sandline troops. If the plan had 
been executed, it should be expected that one would be in place, however. Spicer’s vision 
of the Mi-24 presence was intimidation; there is no indication he intended to use the 
gunships in attack mode.382 He planned for precision strikes using ground troops using 
small arms that would close with the enemy. Even a bow and arrow can be used with 
deadly effect; it would not be unreasonable to expect Sandline troops to respond with 
rifle fire. Sandline’s deadliest weapon would have been the gunships; as long as they 
were used in response to a threat in kind, the criterion of proportionality would be met.  
f. Internal Jus In Bello 
Is there appropriate protection for the PMCs own employees? 
Sandline personnel were paid very well, but money is not protection, of 
course, and most people require protection for their families as well. If operations were to 
be carried out, the Mi-24s would have provided ample protection for troops on the 
ground, and in the event a man was wounded, Mi-17s would have been available for 
evacuation. Beyond that, Sandline employees appear to have been on their own. The 
Sandline contract stated that the agreement would be “terminated upon:–your death.”383 
There were no provisions for families of fallen employees beyond one month’s salary. In 
this case, for such dangerous work, it would be appropriate for such arrangements to be 
                                                 
380 The BRA had help from an outsider to build and refurbish these weapons, as will be discussed 
below. 
381 Arnold, Mercenaries, 76. 
382 Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, 164. 
383 Dorney, The Sandline Affair, 176. 
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made, perhaps a larger death gratuity and an affordable life insurance policy that would 
provide for the employee’s family for the remainder of the life lost in service to the 
company. Such an arrangement would be ideal, and if a company asks an employee to 
risk his life, that company should be prepared for him to lose it. 
g. Just Transfer of Authority 
After hostilities cease, is there a planned transfer of authority to either 
another agent of the principal or to a public authority, such as the UN? 
The PNG government had no plan for what would happen after the BRA 
was defeated, as previously discussed. Since the conflict is secessionist in nature, the 
PNG government would want to assume control, but in a humanitarian crisis, a third 
party would be more appropriate. Even if Sandline was able to break the stalemate and 
create the conditions for peace, a transition period would be required for continued 
stability. A third party, such as the UN, would facilitate the rebuilding process and seek 
to normalize relations between the belligerents. Sandline would not be suitable for this, 
so a plan to transfer authority to an appropriate agent, such as the UN, would be 
necessary. 
3. Assessment 
Admittedly, the situation on Bougainville was much more complex than 
presented here. Since the Sandline operation never actually happened, many of the 
conclusions presented here are speculative. However, they have value in that they enable 
the conditions of an ethically justified intervention to be brought out in the open. In an 
attempt to frame the conflict within the theory of ethical private intervention, the 
conditions Sandline would have had to adhere to have been presented as counterfactuals. 
The results are summarized in Table 5: 
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Criterion Counterfactual solution 
Right Authority 
Sandline’s maneuver, firepower intelligence, and 
control capabilities; PSYOP to aid the support of 
the population 
Just Cause 
Crimes against humanity possibly taking place at 
“care centers” 
Right Intention Liberation of “care centers” 
Discrimination 
Electronic surveillance to locate targets; ground-
based operation for positive identification 
Proportionality 
Ground operations; restrictions on use of helicopter 
gunships 
Internal jus in bello Life insurance; family care 
Just Transfer of 
Authority 
Executed plan for just termination of hostilities; 
coordination with UN or other entity for transfer of 
authority 
Table 5.   Summary of findings, Bougainville case study 
These findings represent a guide that may have resulted in an ethically justified private 
intervention. The theory requires compliance from both the principal and agent to be 
successful though, and it has been shown that the contributions of the PNGDF would 
have to be monitored closely. Ultimately, it must be concluded that the intervention 
proposed by Sandline would not have been ethically justified. However, were the 
conditions described here implemented, it could have been.  
4. Postscript: Harry Baxter, Concerned Citizen of the World 
The PNGDF is not the only side in this conflict that had some help. A man named 
Harry Baxter, an Australian citizen, originally from Ireland, who first went to 
Bougainville as an employee of BCL at Panguna mine, aided the BRA. After seeing what 
was happening to the people around the mine, Baxter left Bougainville but eventually 
returned to help the BRA fight. He did not act as a combatant, however. As an engineer, 
his talents lay in the repair, design, and fabrication of weapons. He helped the BRA use 
scavenged materials to build rifles and shotguns out of pieces of pipe, bullets out of ball 
bearings, and armored vehicles out of abandoned bulldozers. Baxter claims that the 
weapons were used with great effect, and there is evidence elsewhere that verifies that 
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claim.384 Fully aware that he could be justifiably targeted by the PNGDF, Baxter 
continued to help the BRA without pay, and even set up a deal to purchase 350 rifles 
from an outside source. Ultimately, Baxter and the BRA were unable to close the deal 
because they could not raise the AU$350,000 that the rifles cost. If Baxter had been a 
wealthy man, the BRA would have undoubtedly had those rifles and the tide would have 
certainly turned against the PNGDF much sooner. Baxter was motivated by the suffering 
he saw on Bougainville–including the deaths of children from preventable disease he 
believes is caused by the PNG government.385 
In the next case study, the notion of a private individual as the principal in a 
humanitarian intervention will be explored with the aim of exposing the ethical problems 
that arise when a person, such as Harry Baxter, chooses to get involved in a conflict after 
states choose to stay neutral. Baxter is an example of someone who is not motivated by 
money, national interest, or natural resources; he is simply a concerned individual who 
believes that there is an injustice, and that it is within his power to do something about it. 
C. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ON THE EXTERMINATIONS IN 
RWANDA 
The scene presented in the introduction of this thesis, the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda, is a compelling situation in which to put the theory of ethically justified private 
intervention to the test. The case is engulfed in the “holy grail” of just causes—genocide, 
and is peppered with a long list of actors who did not help, including the UN Security 
Council (UNSC). The Rwanda case exemplifies a just intervention in which no 
intervention took place, but that is not to say that no one did anything. There were small 
victories; one person saved here, six people saved there, but in the end, conservative 
estimates say that 800,000 people were slaughtered.386 The death toll was a result of the 
                                                 
384 Arnold, Mercenaries, 76. 
385 Current Affair, A, “Harry Baxter CH9 - A Current Affair Mekamui/Bougainville,” YouTube 
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386 Ghosts of Rwanda, PBS Frontline, Alexandria, VA: PBS Home Video (2005); several interviewees 
(Laura Lane, Phillipe Gaillard, Carl Wilkens) mention small numbers of people being saved. 
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Hutu majority’s aim to wipe out the Tutsi minority, and the killing was especially 
vicious. Many were killed with farming tools or primitive weapons. Women were speared 
from their vagina through their skulls; one elderly woman bled to death after having her 
legs hacked off; a baby was thrown into a latrine to suffocate. Their bodies were left to 
rot where they fell; the attackers threatened to kill anyone who dared to give the victims a 
decent burial.387 The commander of the UN troops in Rwanda, General Roméo Dallaire, 
did what he could to stop the killing with what he had, but to no avail.388 No additional 
troops were sent to Rwanda to intervene. Since then, many scholars have considered what 
would have happened if an intervention force had been deployed to stop the genocide. 
Alan Kuperman’s counterfactual analysis of the effectiveness of a U.S. intervention finds 
that a force of 5,000 troops deployed after the killing started could not have stopped the 
genocide altogether, but up to 100,000 lives could have been saved.389 However, a U.S. 
intervention was extremely unlikely due to the incident in Somalia only six months 
earlier where 18 Americans had been killed.390 Since there was no state principal willing 
to sponsor the action, and no public force available to carry out the intervention, the 
ethics of a privately funded, privately executed intervention in Rwanda will be 
considered in this section. First, the background of the conflict between the Hutus and 
Tutsis will be presented. Second, the counterfactual premises of private principal and 
private agent will be discussed; and finally, an analysis of the scenario will be presented 
within the framework of the theory of ethically justified private intervention. While the 
results follow Kuperman’s conclusions that the genocide probably could not have been 
averted as a result of the PMC’s deployment, it is likely that a private intervention would 
have been ethically justified under certain conditions, and could have saved tens of 
thousands of lives. 
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1. Background 
The Tutsis migrated to the region that is now Rwanda and Burundi in the 14th 
century and subjected the native Hutus to their rule. For over five centuries the two ethnic 
groups maintained a mutually acceptable symbiotic relationship, whereby the Tutsis 
provided government, and the Hutus provided labor.391 There was no apparent hatred 
between the two groups until the colonial period, when Rwanda became part of the 
German Empire in 1890. During that time, the differences between the two groups 
became more pronounced as their colonial rulers restricted key political and military 
positions to Tutsis, a decision that instantly marginalized the Hutu majority. After World 
War I, the German Empire was divided up and Belgium became the administrator of 
Rwanda. The Belgians continued to show favoritism to the Tutsis, who in turn enriched 
themselves at the expense of Hutus. Eventually, there was a commonly held belief among 
both European and Rwandan society that Tutsis were the superior race, based on 
historical “tales” of the migration and domination of northern tribes told to the Europeans 
by some crafty Tutsis.392 The Europeans believed it, and so did the Hutus. However, the 
fiction of Tutsi superiority did not last. 
As the colonial era waned in the 1950s, the Belgians began allowing more Hutus 
into schools, and appointed some more to positions in the political administration. 
Independence was imminent for Rwanda, and both ethnic groups made plans to seize 
power when the day came. Two political parties formed, the exclusively Hutu Parti du 
Mouvement de l’Emancipation des Bahutu (PARMEHUTU), and the Tutsi Union 
Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR). By 1959, the “Hutu Revolution” began when a Hutu sub-
chief was assaulted by a group of Tutsis. A mob of Hutus responded and violent attacks 
on both groups ensued; several hundred people were killed before the Belgians stepped 
in. The Belgians stopped the violence, and presumably in an effort to prevent further 
                                                 
391 There is a third ethnic group, the Twa, who are distinguishable from the Hutus and Tutsi, but only 
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392 Patrick O’Halloran, Humanitarian Intervention and the Genocide in Rwanda (London: Research 
Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995), 2–3; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 34–
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unrest, increased the number of Hutu appointments to local administrative positions. 
Unfortunately, that move only served to fuel the fire, and when the first Rwandan 
elections were held in 1961, PARMEHUTU took decisive control.393 One year later, 
Rwanda was independent. 
Tutsis were viciously oppressed in the years that followed, and an estimated 
20,000 were killed while more than 160,000 were internally displaced or fled to Burundi, 
Uganda, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).394 Bertrand Russell called the 
retaliations against Tutsis “the most horrible and systematic human massacre we have 
had occasion to witness since the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis.”395 The 
persecution of Tutsis peaked by 1964, however, and in 1973 PARMEHUTU was 
abolished by a Hutu military coup led by Major General Juvenal Habyarimana. Although 
the coup was a result of infighting among Hutus, Habyarimana promised to restore 
Rwandan national unity. To accomplish this, he re-established Rwanda as a single-party 
state under the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), 
making every Rwandan automatically a member of the party.396 Relations between Hutus 
and Tutsis became relatively normal after that, except that now it was the Tutsis who 
were excluded from public office or state employment, including the military.397   
By 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel army formed from the 
descendants of Tutsis who had fled Rwanda in the early 1960s, staged their first assault 
on Rwanda’s capital, Kigali, in an effort to seize power. They had been living in refugee 
camps in Uganda for an entire generation; most of them had been in the Ugandan army 
and had fought on behalf of the Ugandan President Yoweri Musevini. Negotiations with 
Habyarimana’s government for the repatriation of the Rwandan refugees had begun, but 
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the RPF decided to enter Rwanda by force to not only facilitate the return of the refugees, 
but also to depose Habyarimana and install a more democratic government.398 A 
combined Rwandan and DRC force with French and Belgian support repelled the attack; 
French forces blocked a second assault fifteen months later.399 
The threat from the RPF galvanized Hutu extremists in the Habyarimana 
government and frightened ordinary Rwandan citizens, who remembered the reprisal 
killings that had occurred in the past against both Tutsi and Hutu.400 Rwandan 
government spending shifted towards militarization, and funds previously earmarked for 
food and medicine imports were used to purchase arms. The Forces Armées Rwandaises 
(FAR) was boosted from 7,000 troops to 30,000; civilian militias (Interhamwe) were 
organized to fight the RPF.401 In spite of all the preparations, however, a peace treaty 
between Habyarimana and the RPF was signed in August 1993, mediated by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Arusha, Tanzania. The Arusha Accords 
included a plan for power-sharing in the government, the formation of a Council of 
Ministers in which Habyarimana’s MRND party would only have five of nineteen seats, 
and the integration of the RPF into the FAR. Radical Hutus opposed it from the start.402 
The Arusha Accords also called for a UN peacekeeping force to be deployed to 
Rwanda, and after some deliberation, the UNSC authorized the UN Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda (UNAMIR), commanded by Canadian General Roméo Dallaire.403 UNAMIR’s 
mandate included passive observation and reporting on the implementation of the Arusha 
Accords, but when Dallaire drafted his ROE for the mission, he anticipated UNAMIR’s 
responsibility to act in the event that crimes against humanity occur. Part of his “Force 
Commander’s Directive No. 2” reads: 
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There may also be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts 
committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require 
UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them. Examples are 
executions, attacks on displaced persons or refugees, ethnic riots, attacks 
on demobilized soldiers, etc. During such occasions UNAMIR military 
personnel will follow the [ROE] outlined in this directive, in support of 
UNCIVPOL and local authorities or in their absence, UNAMIR will take 
the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity.404 
Dallaire submitted this directive to UN Headquarters for approval but received no 
reply. Only two countries objected to the wording in the ROE, Belgium and Canada, so 
after some minor changes it was accepted, and was in effect for the remainder of 
UNAMIR’s mission.405 
The same month that the UNSC approved UNAMIR, the Hutu President of 
neighboring Burundi was murdered by Tutsi army officers in a coup attempt. Massacres 
of both Tutsis and Hutus followed all over Burundi, and tensions in Rwanda were pushed 
to a boiling point. Grievances about ground lost in the Arusha Accords were exacerbated 
and the Hutu Power movement was formed to unify all of the Hutu groups. Cooperation 
with the RPF was condemned, as were moderate Hutus who were perceived to oppose 
Hutu solidarity, and the seeds of genocide were sown.406 By March 1994, the leadership 
of Hutu Power, including Colonel Théoniste Bagosura, the Deputy Minister of Defense, 
had a plan in place to murder every Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda. Large numbers 
of machetes were imported to arm the Interhamwe (rifles were too expensive), and lists 
of names were prepared so that the condemned could be quickly identified to speed the 
killings.407  
On 6 April, President Habyarimana was killed along with the new President of 
Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, when the plane they were traveling in was shot down near 
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the Kigali airport. Habyarimana had been in Dar es Salaam, where it is believed he had 
finally agreed to the implementation of the broad-based transitional government specified 
in the Arusha Accords.408 Seizing the opportunity, Bagosora put his sinister plan in 
motion immediately. First, Hutu opposition officials in the government were rounded up 
and killed by the Presidential Guard, to create the vacuum needed for Bagosura to take 
control. Next, soldiers and Interhamwe were called upon to begin systematically 
slaughtering Tutsis in the capital, while soldiers dispersed throughout the country were 
called upon to do the same.409 By the next day, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a 
moderate Hutu, had been brutally violated and murdered by Rwandan soldiers along with 
the ten Belgian peacekeepers who were sent to protect her. The Radio Télévision Libre 
des Mille Collines (RTLM) began broadcasting encouragement to the killers, including 
the names of Tutsis who were marked for death. By 11 April, more than 20,000 
Rwandans had been killed, and the slaughter was just getting started.410 By 21 April, and 
estimated 250,000 had been killed.411  
As the genocide unfolded, Dallaire frantically requested more troops and assets, 
but his requests fell on deaf ears. The shock of moral conscience evoked by the genocide 
must have penetrated the minds of many world leaders as the days and weeks passed—
but no one ever came to help.  
2. Rwanda: A Theory of Ethically Justified Private Intervention 
On 12 April 1994, the chairman of the PMC Executive Outcomes (EO), Eeben 
Barlow, received a phone call from a UN representative asking if a private force could be 
mustered in time to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Within 24 hours, Barlow and his 
associates conducted a cost estimate of intervention in the Rwandan crisis, including the 
proposed task organization and concept of operation. The company believed that it would 
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be able to put armed troops in the country within 14 days, and have follow-on forces in 
country, including aircraft and artillery support elements, within six weeks—up to 1500 
deployed personnel. Its plan was to establish “security islands,” that would provide safe 
areas for refugees and staging bases for humanitarian relief.412 The plan would be carried 
out in four phases: 
Phase 1: Operational planning and preparation (two weeks) 
Phase 2: Mobilization and deployment (six weeks) 
Phase 3: Execution of the mission to stabilize the country (six months) 
Phase 4: Demobilization and handover to a UN-approved force 
EO estimated that the six-month plan would cost $100 million—it was rejected 24 
hours later because of the cost.413 However, if the UN could not afford to pay for EO’s 
services, what if someone else could? In the sections that follow, an analysis of the 
morality of EO’s proposed mission in Rwanda will be considered using two 
counterfactual premises. The first premise is that EO was hired to do the job. The second 
premise is that EO was hired by a private individual who had access to the particulars of 
the tragedy as they were reported, and the resources to do something about it. With both a 
private principal and a private agent, the dynamic of humanitarian intervention changes, 
as will be discussed. In the end, it becomes apparent that under extraordinary 
circumstances, a private individual funding a private intervention force would be 
permissible. 
a. Right Authority 
Does the intervener possess local external effectiveness: an ability to 
end the crisis? 
In purely moral terms, and for the purposes of this discussion, the 
intervener’s effectiveness in stopping the genocide will have to be the sole determinant 
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of right authority.414 In the case of Rwanda in 1994, where the staggering speed of the 
killing is of prime importance, the benefit of hindsight allows a more thorough and 
accurate estimate of an intervention force’s potential effectiveness. Since EO was based 
out of South Africa, its forces would have been able to deploy much faster than public 
forces based in the U.S. or Europe. A flight time of about 3.5 hours from Pretoria to 
Kigali would have allowed for a quick turnaround for cargo planes. Since Barlow was 
notified on 12 April, and assuming the principal heard EO’s plan within 24 hours and 
agreed to payment within another 24 hours, it is safe to assume that EO staff could have 
begun Phase 1 no later than 14 April. Therefore, by their own estimations, EO could 
have had a vanguard in Rwanda no later than 28 April and its main body in country by 
the end of May.  
By the end of April, however, all of the large massacres of Tutsi had 
already been carried out. The RPF began making announcements through their political 
officers and on the RPF radio station that “the genocide is almost completed.”415 
Kuperman suggests that by the end of April, an estimated 300,000 Tutsis out of a total 
population of 650,000 remained alive. Since 150,000 Tutsis survived the slaughter, there 
were about 150,000 left to be saved. If the genocide lasted one hundred days, or through 
mid-July, perhaps 75,000 of the doomed Tutsis would have been left by the end of May, 
all in unknown locations.416  
If the EO force package included only two Mi-17 transport helicopters and 
two Mi-24 gunships, as it did in Sierra Leone a year later, it would have been extremely 
time-consuming to cover Rwanda’s 10,000 square miles of territory and 600 miles of paved 
roads. Kuperman estimates that using ten helicopters and a search radius of one mile, the 
entire country could have been searched in seven hours, and using five helicopters kept 
aloft continuously–which would require a fleet of twenty helicopters–the roadways could 
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be patrolled hourly.417  In short, to effectively cover the entire territory of Rwanda, EO 
would most likely need twenty helicopters, first to be used for reconnaissance, and second 
for mobility and observation. Gunships could be used initially to disperse roadblocks, and 
to provide close air support in the event of any engagement with the Interhamwe or FAR 
still in the process of carrying out mass killings.  
This is not to say that EO should have refrained from deploying with what 
it had, however. Alison Des Forges believes that the violence was highly centralized, and 
if a foreign force were to seize and hold Kigali, then the government would have been 
seen as illegitimate in the eyes of the people. She claims that stopping the killing in 
Kigali would have stopped the killing in the countryside.418 However, if the genocide 
was almost complete by the end of April, most, if not all, Tutsi in the capital would have 
been gone. Alternatively, if EO could have located the largest remaining pocket of Tutsis, 
established a safe haven, and used its air assets to relocate smaller groups of Tutsis or 
establish a series of safe havens guarded by heavily armed, African EO troops, then 
thousands of live could have been saved. Kuperman estimates that 150 troops could 
secure 10,000 refugees.419 Assuming that is feasible, an EO force of 1500 men would 
have been sufficient to secure the estimated 75,000 Tutsi that remained. Furthermore, the 
principal must have access to sufficient resources to enable the extension of the mission if 
necessary. It would not have to be open-ended, but there must be a plan to stay longer 
than anticipated. 
Therefore, if the agent possesses the will and the ability to deploy to a 
conflict zone and the end result is any number of lives saved, and the principal has 
sufficient financial resources, then together they satisfy the criterion of effectiveness by 
ending the crisis for some people, and they possess right authority. The limited scope of 
the mission should not be relevant to its overall effectiveness, especially if it serves as a 
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model for other organizations to act as well. In the end, the people whose lives are being 
saved will not question the identity of who is saving them or who is paying for it. 
b. Just Cause 
Is there proof of crimes against humanity? Is the intervention a 
response to physical violence? 
By 12 April, given the scope of the killings, it can be safely assumed that 
the principal would have been able to make a case for crimes against humanity. The fact 
that Barlow received a call on that day indicates that all possible avenues of intervention 
were being explored. In fact, as early as 9 April, the New York Times ran an article that 
reported mass killings as a result of the assassination of President Habyarimana.420 By 22 
April, the Los Angeles Times reported the deaths of 100,000 people in Rwanda, the same 
day the New York Times reported that the UNSC planned to cut the UN peacekeeping 
force there.421 Indeed, there would have been ample proof of the genocide in the media or 
through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but if an individual had 
designs on funding an intervention himself, first-hand knowledge of the crisis would be 
necessary, especially considering how fast events unfolded. Therefore, the best case 
scenario is that the principal would be located in Rwanda with the ability to personally 
witness the carnage. If that is not possible, however, an agent of the principal with proof 
of the genocide would be sufficient. 
A private intervener should also be required to prove that no international 
or state-sponsored intervention is imminent. To accomplish this, the principal would have 
to be intimately acquainted with any UN mission already on the ground. In this case, it 
would have been apparent by 21 April, when the UNSC approved Resolution 912 which 
reduced UNAMIR‘s strength from 2,548 to 270.422  Ideally, a private intervention would 
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figure of 250,000 by Kuperman is probably more accurate); ―News Summary,‖ New York Times, 22 April 
1994.  
422 ―UNAMIR,‖ UN.org, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm. 
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sync with any UN mission on the ground to provide assets and capabilities that the UN 
mission lacked. In the Rwanda case, Dallaire became so desperate for support that he 
would have welcomed any assistance.423 
c. Right Intention 
Is there a humanitarian-based end state? 
EO’s plan would be to establish safe havens expressly for the protection of 
civilians; the principal’s plan, however, would be subject to more scrutiny. The 
humanitarian intent of the mission being granted, in the event of a privately funded 
intervention, every stakeholder would ask: why would this person spend so many 
millions of his own money to save these people? His motivations for doing so, unlike the 
motivations of the PMC, would be rightly questioned. As previously discussed, the 
financial motivations of PMC personnel are morally acceptable. However, in the 
principal’s case, motivation must be synonymous with intent. This serves to prevent post-
intervention exploitation of the affected population in terms of national wealth, including 
natural resources. The principal must have no designs on profiting from the intervention; 
his motivations must be purely altruistic. 
If those conditions are granted, therefore, a private intervention can satisfy 
the principle of right intention. 
d. Discrimination 
Does the agent discriminate between permissible and impermissible 
targets? Are there attempts to mitigate collateral damage? 
Because most of the perpetrators of the violence were civilians, as were 
the victims, legitimate targets would necessarily have to be caught in the act, or identified 
as having hostile intent. Furthermore, even though the FAR directly participated in the 
genocide, they could not be considered legitimate targets except when hostile intent is 
                                                 
423 Dallaire allegedly “descended into suicidal depression” after the genocide due to his inability to 
stop it (Anonymous, “UN Exploits Rwanda Genocide,” New American, 19 April 2004: 8). 
 125 
observed. In this case, it could be argued that they are the armed forces of a sovereign 
nation and that it is not permissible to attack them, but as argued in Chapter II, a state that 
sponsors crimes against humanity has failed its responsibility to protect its citizens, 
which voids its sovereignty. Therefore, only if they are engaging in crimes against 
humanity, forces of both the Interhamwe and FAR would justly be subject to attack.  
e. Proportionality 
Are there formal Rules of Engagement (ROE)? Are employees trained 
in the use of aimed, proportionate fire, and appropriate weapons systems for threat 
response? 
This criterion should not be assumed to be true. As previously mentioned, 
PMCs do not do anything they are not paid to do; in this case, the principal would play a 
key role in the implementation of this criterion. An approved ROE would have to be 
presented to the principal as part of the battle plan, and aspects of the contract that 
penalize violations of the ROE would have to be included, following the doctrine of 
positivist agency theory discussed in Chapter V. 
f. Internal Jus In Bello 
Is there appropriate protection for the PMCs own employees? 
As in the previous case, employees would have to be provided with 
adequate protection for both themselves and their families. The Rwandan mission could 
be devastatingly dangerous, and as previously discussed, if an employer asks an 
employee to accept risks, the employer must be prepared to deal with the consequences 
of those risks. 
However, if it is granted that EO and the RPF had mutually supporting 
missions, then EO would have to be vigilant against the use of child soldiers. The RPF 
was known to use adolescents in combat roles,424 and adherence to this criterion 
                                                 
424 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 2–3. 
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precludes the participation of children. If these conditions could be met, then this 
criterion would be satisfied. 
g. Just Transfer of Authority 
After hostilities cease, is there a planned transfer of authority to either 
another agent of the principal or to a public authority, such as the UN? 
Recall that this was Phase 4 of EO’s proposed plan. It also highlights the 
burden that the principal bears; he must be prepared to extend the mission, with another 
agent if need be. An undertaking such as this would require the solemn acceptance of 
responsibility for the situation on the part of the principal; if the mission is not carried out 
to the point that a responsible entity can take over, it would not necessarily be the fault of 
the agent. The principal would not be absolved of his responsibility; he would have the 
duty to find another agent. Likewise, if the agent is unable to continue due to personnel 
shortages or overextension, he maintains a responsibility to notify the principal. In short, 
once begun, there must be a commitment to mission completion, whatever the cost. 
3. Assessment 
Military intervention in Rwanda during the genocide would have saved tens and 
possibly hundreds of thousands of lives.425 If EO’s proposal seemed expensive to the 
UNSC, it should be considered that the UN operation that eventually deployed there 
conducted a humanitarian relief mission at a cost of $3 million per day, which is about 
five times the estimated cost of EO’s plan.426 Although the EO force could not have 
prevented the genocide, in spite of its close proximity in South Africa, this conclusion is 
no different than that of a public force. Furthermore, analysis of a private intervention 
funded by a private individual revealed some additional considerations that are not much 
different than the requirements of a state or international organization, including the will 
to see the mission through, proof that no other intervention is imminent, and the need for 
                                                 
425 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 185. 
426 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 186. 
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an altruistic motive on the part of the principal. Conditions that were found to be required 
for an ethically justified private intervention in Rwanda are summarized in Table 6: 
Criterion Counterfactual solution 
Right Authority 
Sufficient assets available to achieve any degree of 
success; principal must have the resources to 
extend the mission 
Just Cause 
Proof of genocide obtained by the principal; proof 
that no other intervention is imminent 
Right Intention 
Establishment of safe havens; also right motivation 
on the part of the principal 
Discrimination 
Restricted to groups that demonstrate hostile intent 
towards civilians 
Proportionality ROE approved and enforced by the principal 
Internal jus in bello 
Life insurance, family care; restrictions on the use 
of child soldiers 
Just Transfer of 
Authority 
A commitment to just termination of hostilities; 
principal prepared to extend the mission; early 
coordination with UN or other entity for transfer of 
authority 
Table 6.   Summary of findings, Rwanda genocide thought experiment 
The notion of a private individual as the principal in a humanitarian intervention 
should not be considered lightly. Even if all of these conditions are met and there is a just 
cause, no one else is willing to intervene, and the principal both has and is willing to use 
the resources necessary to save people’s lives, a billionaire who hires a private army and 
invades a country, regardless of the antecedent conditions, would most likely be met with 
international condemnation. To be morally right is perhaps a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for the private intervention described here. In the Rwanda case, the actual 
history of intervention in 1994 is a history of regret, shame, and apology. However, if a 
private intervention had occurred and a wealthy individual funded a large private military 
force that saved thousands of lives, history might treat the incident differently; instead of 
shame, the story would be one of people who rose up against a great evil and fought 
against it, in spite of the personal cost. 
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D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
A consolidated summary of the findings from all three cases is presented in Table 
7. Consideration of each criterion individually, with findings from all three case studies 
beside it, is valuable in that it reveals conditions that may not have been previously 
apparent. For right authority to be true, it is now understood that the agent not only must 
possess a sufficient degree of effectiveness, the principal must also be in possession of 
sufficient resources to extend the mission if necessary. Under the just cause criterion, it 
becomes apparent that proof of crimes against humanity is not sufficient in an 
intervention conducted by a hired force; a just cause for a principal with the aim of 
funding an intervention outside of a state apparatus requires evidence that no other 
intervention is imminent as well. Furthermore, to satisfy right intention, a non-state actor 
operating as principal must possess an altruistic motive as well. To satisfy the principle of 
discrimination, there must be mechanisms in place for the proper treatment of prisoners, 
in addition to tactics that reduce civilian casualties, including the acceptance of increased 
risk. Under the principle of proportionality, while an established an accepted ROE is 
critical for any armed force operating in hostile territory, in the analysis of these cases it 
becomes apparent that the principal must be involved in the rewards and punishments 
that result from the adherence, or non-adherence, to the ROE. The principle of internal 
jus in bello for PMCs also becomes important not only for the protection of the PMC’s 
troops, but also for the protection of the troops’ families, if an employee of the PMC is 
harmed or killed while carrying out his duties. Finally, the principle of just transfer of 
authority is demonstrated to be a valuable criterion in the just post bello treatment of the 
authority an armed force takes on when it seizes territory; it would not be able to hold 
that territory indefinitely. A predetermined plan to transfer that authority is necessary for 
a just termination of hostilities and the eventual return to normalcy for the affected 
population. These findings do not result in any new criteria for the theory, but they do 
help refine the conditions under which each criterion may be satisfied. Overall, the 
findings show that the theory of ethically justified private intervention can be an effective 




EO in Sierra Leone 
Sandline in PNG 
Hypothetical EO in Rwanda 
Right Authority 
True for the case; EO achieved victory over the RUF and 
temporary stability for Sierra Leone  
Sandline’s maneuver, firepower intelligence, and control 
capabilities; PSYOP to aid the support of the population 
Sufficient assets available to achieve any degree of 
success; principal must have the resources to extend the 
mission 
Just Cause 
RUF atrocities against civilian population; observed by 
EO troops 
Crimes against humanity possibly taking place at “care 
centers” 
Proof of genocide obtained by the principal; proof that 
no other intervention is imminent 
Right Intention 
A stability level sufficient to hold elections 
Liberation of “care centers” 
Establishment of safe havens; also right motivation on 
the part of the principal 
Discrimination 
Systems for protection and care of prisoners; training and 
example-setting in law of war for partner forces 
Electronic surveillance to locate targets; ground-based 
operation for positive identification 
Restricted to groups that demonstrate hostile intent 
towards civilians 
Proportionality 
Established ROE; no evidence of unjust proportions 
Ground operations; restrictions on use of helicopter 
gunships 
ROE approved and enforced by the principal 
Internal jus in bello 
Satisfactory protection; sufficient casualty care 
Life insurance; family care 
Life insurance, family care; restrictions on the use of 
child soldiers 
Just Transfer of Authority 
Executed plan for just termination of hostilities; 
coordination with UN or other entity for transfer of 
authority 
Executed plan for just termination of hostilities; 
coordination with UN or other entity for transfer of 
authority 
A commitment to just termination of hostilities; principal 
prepared to extend the mission; early coordination with 
UN or other entity for transfer of authority 
Table 7.   Consolidated summary of findings 
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To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of the international 
order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one 
might ask – not in the context of Kosovo – but in the context of Rwanda: 
If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of 
States had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did 
not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have 
stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?427 
The arguments presented here flow into the theory of ethically justified private 
intervention and help formulate the principles of which it is made; the first argument is 
that humanitarian intervention is obligatory, the second argument is that states have an 
obligation to protect its citizens, the third argument presents PMCs as a morally viable 
option. Using Just War Theory and Pattison’s Moderate Instrumentalist Approach to 
humanitarian intervention, theory of ethically justified private intervention is meant to be 
uniquely suited as a guideline to relieve the moral tension that is at the root of the 
international community’s failure to act in in the face of crimes against humanity. 
The methods used to test the theory here are admittedly artificial; while some real 
data is used in the case studies, the counterfactuals are better described as thought 
experiments. The intended result is satisfactory, however. By considering the criteria of the 
theory, even in a spurious scenario, the aim of refining the conditions under which a 
privately funded, privately executed humanitarian intervention would be morally 
permissible has been achieved. The results derived from the study are presented in Table 8. 
  
                                                 
427 Kofi Annan, quoted in Richard Caplan, “Humanitarian Intervention: Which Way Forward?” in 
Just Intervention, ed. Anthony F. Lang, Jr. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 132. 
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Table 8.   The refined theory of ethically justified private intervention428 
The utility of PMCs in the struggle to bring stability to the world should be studied 
further. The theory presented in this thesis is meant as a moral guideline; it does not provide a 
legal basis for private intervention. Furthermore, it does not provide a mechanism for 
accountability for the principal, who could be subject to myriad legal issues, in addition to the 
ethical temptations that arise in the absence of accountability. As such, accountability for the 
principal in the scenario of private intervention becomes a potential source of criticism. 
While there are laws and enforcement mechanisms in place, such as the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), they are notoriously ineffective and thus lack the standing required to 
potentially prosecute an individual or other entity with the means to employ a private army. 
Fortunately, the reality is that it would be highly unlikely for a scenario such as the one 
described here to actually happen, however plausible. 
                                                 
428 Emphasis on the added conditions based on the results of the case studies. 
Criterion Test 
Right Authority 
Does the intervener possess local external effectiveness: an 
ability to end the crisis? Does the principal have the resources to 
extend the mission? 
Just Cause 
Is there proof of crimes against humanity? Is the intervention a 
response to physical violence? Is no other intervention imminent? 
Right Intention 
Is there a humanitarian-based end state? Are the motives of the 
principal humanitarian-based? 
Discrimination 
Does the agent discriminate between permissible and 
impermissible targets? Are there attempts to mitigate the effects 
of collateral damage? Are there provisions for the proper 
treatment of prisoners? 
Proportionality 
Are there formal Rules of Engagement (ROE)? Are employees 
trained in the use of aimed, proportionate fire, and appropriate 
weapons systems for threat response? Is there a system of 
rewards and punishment enforced by the principal? 
Internal jus in 
bello 
Is there appropriate protection for the PMCs own employees? 
Have the employees’ families been provided with adequate 
insurance?  
Just Transfer of 
Authority 
After hostilities cease, is there a planned transfer of authority to 
either another agent of the principal or to a public authority, such 
as the UN? 
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